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Summary 
The thesis is an attempt to develop a speculative (Hegelian) critique of the 
ethical and political questions raised by Jean-Francois Lyotard's book The 
Differend. I have argued that these questions are dependent upon the reading 
of Kant's three Critiques, and his political essays, which Lyotard develops in 
The Differend's four `notices' on Kant, and that it is this reading which opens 
up his concept of difference (`heterogeneity') to the possibility of a speculative 
critique. Chapter one comprises an examination of Lyotard's attempt to 
establish speculative thinking's dependence upon a metaphysical idea of the 
self as the possibility of ethical sublation. I have argued that Lyotard's 
appropriation of Adorno's idea of "Auschwitz" as blocking dialectical sublation, 
fails to recognize the speculative significance of the concrete conditions which 
produced the historical emergence of Nazism. The following three chapters are 
concerned to develop the argument that Lyotard's misrepresentation of the 
spirituality of Hegel's philosophy, conditions his reading of the critical 
philosophy as disclosing the possibility of a spontaneous (ethical) judgement of 
difference. Chapter two argues that Lyotard's claim to show critical subjectivity 
to be a `litigation' of self-conscious faculties, fails to recognize the actual lack of 
unity which characterizes Kant's `transcendental unity of apperception'. The 
exclusion of `otherness', which Lyotard claims is disclosed and suppressed in 
Kant's notion of cognitive experience, actually necessitates concrete self- 
recognition. In chapter three, Lyotard's attempt to abstract an ethical 
`obligation without conditions' from Kant's critical morality is interrogated. I 
have argued that the aporias constituted through the spontaneity of practical 
reason, are reinforced through Lyotard's concept of `ethical time'. The final 
chapter develops a speculative approach to the notions of ethics and politics 
which Lyotard abstracts from the Third Critique. I have argued that the notion 
of an `unpredetermined' judgement which Lyotard articulates in the final 
sections of The Differend, constitutes a subjective `culture' which is ultimately 
non-ethical and apolitical. 
IV 
Abbreviations 
In the text I have used the full titles of the works which I have cited, with the 
exception of Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind, which I have referred to simply as 
the Phenomenology. 
Introduction 1 
Introduction 
In his Lyotard: Writing the Event, Geoffrey Bennington remarks of Lyotard's 
publishing career that it is `at first sight, more remarkable for its shifts and 
breaks than for any continuity'1. This initial impression, I would agree, is 
somewhat misleading; although, as I have argued, The Differend does mark a 
break from Lyotard's earlier writings for a number of important reasons. The 
continuities which Bennington in particular draws out between the `primary 
process'2 of the libido, and The Differend's transcriptions of heterogeneity and 
difference from Kant's critical philosophy, are significant because they disclose 
a transition from the energetical reductivism of Libidinal Economy, to a form of 
engagement with conceptual thinking. This transition is crucial. It constitutes 
a recognition of the necessity of critique, or a `critical activity'3 of thought, to 
the development of an ethical position. Thus, it is only through the terms 
established in The Differend that Lyotard's writing has a genuinely ethical and 
political significance: the texts which immediately precede its publication, The 
Postmodern Condition and Au Juste (translated as Just Gaming), prefigure the 
idea of the differend, while those which have followed have been specific 
articulations of it. 4 The Differend therefore, is not unrelated to Lyotard's 
earliest attempts to establish the uniqueness of the particular; yet it is only 
through the terms of its critique, that his writing is opened up to the possibility 
of a speculative exposition. 
The transcription of Kant's critical philosophy which is set out in The 
Differend, I have argued, is an attempt to expound a critical activity of thought 
which is sensitive to the particularity of difference, that is, to the 
'incommensurability'5 of heterogeneous phrase regimes and genres of discourse. 
Lyotard's reading of the critical philosophy, attempts to show that the forms 
and categories of cognition, or representation, through which Kant expounds 
transcendental subjectivity, depend upon metaphysical ideas of reason to 
guarantee the unity of experience. His claim is that the practical and 
theoretical cognitions of the critical subject, are originally sensitive to the 
Introduction 2 
heterogeneity which they organize; and that Kant, in negotiating this 
exteriority, discloses thinking's immediate receptiveness to the 
`unpresentable'. 6 It is the account of reflective judgement given in the Third 
Critique, which, on Lyotard's reading, establishes this receptiveness as both 
the condition and negation of legitimacy. The absence of determinate concepts 
in the reception of aesthetic and teleological finalities, is abstracted from the 
development of the Third Critique, and presented in The Differend as a 
spontaneous activity independent of the rules of generic discourses. Thus, the 
notion of judgement which is expounded in the Third Critique, is conceived by 
Lyotard as the point at which Kant's `metaphysical' representation of the 
experience and autonomy of the subject, is displaced by a critical activity which 
pervades his account of transcendental faculties. For Lyotard, Kant's reflective 
judgement7 is not a faculty, but the condition of discrete transcendental 
functions: it is the condition which Lyotard presents as opening up the 
possibility of non-metaphysical philosophy, politics and ethics. 
The Differend attempts to develop a critique of `foundationist'8 philosophies, 
which expound the ethical and the political as moments determined through 
conceptual necessity. A genuinely critical philosophy, according to Lyotard, `has 
as its rule to discover its rule: its a priori is what it has at stake ... ': 9 nothing, 
in other words, ought to be presupposed by the philosopher in his or her 
reception of incommensurability which springs from discrete genres of 
discourse. Philosophies which attempt to deduce authority and obligation from 
conceptual necessity, suppress (a priori) the spontaneous judgement of 
difference which lies at the core of The Differends ethical and political 
problematics. For Lyotard, it is to the unpredetermined judgement differends, 
`the unstable state and instant of language wherein something which must be 
able to be put into phrases cannot yet be', lo that thinking is responsible: each 
genre excludes an `otherness' from its `rules' of formation, and it is this 
otherness which must be constantly re-phrased. The ethical and the political 
are presented in The Differend as moments of spontaneous origination, in 
which thinking `links onto', or judges, the event of the current phrase, without 
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recourse to the categories of conceptual legitimation. In its ethical and political 
orientations therefore, the critical activity of thought ought to `delegitimize'll 
the legal and institutional forms through which authority is established as 
right; it ought to judge the difference (differends) which is co-presented by 
heterogeneous discourses. 
The basic argument of my thesis will show that Lyotard's conceptions of 
ethics and politics are founded upon misreadings of Kant's three Critiques (and 
his political essays); and that his concept of thinking's `critical activity', 
reproduces the aporias and contradictions which characterize subjective 
idealism. 
According to Lyotard's reading, Kant's critical philosophy discloses a tension 
between the `unrepresentable' element which exists as other to the subject, and 
the activity of that subject in constituting the unity of itself and its 
representations. In his account of the Critique of Pure Reason, Lyotard 
attempts to show that this tension is disclosed in the relationship of the modes 
of intuition, space and time, to the matter of sensible affection. The temporal 
syntheses on which Kant's idea of phenomenal experience is dependent, is 
presented as presupposing a heterogeneity which the `Transcendental 
Aesthetic' has not subsumed under the rules of cognition. In the Second 
Critique, the persistence of this unrepresentability is negotiated through the 
idea of the `type', by which duty is enabled to present itself within a realm of 
congruent human ends. Lyotard's transcription of the Third Critique, with its 
concentration on the tension between the faculties of reason and imagination 
expounded in the `Analytic of The Sublime', presents the notion of reflective 
judgement as an immediate sensitivity of thought to the otherness negotiated 
by Kant in the First and Second Critiques. The moments of conjunction on 
which Lyotard focuses in his transcriptions of practical and theoretical reason, 
are produced through a `metaphysical' presupposition of `reality'12 as prior to 
the immediate reception of difference. What are understood in The Differend as 
the metaphysical elements of Kant's critical philosophy therefore, are 
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presented as originally sensitive to the heterogeneity which they attempt to 
homogenize. It is this sensitivity which Lyotard presents as distinguishing the 
Kantian project from the totalizing metaphysics of Hegel's speculative 
philosophy. 
Lyotard's reading of the critical philosophy presents an account of the 
exteriority of judgement to the otherness which is present in Kant's exposition 
of both practical and theoretical legislation. The lack of unity in the experience 
of the critical subject, in other words, is articulated in The Differend's `notices' 
on Kant as culminating in a judgement (of the sublime) which is infinitely 
sensitive to the wrong and victimization (of the other) constituted through 
genres of discourse. It is this infinite (spontaneous) sensitivity which, I will 
argue, excludes the possibility of recognizing the ethical significance of 
difference; and which is the presupposition of the critique of speculative 
thought which Lyotard develops in the `Result' section of The Differend. The 
first chapter therefore, shows that Lyotard's attempt to expound speculative 
philosophy as a set of abstract rules of `formation and linkage'13, fails to 
recognize the critique of positing which is developed in Hegel's philosophy. The 
substance of my argument is that speculative phenomenology's account of the 
development of self-consciousness, grounds the necessity of mediation between 
subject and object in the historical contradictions of abstract understanding. 
Lyotard's conception of the self (Selbst) as a Resultat presupposed at the 
`beginning' of the Phenomenology, misrepresents the historicity of this 
exposition: absolute self-recognition is consciousness' re-cognition of the finite 
historical `elements' which continue to form and contradict its freedom. Thus, 
the evil of `Auschwitz', which Lyotard presents as `blocking' speculative 
discourse, must, I have argued, be conceived as a deeply contradictory 
`culture'14 of subjectivity, which destroys its own particular ethical life. 
It is the failure of Lyotard's attempt to consign Hegel's speculative 
philosophy to the realm of metaphysics, that underpins my exposition of his 
reading of Kant's critical philosophy. the second chapter of my thesis is 
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concerned to show that Lyotard's attempt to abstract an immediate 
presentation (of otherness) from Kant's `Transcendental Aesthetic', and to 
expound the activity of the subject's a priori faculties as `forgetting' 
(suppressing) that otherness in their `litigations'15, posits an identity of self- 
consciousness with each of the subject's constitutive activities. The substance of 
my argument is that Lyotard's `juridical' reading of the Kantian subject, 
abstracts the lack of unity determined by a priori faculties, from the historical 
conditions which produce and sustain their formal separation and difference. 
The critical subject's relation to contingency and difference, I have argued is 
not that of an a priori suppression: its synthetic activity is part of a speculative 
development in which the other is ethically mediated in each particular will. 
The third section is concerned with Lyotard's idea of the possibility of 
obligation, and its relation to his reading of Kant's Second Critique. In the 
second of The Differends `notices' on Kant, Lyotard argues that the idea of duty 
suppresses the original freedom which Kant assumes as the formal condition of 
rational autonomy. `Obligation without conditions', according to this account, 
cannot be conceived simply as the exclusion of heteronomous causality; the 
freedom of linkage onto the current phrase can only be sustained through the 
complete absence of representational conditions, including the idea of a 
`congruent' realm of human ends. Thus the fundamental question arising from 
The Differend's presentation of critical morality, concerns how the power of 
spontaneous causality, which Kant attributes to the purely formal 
independence of the will, contributes to the development of consciousness 
towards self-recognition. The argument set out in chapter three shows that the 
forms of agency and passivity through which the moral will is expounded in the 
Phenomenology, constitute aporetic relations of concept and object, subjectivity 
and actuality, which can only be explicated speculatively. By extending the 
critiques of abstract self-legislation developed in the Phenomenology and 
Philosophy of Rightis to The Differencf s idea of obligation, I have argued that 
Lyotard's idea of spontaneous reception of differend is afflicted (a fortiori) by 
the same aporias as Kant's moral will. The formal possibility of freedom which 
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Lyotard abstracts from Kant's exposition of moral necessity, conditions an idea 
of a `presuppositionless' judgement which is incapable of giving ethical 
significance to the other. 
The final chapter is concerned with Lyotard's attempt to abstract the idea of 
a spontaneous ('presuppositionless') judgement of difference (differends) from 
Kant's Third Critique. I have divided this final part of my argument into two 
distinct but related sections: `Reflective Finality and the Logic of Subjective 
Judgement', which is concerned speculatively to expound the (objective) 
necessity immanent in Kant's `reflective judgement'; and `The Politics of The 
Sublime and the History of the Ethical', which develops a critique of the 
relationship of judgement and conceptual representation set out in The 
Differend. By abstracting the non-cognitive, undeterminable moment of 
aesthetic finality from the body of Kant's Third Critique, and attempting to 
establish its reception as the disclosure of a genuinely `critical' judgement, 
Lyotard forecloses on the possibility of an ethical politics. The expositions of 
judgement set out in the Science of Logic and the Encyclopaedia of the 
Philosophical Sciences, and the place which this occupies in the development of 
the notion as such, I have argued, constitutes a profound critique of Kant's 
subjectivization of finality, and a fortiori, Lyotard's notions of politics and 
community. 
The spontaneity of thought which The Differend presents as resistance to 
representation and community depends, I have argued, upon his transcription 
of the antinomy of conception and representation set out in the `Analytic of The 
Sublime'. For it is here, according to The Differend's final `notice', that the 
impossibility of `passages' between different genres and phrase regimes is 
formulated within the terms of transcendental idealism. For Lyotard, the 
experience of incommensurability which Kant expounds as the (a priori) ground 
of sublime affection is the experience of the `unrepresentable' as such: the 
antinomy of reason and imagination discloses thinking's political responsibility 
to the (ontological) experience of heterogeneity. I have argued that this 
Introduction 7 
subjectivizing account of Kant's aesthetic finality, fails to acknowledge the 
speculative necessity constituted in the idea of negative pleasure; and that the 
historico-political problematic which Lyotard abstracts from the `Analytic of 
The Sublime', constitutes an aporetic opposition of the subject to the formative 
actuality (Sittlichkeit) in and through which it exists. The differentiation which 
Lyotard posits as absolutely heterogeneous and incommensurable, can only be 
truly expounded by self-consciousness' misrecognition of its (universal) work, 
desire and otherness. 
The theme I have attempted to sustain throughout therefore, is Lyotard's 
misrepresentation of Kant's critical philosophy, and the consequences of this 
misreading for his ideas of politics, ethics and philosophy. My argument is that 
Lyotard's transcriptions of the three Critiques, and of the political essays, 
fundamentally misrepresent the lack of unity determined by the 
transcendental subject, and actually reinforce the ethical and political aporias 
constituted in the critical philosophy. The power of Hegel's speculative 
exposition of Kant, in other words, is that it does not abstractly privilege or 
exclude any one of his writings; and it is the necessity of this immanent 
critique which I have attempted to re-present through a critique of The 
Differends ethical and political problematics. 
Introduction: Notes $ 
Introduction 
Notes 
1. Bennington, Lyotard: Writing the Event, 1. 
2. See Libidinal Economy, `The Great Ephemeral Skin'. 
3. The Differend, 135. 
4. See especially, Heidegger and "the jews". 
5. The Differend, 167. 
6. See Heidegger and "the jews , section 12. 
7. See Kant's Critique of Judgement. 
8. Heidegger and "the jews", 26. 
9. The Differend, ¶98. 
10. Ibid., 122. 
11. Ibid., 1208. 
12. Ibid., ¶126. 
13. Ibid., 91-97. 
14. See the Phenomenology's account of the `terror' of the French Revolution, 
599-610. 
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15. The Differend, 64. 
16. `The Moral View of the World', Phenomenology, 615-627; and `Morality', 
Philosophy of Right, 75-104. 
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Chapter I 
The Ethical Significance of The Differend 
As I have explained in the general introduction to my thesis, the method of 
exposition I will employ in criticizing Jean-Francois Lyotard's book The 
Differendl, is to question his abstraction of `heterogeneity' and 
`incommensurability' from Kant's critical philosophy. My aim in this first 
chapter of the thesis however, is slightly different from, although essentially 
related to, this project. I will show that Lyotard's idea of the `differend' is 
expounded in terms which make it fundamentally an ethical notion; and as 
such, it is a subjective form which must be conceived as a misrecognition of 
spirit's temporal life and activity. Counterposed to Lyotard's attempt to 
transcribe Adorno's conception of `Auschwitz'2 into his philosophy of phrasing, I 
will show that the Phenomenologys exposition of the French Revolution 
provides an account of ethical dissolution and spiritual deformation, through 
which it is necessary to think the Nazi holocaust. By showing that `Auschwitz' 
. cannot attest to 
the radical heterogeneity of discourses and the absolute 
dispersal of substantive subjectivity (the Selbst), I will establish the conditions 
upon which a speculative critique of Lyotard's reading of Kant can be made. It 
is on the basis of this rebuttal of The Differencf s critique of Hegel, that I will 
expound the ethical significance of the ideas of `presentation', `obligation', 
`politics' and `judgement' which Lyotard develops from his reading of Kant's 
critical philosophy. 
The Differend is an attempt to establish the immediacy of `the phrase' as the 
basis of ethical necessity. Lyotard's claim is that thinking's relation to every 
established form of knowing, what he terms `genres of discourse', is one of 
ontological heterogeneity: each `linkage' onto the `current phrase' is responsible 
to the `nothingness' which opens up through the phrase's immediate 
configuration of the link. Lyotard's idea of the differend therefore, is from the 
beginning expounded as an ethical notion: the entire development of his 
treatise is concerned to disclose the principle of domination inherent in any 
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attempt to homogenize the `otherness' of experience and the originating 
spontaneity of the phrase. 
In his preface to The Differend, Lyotard specifies the central idea of his work 
a case of conflict, between (at least) two parties, that cannot be 
equitably resolved for lack of a rule applicable to both 
arguments ... 
However, applying a single rule of judgement to 
both in order to settle their differend as though it were a 
litigation would wrong (at least) one of them (and both if neither 
side admits the rule) ... 
A wrong results from the fact that the 
rules of the genre of discourse by which one judges are not those 
of a judged genre or genres of discourse. [The Diferend, preface 
xi] 
Differends occur among the phrase regimes and genres of discourse which 
compete to appropriate the `event' for their rules of formation. For Lyotard, it is 
this immediate disclosure of the absence of a universal rule of judgement, 
which discloses thinking's spontaneous origination in and through the phrasing 
of the event. `Linkage' onto the present phrase can never be absolutely 
determined; and it is the subsumption of the occurrence under 
`incommensurable' finalities, which constitutes the wrong perpetrated by self- 
legitimizing discourses (genres). 
Differends therefore, signify the heterogeneity and contingency of phrasing; 
their existence is absolutely contemporary with the phrase's undetermined 
linkage onto the present. This spontaneous origination, which Lyotard 
articulates through his idea of the phrase, is inseparable from the ethical 
notions of wrong and victimization. Any genre which imposes its determination 
of `truth' on the contingency of linkage, necessarily excludes the language of 
legitimation belonging to any other discourse. The victim of a wrong has no way 
of expressing the injustice which is done to him or her; as the rules of the 
phrase or genre with which he or she expresses his or her difference, cannot 
`signify' that wrong, 
A case of differend takes place between two parties when the 
`regulation' of conflict that opposes them is done in the idiom of 
one of the parties, while the wrong suffered by the other is not 
signified in that idiom. [The Differend, 1121 
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The heterogeneity of phrase regimes, according to Lyotard, is determined by 
different dispositions of addressor (agent/sender), addressee (patient/receiver), 
sense (meaning), and referent (object). Each phrase situates thinking within 
the immediate form of its spontaneity: the actuality of the other, or `addressee', 
the object, or `referent', whose sense the addressor determines, and the 
situation in which each of these elements is related, constitute the irreducible 
contingency of each event3. Differends are the inevitable consequence of 
phrasing; for the immediate heterogeneity of the `current phrase' is always 
already what is at stake for the genres of discourse and phrase regimes which 
must link onto the occurrence, 
Genres of discourse do nothing more than shift the differend from the level of regimen to that of ends. - But because several linkages are possible does that necessarily imply that there is a differend between them? Yes it does, because only one of them 
can happen at a time. [The Differend, ¶401 
For Lyotard there is an ethical necessity to remain sensitive to the ontological 
necessity of differends among phrase regimes and genres of discourse. Each has 
its own `protocol' for establishing the significance of the event onto which it 
links; and it is only by respecting the rules of these as irreducible to a general 
principle of evaluation, that wrong and victimization can be phrased without 
prejudgement or `forgetting'4. `That is why it is important to distinguish 
between phrase regimes, and this comes down to limiting the competence of a 
given tribunal to a given phrase'. 5 
It is the competing `finalities' of generic discourse which determine 
victimization and wrong; for it is through these discourses that the contingency 
of phrasing can become suppressed. This concern for the spontaneity of linkage 
onto the event, is what informs Lyotard's conception of speculative thought as 
the imposition of `metaphysical' ideas of mediation and identity upon 
heterogeneous phrase regimen. The development of consciousness which Hegel 
sets out in the Phenomenology, is presented in The Differend as the activity of 
a universal `self (Selbst) which `totalizes' the heterogeneous phrases through 
which it develops. Speculative dialectics are for Lyotard determined by the rule 
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of the `Resultat, whose demand `Engender every phrase as the expressed 
identity of the preceding ones, including the present phrase', 6 suppresses 
thinking's capacity for the phrasing of differends. What is, in other words, has 
its `being' through the spontaneity of phrasing; the universe expands 
`idiomatically through the expression of torts and differends. 
`Auschwitz' is the name within this universe of contingent phrasings, which 
finally discloses the heterogeneity of thought as an ethical necessity. The racial 
mythology of Nazism determines the genocide as an imperative through the 
absolute heterogeneity of `laud and `obligation'. The command of the SS member 
to the Jewish deportee, `That you die; that is my law', 7 requires nothing of the 
latter other than his or her annihilation. There is no possibility of a community 
of victims at `Auschwitz'. Each deportee is completely abstracted from the 
substance of his or her civil and religious life, and made completely subject to 
the law of the `Aryan' mythology. For Lyotard, the wrong perpetuated in the 
death camps cannot be phrased in a positive recognition of a universal `We'. 
This wrong is absolutely destructive of the concept of humanity; its demand is 
that thought phrase the victimization of the `otherness' which is excluded by 
grand narratives and generic discourse, 
In the differend, something `asks' to be put into phrases, and 
suffers from the wrong of not being able to be put into phrases 
right away.. . they 
[human beings] are summoned by 
language.. . to recognize that what remains to be phrased exceeds 
what they can presently phrase, and that they must be allowed 
to institute idioms which do not yet exist. [T1ie Differend, ¶23] 
The conception of speculative thought which Lyotard presents as 'blocked' by 
the name of `Auschwitz' however, is based upon a fundamental 
misrepresentation of speculative phenomenology. The transitions expounded by 
Hegel in the Science of Logic and the Phenomenology of Mind, are concretely 
historical; they do not, as Lyotard contends, `presuppose' the operation of a 
`result' posited outside the body of the text. It is this failure to recognize that 
the speculative method is not a process of abstract `totalization', which 
determines Lyotard's understanding of `Auschwitz' as the end of ethical life. 
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Lyotard's `critique' of speculative thought is determined by his 
understanding of the relationship of between `naming' and identity. The name, 
on Lyotard' conception, is a `rigid designator', which determines a fixed identity 
which is independent of addressors, addressees and deictic signification of 
particular phrases. 
Networks of quasi-deictics formed by names of `objects' and by 
names of relations designate `givens' and the relations given 
between those givens, that is to say a word. I call it a world 
because each of those names, being `rigid'... is inadequate of the 
phrase universes that refer to it, and in particular those 
addressees presented in those universes. [The Differend, 601 
It is the very `emptiness' of the name which is its identity. A nominative can 
appear in any number of sentences, each of which gives it a new signification, 
or even supplants it with new names, without ceasing to be `this' particular 
name: `Cognition can lead one to abandon a name, to replace it by others, to 
admit or create new names'. 8 
Names therefore, are not essences, or metaphysical determinations of 
identity. Their rigidity is constituted in the `fact' that sentences are unable to 
determine a definite object, or `referent', without the nominative assertion of 
identity between `descriptive' and deictic (indicative) phrases. The fixed 
identity of the name must be understood as a necessary part of the process of 
`cognition': without the `trans-sentence' identity of the proper name, 
descriptives and deictics would have only a private, accidental significance. 
They would not be intersubjectively established `cognitions' of a specific 
referent. 
Naming is thus an irreducible moment in the phrase's designation of 
`reality'; a moment which, in the spontaneity of the phrase event, may or may 
not be emphasized, but which is necessarily present, 
Reality: a swarm of senses lights upon a field pinpointed by a 
world. It is able to be signified, to be shown, and to be named... 
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The emphasis is sometimes put as one of these, sometimes as 
another. [The Differend, 82] 
Lyotard's engagement with the speculative thought, is thus an attempt to 
show that the Phenomenology's exposition of consciousness' `development', is 
possible only though a conception of identity which is ultimately `metaphysical'. 
Speculative discourse, according to Lyotard's transcription of its method, begins 
with the assumption a universal concept of the `human self or Selbst, which 
predetermines the development of natural consciousness towards absolute 
recognition. The necessity of absolute knowledge established at the conclusion 
of the Phenomenology, is understood as constituting the necessity of a subject 
whose actuality develops through the reconciliation of different phrase 
regimen. For Lyotard speculative thought takes the Selbst to be implicitly 
identical with the moments of addressee, sense and referent which it 
`addresses': it is only through the presupposition of this universal subjectivity 
that heterogeneous phrases can be expounded as a necessary development, 
[Speculative thought] claims merely to liberate the Selbst's 
infinite movement of alteration, which is potential in the 
universe of the slightest phrase on account of its being dispersed 
into several instances. [The Differend, 93] 
This reading of Hegel reduces speculative philosophy to a generic discourse, 
which pre-establishes `rules' determining the development of the Selbst 
through its various contents. Every speculative proposition has presupposed 
the activity of the Selbst, not only in the formulation of contradictions 
(Lyotard's rule of immanent derivation), but also in the selection of `equivocal' 
phrases which will allow the totalizations through which Absolute Knowledge 
is `engendered. ' On Lyotard's transcription, it is only by maintaining the 
integrity of these rules, that speculative thought is able to present the 
development of self-consciousness as an historical necessity: `The passage is 
only expressed with its terms past'. 9 
Lyotard presents speculative thought as a form of generic `finality'. He 
argues that even if the Phenomenology's `goal' of Absolute Knowledge is itself a 
speculative determination, it is still an `end' towards which spirit's historical 
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development has `progressed'; `a dialecticized goal is still just as much a goal. 
The teleology has merely been sophisticated'. '° The development described by 
Hegel in the Phenomenology is the imposition of a `metaphysical' ideas on the 
phrases' determination of `reality'. The `addressor' of speculative discourse, in 
other words, is the Selbst which `engenders' its development from the rule of 
the `Resultat'. For Lyotard this `protocol' of universal totalization, simply 
privileges the metaphysical identity of the Selbst over the rigid designation of 
the name. Speculative thought destroys the `trans-sentence' identity of the 
nominative phrase, and converts this destruction into a series of historical 
`gains', 
Speculation is a machine that gains, and it is therefore a 
deranged machine. The `thing' only works by transmitting its 
losses including names and pronouns- into gains. [The 
Differend, 96] 
Thus, the `speculative genre', which Lyotard presents as selectively 
admitting, redetermining, and totalizing phrase regimens, is distinguished 
from `philosophy', which is related to `the present' through heterogeneous 
`presentation, presenteds and events'. 11 The operation of the Resultat assumes 
the being of a universal self (Selbst), which is independent of all particular 
names. For Lyotard speculative thought's `metaphysical' designation of identity 
therefore, predetermines judgment of every `presentation'. It cannot express the 
infinite spontaneity and contingency of linkage (onto the `current phrase'), 
precisely because it cannot engender the necessity of its own `protocol', 
The stakes of a philosophical discourse are in a rule (or rules) 
which remains to be sought, and to which the discourse cannot 
be made to conform before the rule has been found. The links 
from phrase to phrase are not ruled by a rule but are the quest 
for a rule. [The Differend, 971 
This conception of speculative thought as producing `gains' from destruction 
however, is sustainable only where it is `presentations, presenteds, and events' 
which are taken as indubitable. In determining the possibility of the phrase's 
immediate presentation of `the real', Lyotard presents the name as `rigidly 
designating' identity. It is only through this postulation of the name as the 
complete absence of determination, that he is able to claim that the rule of the 
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Resultat engenders the Selbst through the destruction of concrete 
identities. 
What is actually gained in the historical development of self-consciousness 
cannot be conceived in Lyotard's notion of absolute relativity as the condition of 
thinking. Speculative phenomenology, in other words, is the substantiation of a 
`content' (self-consciousness) which appears through the concrete necessity of 
its elements. What is produced in historical time are `re-cognitions' of 
consciousness' own actuality, 
if [spirit] must be presented to itself as an object, but at the 
same time straightaway annul and transcend this objective 
form; it must be its own object in which it finds itself reflected. 
[Phenomenology, 86]12 
The necessity of consciousness' movement towards absolute self-recognition 
therefore, is determined by misrecognitions of its own actuality. The forms 
through which consciousness' work, desire, and enjoyment appear to it, are the 
conditions of its being and activity; conditions which determine the necessity of 
universal recognition independently of any predetermined `rule'. Hegel's 
account of the development of `finite spirit' explicates a necessity which is 
concrete with the actuality of consciousness. The forms through which it 
develops do not appear in speculative phenomenology simply because they are 
`totalizable' ('equivocal'); they are necessary determinations of conscious 
subjectivity, and its movement towards self-recognition, 
... 
in the case of conceptual thinking... the negative aspect falls 
within the content itself, as well as being its inherent character 
and moving principle as by being the entirety of what these are. ' 
[Phenomenology, preface, 118] 
Hegel's idea of Absolute Knowledge is not the `dialecticized goal' which 
Lyotard claims is the precondition of a speculative phenomenology. The 
development which is actually described in the Phenomenology of Mind, is 
concrete with consciousness' misrecognition of its real determinations. The 
`history' of finite spirit is the history of abstract forms through which 
consciousness represents the content of its being and independence. Each of 
these forms is itself an objective determination of `natural' consciousness, which 
produces contradictions independently of Spirit's universal self-recognition. 
Lyotard's presentation of speculative thought as a process of abstract summing 
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which presupposes the idea of a `universal self (Selbst) fails to recognize the 
significance of Hegel's exposition. The idea of a universal `self (Selbst) 
does not 
determine and `effectuate' the transitions described in the Phenomenology: this 
idea is a Resultat only in the sense of its determination of necessity after the 
elapsing of historical time. Absolute Knowledge is never `at stake' 
for 
consciousness until the Phenomenology's final transition from 
Revealed 
Religion. 
Lyotard's claim that `the beginning can appear as this final result [Absolute 
Knowledge] only because the rule of the Resultät has been presupposed from 
the beginning', 13 fails to recognize the necessity of the Phenomenology as 
spiritual. The moments through which consciousness develops are not 
determined in their historical appearance by the abstract `rule' of `totalization'. 
Each `objective' form described in the Phenomenology is an articulation of the 
conditions through which consciousness is actualized; speculative 
phenomenology presents, from the very beginning, the substantiation of 
abstract misrecognition. 
Hegel `begins' the Phenomenology of Mind with an exposition of the 
speculative necessity involved in consciousness' most abstract form of knowing: 
the immediate relation of the particular `I' to the particular `this'. The `here' 
and the `now', or the spatial and temporal forms through which the object is 
presented to the `I', cannot be articulated simply as determinations of 
particularity. When the particular `I' attempts to communicate `when' and 
`where' a particular object `is', the immediate intuition of the latter's self- 
existence becomes impossible to specify. Consciousness cannot determine the 
presence of the object to itself without the mediation of universals that specify 
which `here' and which `now' is intended. 
The `I' of this `sense certain' consciousness has the same structure as the 
`here' and the `now': it is the universal ground of all claims about particular 
objects made by particular individuals. The content of experience therefore, is 
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such that it is always intersubjective, involving the universal determinations 
through which the certainty of external objects is mediated, 
[Sense certainty] discovers by experience that its essential 
nature lies neither in the object not in the eye; and that the 
immediate existence peculiar to it is neither immediately one 
nor the other. [Phenomenology, 154-5] 
Even the apparent insubstantiability of what the `I' experiences `here' and `now' 
cannot be determined without reference to universals. It is only by locating the 
punctual instant relation to other temporal `points', that actual determination 
of immediate experience can be grasped. 
Thus, the determinations upon which knowledge as sense-certainty seeks to 
establish itself, the abstract immediacy of the `here', the `now' and the `I', 
cannot be substantiated with the implicitly speculative structure of articulation 
and communication. Universality becomes present to this sense certain 
consciousness as a real determination of its experience; although its (the 
universal's) actual constitution of subjectivity and objectivity is as yet 
unrecognized. 
The transition from `sense certainty' to `perception' which Hegel expounds at 
the `beginning' of the Phenomenology depends only upon the aporetic structure 
of immediate experience. Consciousness' transition from this most abstract 
form of knowing, is produced by the actual necessity of the universals (space 
and time) to the concept of `sense immediacy'. Thus, the dialectics of 
`Perception' and `Force and The Understanding', proceed from an original 
determination of experience as non-immediately constituted. `Consciousness' 
development through these atomistic moments requires no `totalizing' concept 
of the `Self (Selbst); the movement towards the intersubjective determinations 
of `Self-consciousness' is produced from the speculative necessity inherent in 
immediate presentation as such. The `gains' which consciousness makes 
throughout its historical development are `re-cognitions' of its own actuality; 
nothing appears in this phenomenological movement which is not a necessary, 
although abstract, determination of its (free) subjectivity. 
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Lyotard's reading of the idea of speculative phenomenology therefore, is a 
fundamental misrepresentation of Hegel's project. The transitions laid out in 
the Phenomenology, are not `effectuated' though a universal concept of the 
'Self; each is an historical moment of self-consciousness which produces 
contradiction and transition from its own concrete necessity. The `result' of 
Hegel's speculative exposition cannot be understood as `presupposed' 
independently of its development; Absolute Knowledge appears at the end of 
the Phenomenology because the historical development of consciousness has 
necessitated it. The `result' of the Phenomenology is not a `goal', as nowhere in 
the text does it appear to natural consciousness as such. Lyotard's conception of 
speculative thought as a `generic discourse' which suppresses the heterogeneity 
of phrase regimen, fails to recognize the `actuality' of the determinations 
through which consciousness develops. For him, the `rules' of speculation 
followed in the Phenomenology, determine nothing more than an infinite 
necessity for `new' sublations. 14 It is only on this understanding of the 
development of finite spirit, that the possibility of an utterly non-dialectical 
moment is disclosed. 
It is this misrecognition of the historical nature of speculative thought which 
informs Lyotard's conception of `Auschwitz' as the end of ethical life. His 
attempt to show that the transitions expounded in the Phenomenology 
presuppose the operation of determinate `results', leads to a fundamental 
misunderstanding of the relationship of spirit to its finite forms. The 
Phenomenology, by showing how consciousness develops through abstract 
moments of misrecognition, discloses spirits `absolute knowing' as the non- 
positive relationship of consciousness to itself. Every form through which 
consciousness has passed in its movement towards self-recognition, is retained 
as a necessary determination of its absolute negative activity. Lyotard's 
demand that speculative thinking must be able to `name' the moment of ethical 
sublation which results from the event of `Auschwitz', fails to recognize the 
significance of the Phenomenology's historical exposition. For once absolute 
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knowledge has been determined as the necessary end of consciousness' 
temporal development, there can be no possibility of spirit encountering 
substantively `new' contradictions. `Auschwitz' therefore, must be conceived as 
part of empirical history's reproduction of a particular contradictory moment in 
spirits' development. A moment which, objectively, cannot sustain itself as 
ethical life, and which ultimately determines its own destruction. 
Lyotard's' transcription of Adorno's idea of Auschwitz as a `model' which is 
`excepted' from the possibility of speculative totalization, attempts to show that 
phrase regimen are always absolutely heterogeneous, and that this 
heterogeneity presents the infinite possibility of victimization and wrong. The 
obligation of thought to phrase constantly the differends through which wrong 
appears therefore, is presented as the fact of an historical occurrence in which 
the determinations of `prescription' and `legislation' are irreducibly 
heterogeneous. The Nazi discourse of original racial superiority is understood 
by Lyotard as determining an imperative which can engender no positive 
ethical sublation, and which discloses the heterogeneity of law and obligation 
through the `model' of absolute victimization. 
Speculative phenomenology, on Lyotard's understanding, requires that all 
heterogeneity should be totalizable. Each `phrase' must be recognized as 
constituting part of a determinate contradiction, which negates the ethical 
substance of its particular discourse. By failing to mediate adequately the 
phrases through which it is actualized therefore, each discourse produces its 
concrete moment of sublation, or the transition to a higher form of recognition: 
The speculative rule of the Resultät is formulated, 'Engender every phrase as 
the expressed identity of the proceeding ones'. 15 
The phrases of law and obligation which are determined by the racial 
mythology of Nazism, cannot, on Lyotard's reading, contribute to the 
development of ethical recognition. The discourse of an original superiority of 
the `Aryan', constitutes the complete exception of the Jewish race from the 
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matter of humanity. The obligation to which the deportee is subject 
is simply to 
die; for the law of the SS requires no more of him or her than that he or she 
should no longer exist, 
That which orders death [the SS] is excepted from obligation, 
and that which undergoes obligation [the deportee] is excepted 
fro the legitimation. The authority of the SS comes out of a we 
from which the deportee is excepted once and for all. [The 
Differend, 1157] 
The event of `Auschwitz' is determined through a discourse which cannot 
be 
sublated in the development of a universal self (Selbst). The forms of law and 
obligation which determine the genocide, appear as absolutely heterogeneous 
elements which can engender no determinate contradiction, or more adequate 
self-recognition. The movement of speculative thought is `blocked' at 
`Auschwitz'. 16 
The name `Auschwitz', is presented in The Differend as that `within which 
speculative thought could not take place... a name not sublatable into a 
concept'. 17 The law of `Aryan' destiny, in other words, is presented as an 
hermetic determination which cannot be conceived as a sublatable recognition 
of the Selbst. Thus, for Lyotard, the persistence of the speculative method `after 
Auschwitz', constitutes an infinite scepticism which consumes and expels every 
determination on which it alights: `It is necessary, `after Auschwitz', for thought 
to consume its determinations ... with no result'. 
18 
Thinking `after Auschwitz', can no longer seek to determine the substance of 
a universal self in the forms or `phrases', which constitute the `being' of the 
community. Each phrase ought to be treated as a discrete and contingent 
occurrence, which determines the relation of thinking to the `immediate' as a 
moment of pure spontaneity: `The necessity of their being a phrase is not logical 
(the question of `How? ') but ontological (the question of `What')'. 19 The ethical 
necessity which Lyotard is trying to establish the event of `Auschwitz' therefore, 
is a respect for the contingency and uniqueness of thought's relation ('linkage') 
to the present; a respect which he attempts to determine through the notion of 
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the differend. `After Auschwitz', the heterogeneity of `presentation' ought to be 
recognized as a `regulative idea' opposed to the homogenization of generic 
discourses. 
The Differend's exposition of the Nazi mythology presents an imperative 
which can engender no concrete moment of sublation, and which discloses the 
absolute contingency of the event (of linkage) through the fact of absolute 
victimization. The spontaneity of thinking's relation to the `current phrase' 
therefore, is demonstrated by the historical obligation to express the 
`inexpressible' wrong carried out by the SS in the death camps, 
The differend is an unstable state and instant of language 
wherein something which must be able to be put into phrases 
cannot yet be. This state includes silence, which is a negative 
phrase but it also calls upon phrases which are in principle 
possible. [The Differend, $221 
Every presentation, in other words, as a point of contingent linkage, cannot be 
subjected to the end of generic discourse without the constitution of wrong. 
With the event of `Auschwitz', thought discovers a wrong, the necessity of 
whose expression exceeds any possibility of speculative sublation. Thus, what 
remains `after' the death camps, is the need constantly to initiate new (literary, 
artistic, philosophical) phrasings of the inexpressible evil which has foreclosed 
upon the possibility of speculative thought. 20 Within the structure of The 
Differend, `Auschwitz' is presented as the point where the identity of obligation 
and legislation, of finite and substantive will, is permanently disclosed. It is 
conceived by Lyotard as an historical event which ought, under the rules which 
he attributes to speculative philosophy, to produce a mediating `result'. The 
impossibility of such a production is what, on this reading, reduces speculative 
thinking to an infinite scepticism which cannot re-engender the experience of 
satisfaction in self-conscious subjectivity. For Lyotard, the `negative dialectics' 
which Adorno expounds as the `self-reflection'21 of speculative thought `after 
Auschwitz', is the projection of Hegel's sceptical mind into the bad infinity of 
negative critique. Nothing determinate can afford satisfaction to thought; 
everything is consumed without expectation of a production which is not simply 
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`waste, shit'. 22 This argument fails to recognize the historical significance of the 
Phenomenology's exposition of scepticism. 
Hegel's account of the sceptical consciousness demonstrates the aporetic 
nature of thinking which constantly returns to itself as negative essence. This 
self-consciousness cannot sustain any concrete distinction between itself as the 
universal condition of representations, and the contingent forms which are its 
transient contents. Lyotard's reduction of ethical thought to the 
unpredetermined reception and spontaneous phrasing of heterogeneity, 
remains within the aporetic moment of scepticism. For by asserting the 
absolute indubitability of the phrase's `presentation', he presupposes `thinking' 
as an activity originally divorced from the substance of subjectivity. 
The Phenomenolog 's exposition of scepticism, shows that the impossibility of 
determining the `truth' of relativity is lost in the positing of that relativity as 
absolute. The Differend however, presents the indubitability of the phrase as 
its simple, irreducible occupation of present time: even `presentation' is in this 
sense identical. The necessity of presentation and phrasing is a contradictory 
conception of thinking. Nothing which is `thought', not even the necessity of 
differends, recognizable as concrete; there is only the indubitability of 
presentation, 
The condition of the encounter [of genres and phrase regimen] is 
not this [communicative] universe, but the phrase in which you 
present it. It is a transcendental and not an empirical condition. [The Differend, 139] 
By maintaining that it is only the contingency of linkage onto the current 
phrase which is ethically necessary, Lyotard is left with no substantive concept 
of difference. The heterogeneity of phrase regimen and genres of discourse, can 
appear as `incommensurable' only when conceived `linkages' and `finalities' are 
constituted in immediate abstraction from the substantive elements of ethical 
life. It is by placing the `mythological origination' of the holocaust outside of 
these elements, that Lyotard is able to posit `Auschwitz' as the dissolution of 
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speculative thought in negative dialectics. 23 
The sceptical consciousness is a phenomenological moment. Its conviction of 
the absolute contingency of appearance concretely determines the unhappy 
consciousness' attempt to find certitude in an external `unchangeable' being. 
The essence of scepticism is its positing of life, existence and activity as 
arbitrary determinations external to its negative self-certainty. The truth of 
this separation however, is that the moment of absolute doubt is never more 
than an abstract self-determination which is always forced back into commerce 
with what it has taken to be utterly unessential i. e. the multiplicity of actual 
social relations in which it is implicated and upon which it depends. This 
consciousness, is the moment through which Hegel develops the contradiction 
between what self-consciousness takes to be `essential' (the unchangeable), and 
the actual determinations through which its freedom is to become substantial 
for it. 
Lyotard's conception of the relationship between thinking and immediacy 
therefore, leaves self-consciousness in a state of indeterminacy identical to the 
`fickleness and instability' of the sceptical mind. The concrete determinations of 
its life and activity, appear to it simply as moments external to its spontaneous 
reception and judgement of difference. This state of indeterminacy however, 
cannot be formed as an ethical necessity; its historical production is the 
`unhappy consciousness' which has recognized itself as an `internally 
contradictory being' devoid of actuality and independence. The profoundly 
disturbed and perverted form of self-consciousness which Hegel presents as the 
consequence of scepticism, demonstrates the necessity of objective mediation of 
subjectivity. The possibility of the ethical, is shown to depend upon the 
consciousness recognizing itself in the actual work, desires and satisfactions 
which constitute its life. 
The spontaneous activity of `linkage' which Lyotard attempts to determine as 
the inescapable condition of the ethical, does not reduce speculative thinking to 
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a negative scepticism which destroys every concrete form it produces. 
The 
moment of universal doubt produces a form of self-consciousness which can 
determine nothing substantive through its activity. Pure negation, in other 
words, results in absolute incertitude. It is this recognition which constitutes 
the unhappy consciousness as inalienably related to a fixed and unchangeable 
being in which it attempts to ground the whole of its life and activity. This 
relationship however, merely serves to deepen and intensify the unhappiness of 
self-consciousness, as it can relate to the real determinations of its existence 
(work, enjoyment, and desire) only as external to and deforming of, the purity 
of its devotion. Thus, self-consciousness knows itself as a pure contingency 
which is incapable of recognizing its own independent activity, or that of the 
other. 
By thinking the unchangeable in this way, self-consciousness is constantly 
reduced to mere feeling and intuition. The whole of its activity in the world 
becomes degraded to nothingness; as the substance for which it yearns can give 
no concrete meaning to its life and activity. The unhappy consciousness, is the 
splitting of being and activity, the `in-itself and the `for-itself, into two opposing 
and unmediated forms. It knows its own desire, work and enjoyment only as 
gifts from the `in-itself (the `unchangeable' being of an unfathomable deity), for 
which it must give thanks. The whole of the activity of this dualistic self- 
consciousness, is self-denial and self-abasement; it is the constant reduction of 
its actuality to nothingness, 
... the 
individual consciousness... denies itself the satisfaction of 
being conscious of its independence, and refers the essential 
substance of its action to the beyond and not to 
itself. [Phenomenology, 261] 
Thus, deprived of its actual significance, the transformative activity through 
which self-consciousness sustains itself as a living being, becomes a constant 
enactment of degradation and perversion. Its life becomes fixed upon its 
depravity. 
The emergence of the unhappy consciousness from the indeterminacy of 
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scepticism therefore, is the point at which Hegel attempts to demonstrate the 
necessity of natural consciousness' recognition of its actuality. Work, desire and 
enjoyment constitute the real determinations of a being whose `life' is 
transformative activity. Where these determinations become alienated to the 
actuality of an unchangeable being, consciousness becomes subject to a 
spiritual deformity which is grounded in a lack of objective self-recognition. The 
absence of certitude which produced the unhappy consciousness, determines 
self-consciousness as a form whose individuality is dependent upon the actual 
mediations of ethical life, 
For giving up one's will is only in one respect negative;... it is at the same time positive, positing and affirming the will as not a 
particular, but universal. [Phenomenology, 266] 
As finite spirit, self-consciousness requires the objective mediations of ethical 
life in order to realize its independence. 
The question that a speculative critique of Lyotard's thought must answer 
therefore, is how his understanding of `Auschwitz' can be encompassed within 
the terms of speculative philosophy. For if Hegel's exposition of scepticism has 
demonstrated the impossibility of pure (negative) spontaneity as the condition 
of the ethical, and the dialectic of the unhappy consciousness has shown the 
necessity of the objective self-recognition to ethical life, then the event of 
`Auschwitz' cannot be conceived as reducing speculative thought to a `negative 
dialectics'. The discourse of Nazism, in other words, must involve a determinate 
contradiction `re-cognizable' as part of spirit's temporal development towards 
absolute knowledge. This contradiction is described by Hegel as a 'culture' of 
consciousness which destroys and perverts the `lawless' ethical life which is its 
precondition. 24 
Historically, the alienation of the unhappy consciousness from its actuality 
(work, enjoyment, desire), is constituted through the objective forms of Roman 
property law, and the lawlessness and coercion of feudal ties. The latter 
determine social relations as violence and fragmentation; and it is against this 
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background that consciousness attempts to `re-form' ethical life on principles 
which it abstractly determines. This intention to suppress the actual 
mediations of ethical life, constitutes a necessity in which the latter is 
perverted in its real effects. Self-consciousness, is re-formed as a subjective 
determination which reinforces the violence and lawlessness of social relations. 
The dualistic subject whose spiritual deformity is expounded by Hegel in the 
dialectic of the unhappy consciousness, has become formed as a false 
reconciliation of subjectivity and ethical life. The substance of the latter is 
determined through its misrecognition by the former. This constitutes a 
completely `false' reconciliation in which consciousness fails to recognize its 
formation of and by the lawlessness of its world. It is a reconciliation brought 
about by the pure culture of subjectivity. 
The falsity of this `pure' reconciliation, is expounded in the Phenomenology's 
sections on the practical determination of `Reason': `The Law of the Heart'; 
`Pleasure and Necessity', and `Virtue and the Way of the World'. 25 The 
determination of these forms presupposes an historical background in which 
property relations have not established a formal universality of recognition; and 
where, consequently, self-recognition and the recognition of others, is 
determined as pleasure and desire. These abstract individualities, experience 
`life' only as consumption; while their `virtuous' activity can only bring them 
into conflict with the `course of the world' (the actuality of the ethical which is 
preserved in the rejection of desire, pleasure and action). The `absolute' ethical 
life of the state can appear to self-consciousness only as an empirical, 
contingent hegemony of `wealth', which each tries to enjoy as a particular self- 
seeking individuality. 
`Pleasure and Necessity', `The Law of the Heart', and `Virtue and the Course 
of the World' are all perverted forms of self-consciousness where `practical' 
intentions actually reinforce the `lawless' satisfaction of desire and pleasure 
which constitutes the ethical life of the state. The relationship of these forms of 
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subjectivity to the ethical substance which they presuppose, demonstrates the 
necessity of consciousness' recognition of itself in the actual determinations of 
its life. 
The Differend presents subjectivity and actuality as forms constituted within 
the speculative `genre'; forms which for Lyotard are dispersed throughout the 
infinite possibility of phrasing the occurrence. On this account, every regime 
constitutes a particular `universe' in which the disposition of sense, referent, 
addressor, and addressee, immediately determines a relationship of discrete 
agency (the `addressor') to a discrete patient (the `addressee'). Each of these 
universes emerges into a play of competing regimes and discourses; each is 
`linked onto' by a particular rationality which attempts to exclude the 
contingency of the event. The impossibility of speculative thought `after 
Auschwitz' is supposedly constituted by the impossibility of engendering any 
mediating principle from the incommensurability of phrase regimes and generic 
discourses: the idea of a universal self (Selbst) is for Lyotard beyond the finite 
forms through which Hegel attempts to expound its necessity. It is 
`metaphysical'. 26 
The account of `Auschwitz' presented in The Differend is an attempt to 
demonstrate the absolute heterogeneity of phrase regimen. Lyotard's claim is 
that there is no possibility of deriving a `nameable' moment of reconciliation 
from the phrases of legislation and obligation which are constituted in the Nazi 
discourse of `Aryan' destiny. The `universes' of obligation and legislation within 
which the SS and deportee are situated by the Nazi discourse, cannot, on this 
reading, produce a speculative `result'. The hegemony of Nazism culminates in 
the event of the death camps, precisely because it is a self-perpetuating denial 
of the concept of a universally human self. By the mythologising of its racial 
particularity as the only sufficiently human being, the Nazi appeal to the 
`Aryan' race as the agent of historical necessity, determines the impossibility of 
universal recognition. Speculative thinking cannot `engender' a determinate 
moment of mediation from the forms of obligation and law which produce the 
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event of `Auschwitz'. 
This `heterogeneity' of law and obligation however, is not non-speculative, 
and does not disclose the Nazi discourse as an absolutely non-speculative 
moment. By demanding that speculative thought should 
be able to `name' the 
moment of ethical sublation produced at `Auschwitz', 
Lyotard fails to 
distinguish between the natural self-consciousness whose development is 
expounded in the body of the Phenomenology, and spirits' 
`reflective' self- 
understanding which is reached at its conclusion. The forms through which 
absolute knowing comes into existence have already produced the 
contradictions which determine the history of consciousness; while the 
autonomy of spirit is a `re-cognition' of these forms as `objects' essential to its 
negative activity, 
Hence spirit necessarily appears in time, and it appears in time 
so long as it does not grasp its pure notion, i. e. as long as it does 
not annul time. Time is the pure self in external form... and not 
grasped and understood by the self, it is the notion apprehended 
only through intuition. [Phenomenology, 8001 
The `pre-modernity' of Nazism's racial discourse does not present an absolutely 
non-speculative moment. It must be understood as the reappearance of a 
contradictory type of self-consciousness, whose `grandest forms' Hegel expounds 
in the Phenomenology, as the `satisfied' and `unsatisfied', that is, German and 
French, Enlightenments. 
As the most violently contradictory `culture' of subjectivity, the abstract 
materialism of the French Enlightenment, constitutes an absolute denial of 
ethical substantiality to the social relations which are its precondition: `The 
universal will goes into itself, is subjectivized, and becomes individual will, to 
which the universal will and universal work stand opposed'. 27 This failure of 
self-consciousness to acknowledge the lawlessness of the property form which 
determines its activity, that is, the immediate power of wealth in the absence of 
bourgeois property rights, deepens and reinforces that lawlessness. The self- 
consciousness produced by the French Enlightenment therefore, is determined 
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through an absolute opposition to the ethical relations which forms it: 
`reformative' intentions cannot realize themselves as objective determinations, 
and constantly perverted by its own activity, 
It follows from this, that it cannot arrive at a positive 
accomplishment of anything... in the way of actual reality, 
either in the form of laws and regulations of conscious freedom, 
or of deeds and works of active freedom. [Phenomenology, 6031 
This self-consciousness is aware of itself as the object, or universal `matter', 
of a freedom which is opposed to every finite determination of the ethical which 
it encounters. The absence of bourgeois property rights, means that nothing 
outside consciousness' affirmation of itself as the infinite being ('matter') of free 
will, can remain in place as a `real' ethical form. The concrete differentiation of 
society, in other words, has become subject to the `stubborn atomic singleness of 
absolutely free self. 28 The absolute `matter' of freedom which the revolutionary 
consciousness attempts to realize, is speculatively determined as `pure 
abstraction', or characterless object of faith and superstition. 
It is the French Enlightenment therefore, which produces the terror of 
absolute freedom. The ethical life of a state governed solely by the `law' of 
wealth, is taken as a lawless irrationality which it has the vocation to destroy. 
Abstract materialism passes over into a violent instrumentalist idealism, which 
treats the actual mediations of individuality present in social relations, as 
completely subject to the law of its 'universal' freedom, 
The sole and only work and deed accomplished by universal freedom is therefore death, a death which achieves nothing; for 
what is negated is the unfulfilled punctual entity of the 
absolutely free self. [Phenomenology, 605] 
The truth of the French Enlightenments' attempt to displace the dominance 
of faith and superstition, is an absolute negation which can acknowledge 
nothing beyond the law of its own activity. The `matter' which it constantly 
invokes as the substance of rational human association, is completely without 
characteristics, and produces a self-consciousness which is absolutely 
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threatened by its own activity. Speculatively understood, the French Revolution 
constitutes an utter dislocation of self-consciousness from the substance of 
ethical life, and the appearance of `free will' as the agent of meaningless 
annihilation. The lawlessness which self-consciousness sets out to `re-form', is 
merely reaffirmed; and the substance of ethical life more and more deeply 
disrupted by subjectivity's want of objective recognition. 29 
The claim developed in the `Result section of The Differend, is that this 
(Hegelian) tyranny of absolutely free will, invokes an activity of the subject 
(Selbst) which is originally contained within the genre of speculative discourse. 
Lyotard's argument is that the transition to the higher ethical form of morality, 
can only occur because the `punctual self which Hegel identifies as the source of 
(French) revolutionary terror understands itself as a universal law. On this 
reading, it is only because the relationship of each individual to the totality 
appears as a law which commands the realization of universal freedom, that 
the terror of the French Revolution can be conceived as a destructive (yet 
productive) `culture' of self consciousness. The discourse of Nazism, according to 
Lyotard's understanding therefore, excepts itself from the possibility of 
`dialectical effectuation'; for the law which it announces simply commands the 
purification and hegemony of one particular race. The argument developed in 
the rest of the chapter, will show that Lyotard's attempt to distinguish radically 
the terror of `absolute freedom' from the terror of racial destiny, fails to 
recognize the speculative necessity in Nazism's violent appropriation of the law 
for the good of the Volk 
In Heidegger and `the jews', Lyotard expounds the victimization of the 
Jewish people by the Nazis, as the moment at which `Occidental' thought 
discloses the destructiveness of its relation to that which it cannot represent 
and control. The `indeterminate otherness' which haunts representational 
thinking, that which is `forgotten' and cannot be forgotten by it, is symbolized 
by the religious, racial, political, and social persecutions to which real Jews 
have been subjected historically. `The jews' are all those elements which exist 
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as irreducibly `other' to the categories of formal and representational thinking. 
It is this constant undermining of the `foundations' of its project, of its hope for 
irreversible progress, which makes the presence of `the jews', as radical 
heterogeneity, intolerable to Western thought. Thus, the Nazi slaughter 
testifies to the `unthinkable' which cannot be eradicated from representational 
thought, by attempting to liquidate utterly the name of the otherness which 
always afflicts it: `the jews', 
... the slaughter pretends to 
be without memory ... and through this testifies again to what it slaughters: that there is the 
unthinkable, time lost yet always there, a revelation that never 
reveals itself but remains there, a misery ... 
[Heidegger and `the 
jews', 23] 
Lyotard's claim that the event of the death camps marks the end of 
speculative ethics, is founded upon a misrecognition of Nazism's relationship to 
the actual social relations which produce it. The essential determinations of 
Nazism, that is, the lawlessness of ethical life, the reformative `vocation' of 
subjectivity, and the belief in the mythology of the `Aryan' race, produce a 
`culture' of self-consciousness which results in the dissolution and ultimate 
destruction of the state. By taking `Auschwitz' as Nazism's uniquely exceptive 
(destructive) relation to the other, Lyotard ignores the disintegrative impact 
which Nazism has upon the ethical substance of the state. The evil of the 
genocide, in other words, must be understood as part of an extreme and deeply 
contradictory `culture' of self-consciousness, whose objective necessity is the 
destruction of its own particular ethical life. 
In order to give an adequate account of the `culture' of Nazism, it is 
necessary to determine the nature of the relationship that exists between the 
lawlessness of the Weimar Republic, and the ethical and political appeal of the 
discourse of National Socialism. The aim of the thesis is not to provide an 
empirical history of the social and economic conditions which determined the 
rise of Nazism; but merely to indicate how the complete collapse of the national 
economy, and the disintegration of a recognizably ethical social order, provide 
the historical conditions for a destructive `culture' of self-consciousness. 
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Hannah Arendt, in her treatment of the disintegration of traditional class 
structure in Weimar Germany, remarks that, 
Democratic freedoms may be based upon the equality of all 
citizens before the law; yet they acquire their meaning and 
function organically only where the citizens belong to and are 
represented by groups or form a social and political hierarchy. 
The breakdown of the class system, the only social and political 
stratification of the European nation states, certainly was one of 
the most dramatic events in recent German history. [The 
Origins of Totalitarianism, 312] 
Although Arendt's analysis of the relationship between the success of Nazism, 
and the breakdown of social and political stratification in the Weimar Republic, 
is not explicitly speculative, her conception of the nation-state as constituted 
through the mediation of particular, `finite' determinations of work, desire, and 
satisfaction, does disclose a homology with the Phenomenology's exposition of 
the French Revolution. For Hegel, it is the absence of formal (bourgeois) 
property law, which produces self-consciousness' determination ('culture') to re- 
form what it conceives as the arbitrariness of social relations. Arendt's idea of 
`massification' of traditional class divisions invokes the concept of a lawless 
social existence as necessary to the emergence an success of Nazism. Equality 
before the law is understood in her analysis of `The Classless Society'30 as 
possible only where there is an objective mediation of individuality through the 
social and political institutions of the nation-state. In the absence of this 
mediation - an absence manifestly present in Weimar Germany - the nation- 
state is reduced to an aggregation of dispossessed individuals ('the mass') who 
do not constitute part of its substance. For Arendt, where the law is utterly 
without concrete significance for the individual, the state has already lost the 
possibility of resisting millennial ideologies of reform. The analysis of Nazism 
developed in The Origins of Totalitarianism, is `speculative' in the sense of its 
expounding the relationship between a fractured, `lawless' community, and the 
emergence of a violently destructive `culture' of consciousness. 
With the emergence of uncontrollable inflation and catastrophic levels of 
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unemployment after the First World War, the Weimar Republic could not 
sustain the necessity of bourgeois rights and freedoms. The social relations in 
which the substance of these abstract freedoms is constituted were ruptured by 
the inability of the `System of Needs' to provide for the material requirements 
of ethical life. The possibility of a universal recognition was excluded by the 
destruction of the state's material grounding in work and particular 
satisfactions. For without the reproduction of `socially constituted needs', the 
relationship of individuality to the law of the state becomes that of an abstract 
activity to an external, `lawless' coercion. 
The existence of bourgeois rights and freedoms in Weimar Germany could 
not prevent the emergence of a form of abstract individuality which is 
fundamentally alienated from the ethical and political life by the state: `This 
apolitical character of the nation-states' populations come to light only when 
the class system broke down and carried with it the whole fabric ... which 
bound the people to the body politic'. 31 It is the impossibility of maintaining the 
integrity of ethical life under conditions of absolute material deprivation, which 
informs Arendt's conception of the `massification' of classes as the precondition 
of totalitarian movements. 
This radical breakdown of the traditional duties and satisfactions of ethical 
life was the pre-condition of the `culture' of Nazism. Individuals were no longer 
tied to the finite aims and duties of a particular class; they became atomized 
and isolated units, which were formally homogeneous in their want of ethical 
and political identity. This `rabble of paupers' as Hegel refers to propertyless, 
sub-political individuals32 were not amenable to the ethical and political 
demands of the state; they had no objective articulation with its authority. 
Thus it is through the `massification' of the classes which constitute the 
substance of ethical life, that the possibility of the `culture' of totalitarian 
politics is determined, 
Totalitarian movements are mass organizations of atomized, isolated individuals. Compared with all other movements, their 
most conspicuous characteristic is their demand for total, 
unrestricted, uncontrollable and unalterable loyalty of the 
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individual member. [Origins of Totalitarianism, 323] 
The `absolute and unconditional' loyalty demanded by Nazism is to the 
historical destiny of the race. With the dissolution of the old class-based duties 
of ethical life, the millennial demand that the `Aryan' race should reform the 
lawlessness of the Fatherland, became the animating principle, or `culture', of 
self-consciousness. Blame for the disintegration of the nation-state, is 
attributed to the parasitism of Judaism on `Aryan' society, and to the 
adulteration of racial purity by the Jewish race. 
Nazism proceeds from the notion of an absolute material difference obtaining 
between the `Aryan' and the `Jew': it attempts to to determine what 
distinguishes absolutely the Aryan `culture creator' from the Jewish `culture 
destroyer'. 33 The attempt to determine the essence of the race as the substance 
of the nation-state however, reproduces the contradiction of `alienated spirit' 
through which the French Enlightenment is determined as a destructive 
idealism. In trying to specify what is `Aryan', the Nazi discourse contradicts its 
apparent intention to reform the ethical life of the state; for the project of racial 
purification reveals itself as a destructive bad infinity. 
After the Nazis came to power, this concept [of the absolute 
equality of all Germans in the Volksgemeinschaft] lost its 
importance... The Volksgemeinschaft was merely a 
propagandistic preparation for an `Aryan' society which in the 
end would have doomed all peoples, including the Germans. 
[Origins of Totalitarianism, 360-1] 
As with the French Enlightenment, the `culture' of Nazism makes its absolute 
an indeterminate `material' which is an object of faith for those individuals who 
supposedly exist in and through it. Nazism is a violently instrumental idealism, 
which treats the individuals who constitute the ethical substance of society, as 
more or less adequate examples of the `Aryan' race. 
The vocation of Nazism to `re-form' the lawlessness of the nation-state, is an 
historical reoccurrence of self-consciousness as a pure, violent `culture'. The 
`mythological' determination of the Nazi discourse does not except it from the 
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speculative determination of `alienated spirit': the terror of Nazism is 
constituted through the same contradictory relationship of subjectivity to the 
objective determination of ethical life' which prevented the French 
Enlightenment from producing an ethically reformative movement. Nazism is 
incapable of realizing the notion of Volksgemeinschaft: a community of 
substantively equal beings cannot be made actual through the `culture' of racial 
destiny. 
The absolute purity and dominance of the `Aryan' race, which is the aim of 
Nazism, constitutes self-consciousness as a violently instrumental idealism, 
which completely disregards the substance of the ethical. By seeking to realize 
the unspecifiable concept of the `Aryan', Nazism destroys and perverts the 
satisfaction of work, enjoyment and desire constituted in ethical life, and 
dissipates the social and material wealth of the nation-state in its millennial 
projects. Its `propagandistic' intention to reform the lawlessness of the ethical 
life which is its precondition, actually deepens the dislocation of the state, 
reducing its cohesion to an undeterminable belief in the original superiority of 
the `Aryan' race. The end (termination) of the Nazi mythology therefore, is not, 
as Lyotard claims, simply `police action' which destroys its hegemony but leaves 
its self-consistency unrefuted. Its ultimate destruction from outside, is actually 
brought about by the nihilistic relationship which the `Aryan' self-consciousness 
assumes towards its own nation-state. 
The understanding of the terror of the French Revolution presented in The 
Differend therefore, fundamentally misrecognizes Hegel's notion of a `culture' of 
self-consciousness. Lyotard's claim is that the terror of the revolution can be 
sublated by speculative discourse because of the former's invocation of a 
universally `rational will'. The historical transition to the moral self- 
consciousness which conceives its freedom as distinct from the `heteronomy' of 
ethical substance, is presented by Lyotard as possible through the 
Phenomenology's predetermination of a non-exceptive universality of the self 
(Selbst): 
We think of terror. But the Jacobin Reign of Terror allows no 
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exceptions... the legislator is obligated to the transparency of 
pure will by the same token as everyone else, he is thus suspect 
like them. The particular terror merely verifies the principle of 
autonomy. [The Differend, 153] 
The possibility of determining such a definite `result' from the occurrence of 
`Auschwitz' however, does not, on Lyotard's understanding, exist; for the Nazi 
discourse simply `excepts' the Jewish race from the concept of humanity, and 
`obligates' them to die. Speculative thought cannot salvage the universality of 
the self from the forms of legislation and obligation determined at Auschwitz: 
At `Auschwitz'... exception is what rules. Its speculative name is 
not the rational terror that is extended infinitely because good 
will is to be required from every you. Nazism requires nothing 
from what is not `Aryan' except for the cessation of its appearing 
to exist. [The Diüerenc4 1159] 
This understanding of Nazism and the event of the death camps relies upon 
the misconception of speculative thought which is set out in The Differend's 
`notice' on Hegel. Lyotard's presentation of the transitions expounded in the 
Phenomenology, is that they presuppose the `generic' rule of the Resultat, 
which is formulated as `Engender every phrase as the expressed identity of the 
proceeding ones, including the present phrase' 34 Speculative development is 
expounded as self-consciously postponing its mediation of reason's abstract 
forms, in order to determine the history of Absolute Knowing as the 
`equivocation' and `effectuation' of identity. Lyotard's idea of the Resultät, 
attempts to show that speculative thinking's claim to have no `natural', or 
`posited' beginning, actually presupposes the mediatedness of spirit in the 
determination of its transitions. On this reading, it is possible to `name' the 
speculative result of each transition expanded in the Phenomenology, only 
because the Idea of the Self (Selbst) has predetermined self-identity as negative 
and contradictory. 
The beginning can appear as this final result only because the 
rule of the Resultät has been presupposed from the beginning. 
The first phrase was linked onto the following one and onto the 
others in conformity with this rule. But this rule is merely 
presupposed and not engendered. [The Differend, 971 
The detail of Lyotard's misrepresentation of the transitions expounded in 
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the Phenomenology, has already been set out in the first section of the present 
chapter. The point that needs to be restated however, is that Hegel's method of 
exposition is thoroughly historical: the contradictions through which abstract 
reason develops, cannot be reduced to the pure activity of the universal self 
(Selbst) `effectuating' particular transitions. Hegel's speculative method is 
concretely rooted in the forms of abstract understanding (verstand); it cannot 
be separated from the exteriority determined in the development of natural 
consciousness, 
The [speculative] movement includes within it the negative 
factor, the element which would be named falsity if it could be 
considered one form which had to be abstract. The element that 
disappears has rather to be looked at as something essential... 
Appearance is the process of arising into being and passing 
away, a process that... constitutes reality and the life movement 
of truth [Phenomenology, 105] 
Neither the logical idea of the Notion, nor the Phenomenology's absolute self- 
recognition therefore, determine their histories as pure teleology; both of these 
conceptions become explicit only after their necessity emerged from actual 
contradictions. 
It is The Differend's particular reading of speculative thought, which informs 
Lyotard's conception of the end of ethical life. By conceiving the transitions 
described in the Phenomenology as `... the Selbst's infinite movement of 
alteration, which is potential in the universe of the slightest phrase on account 
of its being disposed in several instances', 35 Lyotard fails to recognize that the 
infinity to which the self is subject, is the substance of its own ethical 
recognition. The transitions described in the Phenomenology are determined 
through the `actuality' of misrecognition; that is, through the abstract 
formations of subjectivity and objectivity determined in (relative) ethical life. 
`Every moment', Hegel remarks in the `preface', `is necessary; ... 
for each is 
itself a complete individual form, and is fully and finally considered only so far 
as its determinate character is taken as a concrete whole'. 36 Consciousness does 
not wait upon the activity of its universal idea to `engender' the contradictions 
by which it develops towards absolute knowledge: the necessity of mediation as 
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the ground of the ethical is produced through the individuality of each 
form of 
abstraction. Spirit, is determined through recognition of the concreteness of 
misrecognition with the true: 
... that which obtains 
distinctness in the course of its [Spirit's] 
process, and secures specific existence, is preserved in the form 
of a self-recollection, in which existence is self-knowledge, and 
self-knowledge gain immediate existence. [Phenomenology, 105- 
61 
Lyotard's understanding of `Auschwitz' is that it discloses the Nazi discourse 
of `Aryan' destiny as an absolutely non-speculative moment. The law which 
is 
decreed by this mythology of Aryan destiny, determines the `obligation' of the 
racially inferior `other' as pure terror; a terror which culminates in the 
unredeemed and irredeemable death of the Jewish deportee in the death 
camps. This heterogeneity of the law and the obligation it determines, is 
presented by Lyotard as the impossibility of `engendering' a speculative `result' 
from the mythological discourse of Nazism: 
Here is a name [`Auschwitz'] within which speculative thought 
would not take place. It wouldn't therefore, be a name in Hegel's 
sense, as that figure of memory which assures the permanence 
of the referent and of its senses when spirit had destroyed its 
signs. It would be a name without a speculative `name', not 
sublatable [irreducible] into a concept [ The Diflerend, ßj152] 
This is a fundamental misrepresentation of the relationship between spirit as 
such, and the individual moments through which consciousness passes prior to 
absolute self-recognition. The Phenomenology's account of the development of 
consciousness towards absolute knowledge, grounds the necessity of mediation 
between subject and object (`truth and knowledge') in the historical 
contradictions of the abstract understanding (verstand). The `diversity though 
which self-consciousness develops towards recognition of its idea therefore, is 
j fully determined by the negative activity of finite spirit in relation to the forms 
of its misrecognition. In absolute knowledge however, the forms through which 
consciousness had substantiated itself are preserved as non-deterministic 
moments of self-determination; the autonomous existence of the subject is 
mediated through a `reflective' recognition of the contradictions which formed 
it, 
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While in the Phenomenology of Mind each moment is the 
distinction of knowledge and truth... Absolute Knowledge does 
not contain this distinction and supersession of distinction. 
Rather, since each moment has the form of the notion, it unites 
the objective form of the truth and the knowing self in an 
immediate unity. [Phenomenology, 805] 
As absolute self-reflection, consciousness ceases to be externally determined 
by 
the actuality of its forms. It is no longer the `natural' misrecognizing `ego' of the 
Phenomenology's historical exposition; but has become existence in and for 
itself, the `restless activity of negation'. 
The `pure matter' which the French Enlightenment conceives as the true 
substance of ethical life, determines a violently idealistic and utilitarian 
revolution which destroys, rather than transforms the substance of actual 
social relations. From the perspective of absolute self-recognition, the Nazi 
discourse of `Aryan' superiority is determined by the same inability to reform 
the lawless ethical life which gives it its `vocation'. Self-consciousness 
redetermines the impossibility of a universal legislative `being' which remains 
absolutely distinct from the actual individualities which it purports to liberate. 
Ethical life cannot be sustained on the basis of the relationships of subjectivity 
to actuality posited by `alienated' spirit. 
Speculatively conceived, the event of `Auschwitz' is determined by a 
discourse of absolutely indeterminate `being' which destroys the actual 
substance of ethical life. Nazism's attempt to except the Jewish race from the 
concept of humanity, involves self-consciousness in a constant redefinition of 
`Aryan' purity: it cannot determine the `essence' of the particular which it must 
sustain as universally dominant. The discourse of Nazism, reproduces the 
dualistic determination of self-consciousness constituted in the Terror of the 
French Revolution. For although the latter explicitly invokes the concept of a 
universal `matter' of autonomous human association, the relation of its activity 
to the substance of ethical life is essentially violent and destructive. The 
necessity of sublating this perverted and perverting self-consciousness is not 
exclusively determined by its claim to speak for the `pure matter' of humanity. 
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It is the liquidating relationship of consciousness' revolutionary `culture' to the 
actual determinations of ethical life, which constitutes the contradictoriness of 
`alienated spirit', 
It is thus the interaction of pure knowledge with itself; pure 
knowledge qua essential reality is a universal will, while this 
essence is simply and sole pure knowledge... In the same way 
objective reality, `being', is for it absolutely self-less form; for 
that objective reality would be what is not known; this 
knowledge however, knows knowledge to be the essential fact. 
[Phenomenology, 6101 
What Lyotard alights upon when he claims that the `Rational terror [of the 
French Revolution] is inclusive and progressive'37, is not the definitive 
recognition of Hegel's alienated spirit. The dialectic of the `Terror', as it is 
expounded in the text of the Phenomenology, is the historical conclusion of self- 
consciousness' development through the `culture' of dualistic subjectivity. The 
destructive relation through which the French Enlightenment perverts and 
disrupts the substance of the ethical, produces the transition to morality. It is 
this universal `vocation' of self-consciousness to form ethical life which 
determines the `recognition' of rational individuality as the ground of abstract 
rights and bourgeois property law. The abstractly free will becomes the locus of 
absolute respect and dignity. 38 
That the Nazi terror fails to `engender' such a determinate `result' however, 
does not, as Lyotard maintains, foreclose upon the possibility of ethical 
mediation. Taken speculatively, the discourse of Nazism is determined as a 
`culture' of self-consciousness whose activity deepens the lawlessness of the 
ethical life which produces it. The projects of racial purification and global 
conquest which ultimately bring destruction to the ethical life of the nation 
state, derive from the demands of an unspecifiable `matter' of pure humanity 
(the concept of the original `Aryan' being). The heterogeneity of law and 
obligation as they are constituted in the Nazi mythology does not simply negate 
the aporetic determination of consciousness' `subjective culture'. As an 
objective, historical moment, the Reich could not maintain its racial discourse 
as the ground of a substantive ethical life; while in terms of spirits' `reflective' 
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determination as absolute knowing, the culture of Nazism is recognized as a 
`form' (of self-consciousness) which necessarily returns individuality to 
nothingness. 
Nazism's reformative intention, like that of the French Revolution, is 
constituted as an irrational belief which violently disrupts the substance of 
ethical life: the `pre-modernity' of the Nazi discourse reproduces a form of self- 
consciousness which the Phenomenology has shown to be ethically and 
politically inadequate. The content of the Aryan mythology therefore, must 
be 
understood in terms of the relationship of self-consciousness to the ethical 
substance which determines it, and which is determined by it. The lawlessness 
and destitution of the Weimar Republic forces self-consciousness to find 
satisfaction in a mythology which ultimately completes its loss of substance. 
`Auschwitz' does not present a discrete, `non-totalizable' moment to speculative 
thought, but determines the extremity of self-consciousness' alienation from 
substantive ethical existence. The liquidating heterogeneity of law and 
obligation which appears in the extermination camps, is part of the `Aryan' self- 
consciousness' destructive vocation to purify itself and its world. 
Lyotard's conception of `Auschwitz' as the historical event which cannot be 
speculatively sublated, relies upon a misrepresentation of the relationship of 
spirit to its forms which is expounded in the Phenomenology. The destructively 
idealistic self-consciousness which emerges from the French Enlightenment, is 
the historical form whose contradictions demonstrate the impossibility of 
determining ethical life through an unmediated `general will'. The transition 
from self-consciousness' belief in a universal `matter' of human association to 
the rational necessity of the morally autonomous individual, is produced 
through the destructive actuality of `Absolute freedom'. 
The `culture' of the French Revolution, produces the moral Autonomy of the 
will as a concrete necessity for natural consciousness. The particularity of this 
sublation however, does not determine the `distinctiveness', or `specific 
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existence', of the form of alienated spirit which is preserved in absolute self- 
recognition. In thinking itself through the concrete determinations of ethical 
life, self-consciousness returns to the culture of `alienated spirit' as a form 
which cannot determine ethical activity. The `reflective' awareness of knowing 
does not depend on production of novel contradictions from the substance of 
actual states: its 'freedom' is the power to determine its existence through `self- 
recollection' of the forms through which it has developed. 
`Auschwitz' does not `block' speculative thinking. Its essential determination 
is the destructive relationship which the `Aryan' culture assumes to ethical life; 
and as such, can be speculatively `thought' in terms of its fatal contradiction of 
the law of the notion. 
Nazism, by its determination to carry out the genocide of the Jewish race and 
the subjugation of all non-Aryans, is recognized as determining the necessity of 
its own destruction. The demand to actualize the original superiority of the 
race, not only in the internal ethical constitution of the state, but also in the 
acquisition of new `living space' for the Reich, necessitates conflict with all 
those nations who oppose the destiny of the `Aryan' race. That the Third Reich 
was ultimately `put down' by war and invasion therefore, is part of the actual 
determinations of Nazism's racial politics. The absolute heterogeneity of law 
and obligation which determines the genocidal imperative of this discourse, 
cannot engender a substantively new mediation. The moral self-consciousness 
which followed the terror of the Revolution has already been produced and 
sublated in spirit's historical development. Thus, Nazism's destruction is 
recognized by speculative thinking as the necessary consequence of its 
relationship to the substance of ethical life: the law of the notion (infinitely self- 
determining subjectivity) `re-cognizes' its necessity through the reappearance of 
absolute lawlessness and `barbarism'. 
For Hegel, the concept of `the good' cannot be posited in a definitive 
statement. It is only through the recognition of positing as inadequate to realize 
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the absolute, that speculative thought has the power to reform the actuality of 
ethical life. The law of the Notion does not, as Lyotard's argument maintains, 
demand the infinite reproduction of substantially new contradictions and 
mediations; but determines the finitude of ethical life through the (abstract) 
forms set out in the Logic and the Phenomenology. 
... good 
in its concrete existence is not only subject to destruction 
of external contingency and by evil, but by the collision and 
conflict of the good itself. [Science of Logic, 820] 
Absolute ethical life cannot cease to be speculative; it is always `afflicted with a 
determinateness of subjectivity'39 which contradicts the idea of the Notion. This 
contradiction however, does not take the form of an (unrecognized) external 
domination; the law of the Notion is present in every form of subjectivity which 
becomes determinate within the state. As such, this law neither constitutes the 
`actual' as dominant over the self-reflection of consciousness, nor determines 
consciousness itself as an absolute demand (Sollen) ranged against all 
immediate existence. The `Idea of the Good' is determined as the `real necessity' 
through the contingent determinations of actuality. 
The law of Nazism reproduces the contradictory determination of 
consciousness as a `culture' of pure, destructive subjectivity. The evil which is 
perpetrated through this mythology of `Aryan' destiny therefore, destroys the 
actual melcliations by which the ethical life of the state is sustained. Every 
desire, endeavour, or satisfaction constituted within this life becomes subject to 
the absolute demand of the race; there is no possibility of realizing the good in 
any (objective) form, other than the nihilizing activity of service to race. As 
Arendt remarks in her analysis of totalitarian movements, `[they] can remain in 
power only so long as they can keep moving and set everything around them in 
motion'. 40 The hegemony of the Nazi law, destroys the determinateness of 
subjectivity through which the idea 'of the good is made actual. Speculative 
recognition of this law as a self-destructive `evil', is possible only within states 
which recognize the actual finitude of subjectivity. 
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The idea of the good determines ethical life through finite spirit's recognition 
of `real necessity' in its own contingent forms. Hegel remarks in the Logic, 
This necessity is at the same time relative... it has its starting 
point in the contingent... the real actual is the determinate 
actual, and has first of all its determinateness as immediate 
being in the fact that its is a multiplicity of existing 
circumstances [Science of Logic, 549] 
Speculatively conceived, the concept of a universal (`self-existent') selfhood is 
constantly re-formed within the absolute ethical determinations of particular 
states, all of which remain subject to the violence and dissolution of finitude. 
Lyotard's demand that speculative thinking ought to be able to `name' a specific 
moment of ethical mediation `resulting' from the Nazi discourse fails to 
recognize that the substance of good cannot be determined through what is 
essentially a `culture' of self-consciousness. The law of Nazism contributes to 
spirit's absolute self-knowledge through its ultimate destruction of the nation- 
state which it intends to reform. Empirical history, in other words, reproduces 
this contradictory `culture' of self-consciousness as a moment of absolute 
domination of the German nation-state by the `Aryan' mythology: it is the 
objective necessity of its destruction which must be recognized by speculative 
thought. 
Speculative philosophy therefore, is not `blocked' by the Nazi discourse and 
the event of `Auschwitz'. On the contrary, the necessity of the law of the notion 
is `re-cognized' in the objectively determined fate of Nazism to destroy itself, the 
`adversaries' who put an end to the Reich are not, as Lyotard contends, 
powerless to refute the Nazi mythology, or to think speculatively about the 
event of the holocaust. It is for them, as ethical forms, that the speculative 
determination of Nazism is not only possible, but necessary. 
Lyotard's understanding of `Auschwitz' as `an experience of language which 
brings speculative discourse to a halt'41 therefore, is based upon a fundamental 
misrepresentation of speculative method. His reduction of the method 
expounded in the Logic and the Phenomenology to the operation of a 
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predetermined `result' (the Notion, Absolute Knowing), produces an impossibly 
abstract, non-historical conception of the Nazi genocide. It is only by 
abstracting the racial `culture' of Nazism from the historical context into which 
it emerges, in other words, that Lyotard is able to sustain the idea of 
`Auschwitz' as an absolutely non-speculative moment. 
The intention of this `speculative' exposition of Lyotard's idea of `Auschwitz', 
is not simply to show that his understanding of Nazism is `wrong', but that it is 
part of a basic misrepresentation which is continued throughout the text of The 
Differend. By demonstrating that the historical event of `Auschwitz' does have 
a speculative significance, the possibility of maintaining thinking's relation to 
the present as absolute heterogeneity and contingency, is refuted. The ethical 
significance of Lyotard's idea of the differend, in other words, is crucially 
undermined; for without the necessity of spontaneous `linkage' onto the 
present, the phrasing of `wrong' is reduced to an abstract and subjective `law of 
the heart'. 
Thus, the basic ground of a speculative understanding of Lyotard's project is 
established. Ethical and political claims cannot be made on the basis of 
absolute, spontaneous heterogeneity; and it is in trying to carry out just this 
project, that Lyotard systematically misrepresents both Kant and Hegel. The 
following three chapters, therefore, will show that in misrepresenting Kant's 
critical philosophy, Lyotard fails to recognize the import of Hegel's critique of 
Kant, and its significance for ethical and political thought. 
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Chapter I 
Notes 
1. Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Differend, trans. Georges Van Den Abbeele, 
Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1988. 
2. See Theodor W. Adorno, `Meditations on Metaphysics' in Negative 
Dialectics, trans. E. B. Ashton, London: Routledge, 1973. 
3. Both Readings, in his Introducing Lyotard: Art and Politics (London: 
Routledge, 1991), and Bennington, in his Lyotard: Writing the Event 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988), are concerned to endorse 
the dislocating non-objectivity of the phrase. Bennington expounds 
Lyotard's concept of the phrase as the `analogical or symbolic' form of 
presentation whose indubitability lies precisely in the `fact' of its non- 
objectivity. `The sentence [phrase] is an analogical presentation of the 
event, which is as such unpresentable' [Lyotard: Writing the Event, 177]. 
For Readings, it is the singularity and non-contextuality of the moment of 
linkage (phrasing of the event) which remains always undetermined by 
genres of discourse; `... the "phrase", as the elementary particle is 
resistance to grand narratives and metalanguages' [Introducing Lyotard, 
1131. Chapters one and two however, will show that the non-objectivity of 
the temporal instant constitutes a negative ('sceptical') relation of self- 
consciousness to its experience, which cannot produce any substantive 
judgement. Mind is reduced to a doubt which doubts its own negativity. 
4. For Lyotard, Western, or `Occidental' philosophy, is characterized in 
general by a desire to represent the world of `events' as a congruent totality, 
and so give its ethical and political projects secure transcendental 
foundations [Heidegger and `the jews', 22]. According to Lyotard's account, 
this tendency to represent and formulate the contingency of particular 
events within the `architectonic' systems of reason, constitutes an 
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indeterminate `otherness' which it can never `forget' nor sublate. It is this 
impossibility of `forgetting' those excepted from discourses of legitimation 
(`the jews'), and the `unconscious affect' which this constantly reproduces 
`outside' representational thinking, that Lyotard proposes as the power 
originating the Nazi Holocaust. The death camps attest to the `unthinkable' 
otherness which philosophy attempts to forget, and which Nazism tries to 
annihilate both in fact and in memory. Lyotard remarks of the Holocaust, 
`The solution was to be final: the final answer to the "Jewish" question. It 
was necessary to carry out right up to its conclusion, to "terminate" the 
interminable. And thus to terminate the term itself [Heidegger and `the 
jews, 22]. 
5. The Differend, 126. 
6. Ibid., 1158. 
7. Ibid., 197. 
8. Ibid., 9[60. 
9. Ibid., p94. 
10. Ibid., p96. 
11. Ibid., p97. 
12. G. W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind, trans. J. B. Baillie, New York: 
Harper and Row, 1967. 
13. Ibid., 96. 
14. Bennington remarks in Lyotard: Writing the Event, `Any "we", even that of 
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"humanity" 
... 
is dispersed: which is why Auschwitz is something new, and 
why it brings down the self of the speculative dialectic. Auschwitz is 
therefore immediately the question of `after Auschwitz', if not enough of a 
"we" remains to ponder the dispersion of the we at Auschwitz' [Lyotard: 
Writing the Event, 1511. 
(t 
is remark brings out the fundamental 
misrecognition of Hegels speculative phenomenology which is maintained 
throughout The Differend. Speculative exposition of self-consciousness' 
relation to the totality of ethical life does not attempt constantly to 
determine `new' categories of ethical sublation. The concept of spirit cannot 
be conceived in terms of an infinite accommodation of ethical dissolution. 
Rather, the question of `after Auschwitz' must be approached in terms of 
the breakdown of the substance of ethical life which produced the death 
camps, and the possibility of empirical history reconstituting equally, or 
even more destructive distortions of subjectivity. 
15. The Diii`erend, p97. 
16. For Lyotard, the `law' of the SS is non-speculative because its `mythological' 
infinitude cannot pass over into the finite forms of work and conscience 
which the speculative concept of law requires; just as the deportees' 
obligation to die cannot pass over into the infinite. `The infinity of the 
legislator', he argues, `would have to become for itself the finitude (of a good 
conscience, of the absence of risk, of force); the finitude of the obligated one 
would have to become for itself the infinity (that he knows and wants the 
law ordering his death)' ['Discussions, or phrasing "after Auschwitz"', trans. 
Georges Van Den Abbeele, in ed. A. Benjamin, The Lyotard Reader, Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell, 1989,3791. The `we' of universal subjectivity cannot, on 
this reading, emerge from the `Auschwitzian' determination of `normative' 
and `prescriptive' phrases. Lyotard's exposition however, fails to conceive 
that this very discontinuity of law and obligation has a profoundly 
speculative significance. It is through its inability to re-cognize the 
necessity of the law, self-consciousness becomes part of a violently idealistic 
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`culture', which spirit, as the activity of `world mind' [Philosophy of Right, 
1352], must act against. 
17. The Differend, 1152. 
18. Ibid., 97 
19. Ibid., 7103 
20. For Lyotard, the event of `Auschwitz' necessitates acknowledgement that 
the `moments, formations, and entities' [Heidegger and `the jews', 291 
through which Western philosophical thought attempts to constitute its 
historical `memory' of the present totality, are always subverted by an 
indeterminate otherness which afflicts every attempt at sublation. 
Following Adorno's exposition of the Holocaust in Negative Dialectics, 
Lyotard maintains that `Auschwitz' is the ruination of thinking's systematic 
pursuit of identity; that the evil of the death camps can only be attested to 
by writing the untotalizable complaints and sufferings which survive the 
Nazi slaughter. Testimonies to the event of mechanized destruction of the 
Jewish people, as Primo Levi observed in The Drowned And The Saved, can 
only be of limited significance; they can do no more than hint at the 
experience of the `complete witnesses whose disposition would have a 
general significance' [Primo Levi, The Drowned And The Saved]. In his 
`Meditations on Metaphysics' [Negative Dialectics, 361-408], Adorno 
remarks that `after Auschwitz' it is only through such `micrological' 
testimony that dialectics can sustain its claim to proceed through 
presuppositionless critique. `Micrology', he remarks, `is the place where 
metaphysics finds haven from totality. No absolute can be expressed 
otherwise than in topics and categories of immanence, although neither in 
its conditionality nor as its totality is immanence to be deified' [Negative 
Dialectics, 407]. For Lyotard however, not even a `negative dialectics' can 
survive absolute heterogeneity of law and obligation which 1 qpj ei}s at 
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`Auschwitz'. Adorno's project presupposes the same rule of immanent 
derivation which allows speculative dialectics to re-engender constantly the 
`we' that `results' in universal selfhood. Negative dialectics, by always 
rejecting the immanence of identity, also, on Lyotard's reading, constitutes 
a teleological project in which the `critique' of representation becomes an 
end in itself. `Otherness' is never allowed to express ('phrase') the 
particularity of the wrong done to it. 
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misrepresenting consciousness and a lawless world' [Gillian Rose, Hegel 
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Chapter II 
Presentation, Misrecognition and Ethical Life 
The phrase, for Lyotard, presents the event as the irreducible discontinuity 
of past and future. This discontinuousness is disclosed by phrases as the 
undetermined necessity of linkage onto the `current' phrase, which is itself a 
moment of contingent linkage onto a prior occurrence (phrase event). Phrases 
then, occupy present time as particular universes (i. e. disposition of sense, 
referent, addressees and addressors) which necessitate linkage, but which 
cannot predetermine what that linkage must be, 
One phrase calls forth another, whichever this might be. It is 
this, the passage, the time, the phrase (the time in the phrase, 
the phrase in time) that survives the test of doubt. Neither the 
sense of the phrase, nor its reality are irreducible. [The 
Differend, ¶102] 
Thus Lyotard's attempt to write the uniqueness and contingency of the event is 
disclosed through the idea of `presentation', or the indeterminate `what' (of 
occurrence) which is both disclosed and undisclosed by phrase regimes. The 
indubitability of the phrase, in other words, is its simple irreducibility: 
everything that can be addressed to the phrase must itself be phrased, must 
itself be an occurrence. Presentation as such, of the phrases' discrete 
determination of the immediate, cannot be presented; it remains an 
inescapable indeterminacy which the current phrase always `forgets'. 1 
Being therefore, is infinitely dispersed through the temporality of 
presentation; that is, through the necessary contemporaneity of one phrase, 
and the necessity of contingent linkage onto phrases, 
The necessity of there being And a phrase is not logical (the 
question of `How? ') but ontological (the question of `What? ') [ The 
Differend, 1103]. 
To `present' the being of a phrase is to determine it as an `existent' within a 
phrase universe, and so once again to `forget' the occurrence of an 
undetermined moment of presentation. This however, does not mean that 
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phrases `operate' to defer the presentation of their presentation; there is no 
functional identity among them. Rather, phrases are simply the uniqueness of 
their occurrence; they are, `Not Being, but one being, one time, [un etre, une 
fois]'. 2 
Generic discourses are related to phrase regimen as `unique finalities' [91180] 
competing to appropriate the occurrence for their particular `ends'. Genres, in 
other words, articulate an idea which places the heterogeneity of immediate 
presentation within an homogenizing teleology, 
The abyss that separates them [phrase regimen] would be, if not 
filled in , at 
least covered over or spanned by the teleology of 
genres of discourse. [The Differend, 1180] 
Each genre claims to determine the `true' significance of the phrases' 
immediate presentation, and to subsume that presentation under a universal 
necessity. Thus differends occur through the contingency of linkage onto the 
event. In attempting to appropriate the `Is it happening? ' for their particular 
`ends', genres present heterogeneous discourses for which there is no universal 
moment of mediation or judgement. Lyotard's conception of the ethical 
therefore, is fundamentally determined by the temporality of presentation: : 
`obligation' to the otherness which is always co-present with representational 
discourse, is a pure spontaneity which cannot be reduced to diachronic time. 
The immediacy of presentation constitutes the necessity of phrasing wrong and 
victimization independently of predetermined concepts; that is, of judging the 
incommensurability of heterogeneous genres. 
The idea of presentation which Lyotard expounds in The Differend, has its 
roots in the unintuitable, undelimitable energy of the `libidinal band', the 
violence of whose relation to conceptuality Lyotard sets out in his Libidinal 
Economy. 3 Nothing which occurs within the `primary process' of the libido is 
spatially or temporally describable; as pure immediacy, or intensity, each 
`segment' is forgotten before language can even begin to describe it. In The 
Differend, this unpresentability is re-articulated as the ontological necessity of 
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the phrase: each regime presents a `universe' within which presentation as 
such cannot appear. For Lyotard, linkage onto the current phrase can never be 
produced through conceptual necessity: it is always an `event' in which 
predetermined necessity is called into question for critical judgement. The 
reading of speculative thought which Lyotard develops in the `Result' section of 
The Differend, attempts to show that Hegel's exposition of the development of 
consciousness, is determined by a metaphysical idea of the self (Selbst). The 
transitions described in the Phenomenology, in other words, are presented as 
entailed in a `protocol', or set of rules, which predetermine the `productive' 
aporias and contradictions set out in the history of self-consciousness. On this 
reading, the development of natural consciousness towards self-recognition, is 
maintained only through Hegel's fixing of its actuality in the idea of universal 
selfhood. Speculative exposition is dominated, according to Lyotard, by the 
necessity to produce dialectical sublations of an `otherness' which it has already 
produced as sublatable. 
This understanding of speculative philosophy as a form of generic discourse 
fundamentally misrepresents the conception of actuality which is developed in 
the Phenomenology. Each of the moments through which Hegel expounds the 
development of self-consciousness is concretely historical: the aporias set out in 
the body of the Phenomenology, are identical with the work, satisfaction and 
desire formed within the particularity of ethical life. Speculative 
phenomenology therefore, expounds the development of consciousness through 
its misrecognitions of its own actuality. The contradictions which drive this 
development impose nothing external upon the `special and peculiar character'4 
of each ethical form; they articulate the abstraction of difference (particularity) 
from the objective conditions in which it is actual (Sittlichkeit). The argument 
set out in this chapter will show that Lyotard's idea of `presentation', and the 
ethical and political problematics which are conditioned by it, presuppose a 
reading of Kant's First Critique which fundamentally misrecognizes the 
significance of transcendental subjectivity. 
0 
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The critique of Kant which Hegel develops throughout his speculative 
writing therefore, expounds the lack of unity posited and re-posited throughout 
the critical philosophy: the transcendental subject, according to Hegel's 
reading, has its true significance in the abstract particularity produced through 
its practical and theoretical determinations of reason. It is this lack of unity 
which Lyotard appropriates from the critical philosophy. The transcriptions of 
the First and Second Critiques which are set out in The Differend, attempt to 
show that the moments of conjunction (Darstallung) articulated in critical 
ethics and epistemology, disclose an otherness which remains undetermined by 
the transcendentality of the subject. Lyotard's reading of the Third Critique 
attempts to show that judgement is the spontaneous condition of 
`transcendental realms of legitimacy's; and that this spontaneity can only be 
`obligated'6 to its originary power of phrasing difference and differends. The 
argument I will develop through the rest of the thesis, is that Lyotard's 
appropriation of heterogeneity and spontaneity from the critical philosophy, 
fails to re-cognize the significance of Hegel's critique of Kant; and that this 
failure is played out in the aporias which afflict his ethical and political 
problematics. Initially therefore, I will examine Lyotard's attempt to transcribe 
phenomenal experience as critical philosophy's original `negotiation' of 
otherness. 
Speculative philosophy expounds the development of self-consciousness 
through the necessary elements of its finitude: desire (the conception of need), 
work (transformative activity), and enjoyment (consumption, satisfaction of 
need), are `actualities' which natural self-consciousness must ultimately 
acknowledge as rationally mediated determinations. The abstractions through 
which consciousness misrecognizes its substance, are the same forms through 
which its activity becomes identical, with the `reflective' re-cognition of absolute 
knowing. Hegel's idea of spirit, in other words, is not opposed to the being, or 
finitude, of self-consciousness; rather it is the recognition and realization of 
that finitude.? 
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Both Hegel and Lyotard, in setting out their respective positions on ethics 
and philosophy, develop sustained critiques of Kant's general claim that 
knowledge as such, is always cognitively determined. Lyotard's reading of 
Kant's account of phenomenal experience in the First Critique, is an attempt to 
show that the idea of critical subjectivity entails the domination of 
`presentation' by `representation'. Cognition, or the rules of the `cognitive 
genre', has suppressed the `givenness' of the `is it happening? '. This reading 
however, fails to recognize the actuality of Kant's critical subject: it gives no 
account of how phenomenal experience is related to the concrete 
determinations of self-consciousness. Lyotard's misrepresentation of Hegel's 
speculative phenomenology therefore, conditions an understanding of Kant's 
doctrine of experience which reinforces the aporias of subjective finitude. 
The reading of the critical philosophy which Lyotard articulates through four 
separate notices in The Differend, is a sustained attack upon Kant's notion of 
Darstallung, or the possibility of conjoining the `heterogeneous faculties'8 of a 
transcendental subject. This critical idea of a necessary `adjunction' of discrete 
faculties of knowledge, in other words, is presented as the moment at which the 
heterogeneity of generic discourse invades the cognitive integrity of the 
Kantian subject. 
The presentation [of a particular `cognition'] does not come from 
anywhere other than the subject, it is the confrontation of the 
subjects' works with other works by the subject, except that 
their joining together... takes place between the heterogeneous 
faculties, that is, between phrases subject to different regimens 
or genres. ' [The Differend, 641 
The `protocol' of the cognitive genre (subsumption of objects under a priori 
concepts) is unable to contain the differends which necessarily emerge among 
transcendental faculties. Thus, Kant's attempt to establish philosophy on the 
ground of the proper determination of `cognitions, ' is for Lyotard always 
confronted with the impossible task of constituting `universal rules of 
judgement between heterogeneous genres'. 9 
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The thesis which is maintained throughout the critical philosophy, is that all 
true knowledge is grounded in objective processes of cognition. In the Critique 
of Judgement, Kant states explicitly that the `realms' of theoretical and 
practical reason determined in the first two Critiques, constitute a division 
within the single `territory' of the will's a priori legislative activity: each of 
these realms is exclusively governed buy the faculty through which its laws are 
prescribed. The problem which Kant specifies in the introduction to the Third 
Critique, is how it can be possible for the rational cognition of autonomy, to be 
reconciled with the heterogeneous determination of phenomenal experience. 
How, in other words, is it possible to bridge the `great gulf determined by 
faculties whose legislation appears as radically heterogeneous. 10 
The concept of judgement which Kant elaborates in the Third Critique, is a 
transcendental faculty of `reflection' which refers the contingency of theoretical 
explanations to a higher, although unknowable, unity in the manifold of 
particular appearances. The aesthetic and teleological judgements expounded 
in the Third Critique, are both reflective moments which presuppose the 
`determining intelligence' of God as the condition of this unity. Attributions of 
beauty or finality to nature in other words, take their transcendental necessity 
from the critical demand that cognitions must be completely determined by 
their a priori conditions: reflective judgements unify these cognitions as they 
are contingently presented through determinate judgements of the 
understanding (Verstande). The `gulf between the cognitions of practical and 
theoretical reason is bridged by the a priori `faculty' of regarding nature as in 
conformity with the ends of autonomous intelligence. 
It is the project of the Third Critique therefore, which reveals the actuality of 
the self-consciousness determined in the critical philosophy. The faculties of 
Kant's transcendental subject are constitutive of cognitive knowledge: they 
determine a priori conditions which are not of themselves reflective or self- 
aware. 
We cannot conceive ... the finality that must be introduced as the basis of even our knowledge of the ... possibility of many 
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natural things, except by representing it ... as the product of an intelligent cause.... [Critique of Teleological Judgement, 53] 
These faculties do not `think' themselves in relation to the `otherness' they 
presuppose and constantly redetermine: they are simply the formal conditions 
through which that `otherness' is presented (i. e. in the autonomous realms of 
rational self-determination and heteronomous causality). Kant's concept of 
reflective judgement therefore, discloses the abstract heterogeneity of practical 
and theoretical faculties which determine two autonomous and exclusive 
realms of cognition. The categorical imperative commands the will 
unconditionally; while judgements of the understanding determine the 
heteronomous causality of phenomena. Both these realms of legislation 
constitute subjectivity as a form beyond concrete mediation: the `transcendental 
unity' which underlies determinate judgements of experience, is itself 
uncognizable; while the `noumenal causality' of the will is distinguished 
categorically from cognitive representations, 
the concept of nature represents its objects as mere phenomena, 
whereas the concept of freedom presents in its object what is no 
doubt a thing in itself, but does not make it intuitable, and 
further that neither one is capable therefore, of furnishing 
theoretical cognition of its Object (or even the thinking Subject) 
as a thing-in-itself. [Critique of Judgement, 131 
The juridical reading of Kant's transcendental subject which Lyotard 
expounds in The Differend, fails to recognize the formal exclusivity of the 
faculties which determine its experience. The idea of an inner `litigation' of 
faculties in which each criticizes the other through `confrontation of their 
respective objects'12, posits a relatedness which Kant's exposition of practical 
and theoretical reason excludes. The idea of reflective judgement presupposes 
`the one-sidedness of subjectivity and the one-sidedness of objectivity'13: Kant's 
aesthetic and teleological mediations remain subjective precisely because 
phenomenal cognition excludes the possibility of re-cognizing substantive 
difference. Lyotard's transcription of transcendental subjectivity therefore, 
imposes its juridical structure on the abstract legislations of practical and 
theoretical reason: each is presented as knowing the object of the other. 14 It is 
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the critical philosophy's very failure to expound the objectivity of this 
relatedness, which constitutes the substance of Hegel's critique of Kant. The 
opposition of theoretical reason to practical self-determination, is what 
underlies the aporias of moral consciousness. 15 For Lyotard however, this 
mediation is infinitely deferred within the subject: its failure to occur is 
determined with the genre ('cognition) which seeks to `exclude' the absolute 
heterogeneity of the event. 
The discrete faculties which Kant attempts to expound within the cognitive 
genre, are presented in The Differend as forms which infinitely redetermine 
their negative self-identity. Each discrete moment of cognitive representation is 
aware of itself as related to an object to which it is opposed. It is this infinite 
redetermination of otherness which, for Lyotard, constitutes the critical 
philosophy's disclosure of the heterogeneity and contingency of the phrase. The 
object of each form of representation (moral, aesthetic, teleological or 
theoretical), always invokes a judgement of legitimacy which, on Lyotard's 
reading cannot be contained within the structure of cognition. The phrase, in 
other words, cannot be reduced to the metalanguage of subjective faculties: 
each moment of representation is a `presentation' which spontaneously 
necessitates judgement of difference. This conception of transcendental 
subjectivity as both disclosing and suppressing the spontaneous reception of 
difference, is a misrepresentation of its abstractness. The `metaphysical' unity 
of the transcendental subject, which Lyotard understands as an imposition on 
the spontaneous presentation of the phrase, is without substance or actuality: 
the Kantian self-consciousness is originally split into antagonistic forms which 
are constantly reproduced by its activity. It is this formal separation and 
difference which is presupposed and reinforced throughout The Differences 
ethical and political problematics. 
Lyotard's concern with the First Critique, is focussed on Kant's exposition of 
the relationship between `form' and `substance' of intuition set out in the 
Transcendental Aesthetic. For it is at this point that the differend between 
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transcendentally legislative faculties, and the heterogeneity which these 
faculties determine cognitively, is disclosed in an attempt to contain the 
manifold sensory affections (pure immediacy) within the modes of intuition. On 
Lyotard's reading, the `negotiation' of the event which is presupposed by Kant's 
juridical organization of cognitions, is made through the First Critique's 
account of sensible intuition: the `otherness' of `matter' is exteriorized and 
`forgotten' through the formative moments of spatial and temporal extension. 
For Lyotard, it is only through this original neutralization of the event, that 
transcendental subjectivity is able to suppress the immediacy of the phrase 
within a structure of (juridical) litigations. 
In the `Transcendental Aesthetic', Kant attempts to establish that all 
possible objects of theoretical understanding, are constituted through 
determinate judgements which conjoin intuitions and concepts, 
The capacity (receptivity) for receiving representations through 
the mode in which we are affected by objects, is entitled 
sensibility. Objects are given to us by means of sensibility; and 
it alone yields us intuitions; they are thought through the 
understanding, and from the understanding arise concepts. But 
all thought must, directly or indirectly, by way of certain 
characters, relate ultimately to intuitions, and therefore, with 
us, to sensibility, because in no other way can an object be given 
to us. [Critique of Pure Reason, 65] 
Concepts without intuitions are empty analytic unities; while intuitions 
without concepts present only disarticulated impressions. Lyotard's reading of 
Kant's idea of sensory affection however, presents the `givenness', or `matter', 
which precedes representation in space and time, as an `idiom' which cannot be 
transcendentally phrased. Thus, the activity of the Transcendental Aesthetic' 
is a negotiation of immediacy: it is the critical subject's original act of 
conjoining which brings together the two irreducibly heterogeneous `idioms' of 
affection and intuition, 
this passage apparatus [13 arstSll ung] as already occurred in the Transcendental Aest tic: the-faculty of receiving sensible impressions is `bridged' with the faculty of coordinating and objectifying them in the forms of space and time. [The Differend, `Kant Notice', 62] 
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This activity of the Kantian subject (D a rs ta I1 ung, or the 
conjunction/representation of the objects of heterogeneous faculties) excludes 
the immediacy of the phrase event which, for Lyotard, is the locus of absolute 
contingency (the spontaneity of `linkage'). The judgements of Kant's 
transcendental subjectivity are presented in The Differend as `situating' the 
objects of discrete faculties within the genre of cognition, 
the doubling or redoubling that already affects sensibility [in 
the Transcendental Aesthetic] indicates that the subject cannot 
have presentations, but only representations... in the juridical 
sense where the faculties keep making representations, 
remonstrances or grievances to each other through the 
confrontation of their respective objects. [The Differend, 62. ] 
It is only by attributing discrete awareness to the faculties of the 
transcendental subject, that Lyotard is able to render its experience of objects 
in space and time, as experience (feeling, emotion) of the differend between the 
idioms of `form' and `matter' of intuition. 16 Kant's negotiation of the `givenness' 
of affections therefore, is presented as a particular disposition of activity and 
passivity ('addressor' and `addressee') between the intuitive faculties, or 
`phrasings' of the transcendental subject; a disposition which cannot suppress 
the experience of contingency and heterogeneity presented idiom of `matter'. 
Critical philosophy's acknowledgement of an empirical, intuitive element in the 
constitution of phenomenal experience, in other words, is construed by Lyotard 
as disclosing the complete contingency of linkage onto the `current phrase', 
The superimposing of the form phrase, that of the active 
subject, the addressor, on to the matter phrase, in whose 
universe the subject is addressee, transcendental idealism 
comes to cover over empirical realism. It does not suppress it. 
This is why the [phenomenological, cognitive] covering becomes 
unstable. [The Differend, 63] 
The transcendental subjectivity which Kant adduces as the condition of 
phenomenal experience, cannot be reduced to the `litigation' of discrete, self- 
conscious faculties. I will argue that the truth of its `representations' (of 
experience, autonomy and judgement) is re-cognizable only through their 
relation to the objective historical forms (of work, satisfaction, desire and 
otherness) which they reflect and reinforce. 
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Speculatively understood, the `Transcendental Aesthetic', by its specification 
of the spatial and temporal immediacy of the object, determines consciousness' 
most abstract moment of awareness: the `I' of pure, abstract immediacy. The 
development of this consciousness, which Hegel sets out in the forms of 'Sense- 
certainty', `Perception', and the inverting activity of the `Understanding' 
(Verstande), presents the critical subject through a speculative exposition of 
abstract otherness, in which consciousness always lacks concrete self- 
recognition. None of the subject-object relations which are specified in the 
Phenomenology as determining `consciousness', are capable of determining 
concrete self-awareness. Lyotard's `juridical' conception of transcendental 
faculties therefore, fails to recognize that the phenomenal experience of the 
critical subject is part of a phenomenology (historical determination) of 
objective self-recognition. 17 
Both Lyotard and Hegel develop their respective readings of Kant's 
philosophy from critiques of the relationship of sensory affection to the 
understanding presented in the `Transcendental Aesthetic'. For Lyotard, Kant's 
concepts of space and time as modes of intuition, represents an original 
`negotiation of the event'18 through the cognitive activity of a transcendental 
subject. The formation of disarticulated affections into phenomenal experience, 
is presented as the moment at which the subject confronts the immediacy of the 
occurrence, but confronts it only as the emotion of loss. The being of the 
phenomenon is produced through the exteriorization and forgetting of the 
unrepresentability of the pure immediate. Yet for Lyotard, this forgetting 
cannot be without affect on transcendental subjectivity: it is originally aware 
that it is only within the genre of cognitive representation that the deictic 
`idiom' is necessary. 
The subject knows its idiom, space time, can only accord 
referential value to a phrase uttered in this idiom... this is why 
sensation is made a feeling, that is, a phrase awaiting its 
expression, a silence treated with emotion. [The Differend, 631 
This reading of the First Critique foreshadows the ethical reception of 
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difference which is developed in The Differend's `notices' on the Second and 
Third Critiques, and in his essay Heidegger and "the jews': 19 Lyotard's 
understanding of the critical philosophy, presents the Kantian subject as 
related to a contingency whose (spatio-temporal) exclusion is experienced as a 
`loss'. The possibility of being ethically obligated therefore, cannot be 
represented in conceptual thought: it is the immediate sensitivity of thinking to 
the otherness which is co-present with the forms and categories of 
representation. 20 The reading of sensible intuition through which Lyotard 
presents the experience of loss however, fails to recognize the critique of 
abstract cognition which Hegel develops in the Phenomenology. The possibility 
of a spontaneous reception of difference, cannot be conceived as affectively 
(emotionally) presented in the experience of the critical subject. For it is only 
through the objective formation of ethical life necessitated by the negativity of 
abstract understanding21, that the actual significance of the subjective 
particular is recognizable. The relationship between difference and spontaneity, 
must be conceived in terms of the historical forms through which the subject 
misrecognizes itself. 
The dialectic of the understanding gives an account of the concept of `force' as 
an idea produced through a series of `reflective' determinations, whose lack of 
substantial identity finds its explicitude in Kant's separation of truth and 
experience. 22 The concept of force through which the understanding attempts to 
determine its object, is split into that which `has already expressed and 
externalized itself 23 in the differentiated forms of which it is the medium, and 
the undifferentiated `oneness' which exists outside of this essential 
determination of its being. The exteriority of this oneness to the determination 
of force as an object of knowledge, constitutes a contradiction through which 
this abstract side of the relation is `incited' to sublate itself into the moments in 
which it is manifest. The distinction between the two moments, abstract 
oneness, and the differentiated elements through which force actually reveals 
itself as a universal medium therefore, proves to be unsustainable. for the 
production of the particular events in which force is understood as the 
Presentation, Misrecognition and Ethical Life 67 
universal medium, occurs both where this production is the `incited' expression 
of force as `oneness', or `negative unity', and where this unity is external to the 
medium itself, merely `inciting' its efficiency. Neither of the terms through 
which force becomes knowledge, in other words, has an actual priority; each is 
a necessary determination of the other. The truth of these two moments of 
`inciting' and `incited' force `is simply in each being solely through the other, 
and each ceasing eo ipso to be what it is through the other'. 24 
Consciousness, as the abstract universality of understanding (Verstande, 
has become aware of itself as the realization of force (the two vanishing 
moments of incitement) which it had taken to be an external reality. The 
abstract inwardness in which the diverse moments of expression are 
`superseded', becomes fixed in the `notion' of force (qua notion), while the 
`medium' of these expressions becomes fixed in `force as substance'. These two 
moments however, do not remain abstract and indifferent to each other; 
consciousness posits the plurality of sensuous determinations as merely 
negative `appearances' incapable of articulating the true (noumenal) nature of 
reality. The truth immanent in appearances however, is that they are the 
manifestation of the `notion' (abstract unity) and `substance' (the `medium of 
diversity) of force to consciousness. These two moments, through which force 
has been constituted as an object of knowledge, are actually reciprocal 
determinations; each is either the `universal medium' or `negative unity' by 
which the being of force is sustained. The understanding, having separated 
these reciprocal moments into the abstract forms of noumena (the inverted 
world) and phenomena, becomes the point of mediation between them: what 
appears to it is recognized as an appearance of the `inner world', whose content 
is the relation of what is actually existent to a determinate essence. 
It is through the dialectic of the understanding therefore, that the necessity 
of substantive self-recognition is constituted. By the conclusion of its 
appearance as `consciousness', the unity of subjective knowing has the same 
internal structure as the experience it determines: it is an infinite process of 
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reciprocally sustained and vanishing forms. This inwardly related diversity is 
the moment at which formal self-consciousness emerges; for it is here that the 
identity of the `I' has become a circuit of self-attraction and repulsion of 
distinct, but intrinsically related elements. The objectivity which emerges from 
Hegel's dialectic of inversion therefore, is no longer abstractly differentiated 
and opposed; it is the process of `life', in which pure flux (the `medium' of 
diversity) and simple self-identity ('notion) are present as mediated elements. 
The impossibility of determining knowledge as pure `sense-immediacy', 
institutes the historical development of consciousness through misrecognition 
of actuality. Within the dialectic of consciousness itself this actuality proceeds 
through the epistemological presuppositions of empiricism and perception, 
towards the abstractly cognitive understanding of Kant's critical subject. This 
latter form of phenomenal `cognition' produces the moment of self- 
consciousness as such; for it is the understandings' separation of truth and 
appearance which produces consciousness' confirmation of itself in the 
objectivity it determines. Thus, the truth of self-consciousness, i. e. confirmation 
of independent selfhood in the other, proceeds from this formal self-recognition; 
for the dialectic of `life', through which this intersubjective confirmation 
becomes necessary, expounds the transitions of consciousness from an abstract 
identity in difference (the process of reciprocally sustained and vanishing 
forms) to desire and negation. Both the intuitive and discursive moments of 
phenomenal experience therefore, are shown in the Phenomenology as 
inadequate to produce a substantive self-awareness: the speculative 
significance of Kant's critical faculties is their ultimate determination of 
consciousness' actual negativity. 
Lyotard's reading of the First Critique as a cognitive determination 
(suppression) of the `givenness' of the phrase, fails to recognize that it is the 
absence of concrete self-awareness constituted in the relations of phenomenal 
experience, which is the truth of the Kantian subject. Speculatively understood, 
the discursive and intuitive faculties posited in the critical philosophy, exclude 
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substantive self-recognition; for it is through the aporetic structure of 
phenomenal experience that the actuality of the self, its desire, work and 
satisfaction, is historically determined. Lyotard's attribution of discrete self- 
awareness to Kant's cognitive faculties, constitutes critical epistemology as an 
hermetic system of `litigations'. This `juridical' conception of the critical subject 
presupposes an identity of self-consciousness with each of that subject's 
constitutive activities; the immediate occurrence of each `critical' phrase is 
posited as the necessity of an inner litigation which ruptures the unity of 
`representation'. Thus, it is only by abstracting the faculties of the Kantian 
subject from their actual determination of self-consciousness, that is, the lack of 
unity in its experience, that Lyotard is able to present the First Critique as a 
suppression of the absolute contingency of linkage onto the occurrence. 
Within the development set out in the Phenomenology, it is the pure 
negativity of consciousness which emerges from the speculative determination 
of phenomenal experience, that produces self-consciousness as such. For it is 
only where the desire of this negatively independent consciousness is 
objectified in the being of the other, that its self-awareness is confirmed: 
convinced of the nothingness of the other, it [self-consciousness] 
definitely affirms this nothingness to be for itself the truth of 
the other, negates the independent object, and thereby acquires 
the certainty of its own self, as a true certainty, a certainty 
which it has become aware of in objective form. 
[Phenomenology, 225] 
The forms of master and slave embody the victory of the desire for recognition 
over the desire for life; they represent the cessation of universal war through 
absolute self-conviction. This original moment of domination (of the master 
over the slave) is the moment through which the actuality (intersubjectivity) of 
self-consciousness comes into being. It carries with it no articulate recognition 
of universal subjectivity; for the slave submits to the master only because he 
does not want to die, and not because he recognizes his future position of 
servitude as a necessary moment in the development of self-consciousness. 
Thus what is constituted through the forms of master and slave, are the 
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conditions necessary to the development of self-consciousness through concrete 
forms of misrecognition. In the Phenomenology's account of intersubjectivity, 
the desire of generically negative consciousness for confirmation of its 
independence, achieves satisfaction in the form of the master. 25 His domination 
results from the capitulation of the other in the struggle for recognition; it is 
fear of death which commits the slave to his slavery. To the master, in other 
words, the slave is objectified in its dependence upon his will; he has assumed 
absolute power over the slave, the whole of whose activity is the cancellation of 
its independence. 
The master-slave relation is the point at which self-awareness ceases to be 
the atomistic form determined through critical faculties, or the generic 
negativity expounded in the dialectic of life and desire. What emerges from the 
struggle for recognition is the division of consciousness into the discrete forms, 
the being-in-and-for-itself of the master, and the being-for-another for the 
slave, whose intersubjectivity, or concrete `knowing', is the objective form of 
domination. The master recognizes himself only in the abstract volition of 
negative independence (his domination of the slave and consumption of the 
objects created for him); while the slave originally knows only the fear of death 
and absolute obligation to the master. Thus, the essentiality which the master 
takes himself to be, even though it has objective confirmation in the slave, is 
still only the self-assurance of negativity which has resulted from deliberately 
risking life. 
The significance of this relationship to a speculative understanding of 
Lyotard's idea of presentation is that it establishes the necessity of thought's 
relation to actuality without presupposing any positive recognition of universal 
selfhood. What is described by Hegel in the transition from `consciousness' to 
`self-consciousness', is the emergence of the conditions through which 
misrecognition of freedom and independence is possible. 
Self-consciousness exists in itself and for itself, in that it exists for another self-consciousness;, that is to say, it is only by being acknowledged, or `recognized'... This double meaning of what is distinguished lies in the nature of self-consciousness: of its 
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being infinite, or directly the opposite of the determinateness in 
which it is fixed. The detailed exposition of this spiritual unity 
in its duplication will bring before us the process of recognition. 
[Phenomenology of Mind, 2291 
The Phenomenology's account of the development of self-consciousness does not 
demonstrate the operation of universal selfhood, but show that the actuality of 
negative desire necessitates the emergence of objective forms of misrecognition. 
Lyotard's argument for the ontological primacy of phrasing therefore, fails to 
recognize the historical necessity of the forms through which concrete, ethical 
thinking develops. His claim that it is the immediacy of `presentation' which 
cannot be doubted, and which is the irreducible necessity of differends and 
ethical phrasing, rests upon the abstraction of subjectivity from the concrete 
forms in which it misrecognizes and misrepresents its activity. 
Lyotard's conception of the dispersal of `being' throughout heterogeneous 
`genres', fails to recognize that `cognition' can be adequately determined only 
through the ethical forms which self-consciousness substantiates in its 
actuality. Hegel's exposition of Kantian epistemology, by showing that the 
absolute severance of phenomena and noumena as positing consciousness as 
simply self-identity, demonstrates the necessity of concrete self-recognition. 
The abstract relations of `sense immediacy', `perception' and `understanding', 
produce a subjective form in which objectivity is opposed to conceptual 
recognition; a form which is originally set against the `otherness' in which its 
negativity must find satisfaction and (objective) confirmation. The account of 
the transcendental subject which is set out in The Differend's `notices' on Kant, 
fails to recognize first, that intuition does not contribute to the cognitive unity 
of the subject (it merely dominates the activity of the understanding); and 
secondly, that the immediately `ethical' reception of difference, is itself a 
(contradictory) moment of misrecognition which occurs within the historical 
development of Sittlichkeit. My concern in the rest of this chapter, is to develop 
the relationship between the speculative aporias constituted through Kant's 
account of experience, and Lyotard's attempt to expound the ethical and 
political significance of the phrase. 
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Hegel's reading of the critical philosophy is concerned, even in its earliest, 
non-phenomenological forms, to determine the abstract reductivism entailed in 
transcendental arguments. In his early essay on `empirical' (contractarian) and 
`idealist' theories of natural law27, he attempts to show that both Kantian and 
Fichtean conceptions of the moral will, determine a notion of `law' which 
reinforces the inequalities of actual social relations. The `morality' of abstract 
idealism, in other words, is presented by Hegel as actually presupposing the 
utilitarian motivations posited by `empirical' conceptions of an anti-social 
`human nature'; that is, as taking its `content' from the external relations 
constituted in the `system of reality. ' 
The natural law essay begins with an analysis of the method of empirical 
abstraction by which `state of nature' theorists attempt to ground the content of 
natural law. By abstracting `human nature' from the actual determinations 
through which consciousness develops towards self-recognition, this method 
produces a concept of the irreducibly human in which only the determinations 
of pure individuality (the being of the ahistorical ego) can appear. The unity of 
society, in other words, is explained in terms of `natural laws' whose necessity 
derives from the ineradicable threat of return to the chaos of unrestrained 
individualism, 
What is seen [by the empiricists] to be connected with the state 
must therefore also be abstracted {from human nature] because 
the chaotic of the necessary cannot contain absolute unity but 
only simple multiplicity... and so what can fall under the 
concept of linking and ordering of these, the weakest unity of 
which the principle of multiplicity is capable, is therefore 
excluded as something that only comes later and is added onto that multiplicity. [Natural Law, 64] 
This `empirical' method of the contractarians' attempts to reduce human nature 
to fundamental powers and capacities originating in physical existence. This is 
the putative ground of the ethical and political problematic which contractarian 
theories of the state attempt to work through. The natural law essay however, 
argues that the project of trying to found the determinations of ethical 
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recognition upon the hypothetical proposition of an irreducibly atomistic 
`nature, ' turns out to be empirical in a way that its method supposedly 
excludes. For by positing this `nature' as causally efficient upon volition, 
natural law is determined as a necessity which follows simply from the `fact' 
that `rational' consciousness actively seeks its own continuation, and must 
therefore choose ethical life over natural existence. Yet, as has been shown in 
the more developed arguments of the Phenomenology, even the most abstract 
principle of ethical life (i. e. the assent to domination through the fear of death 
described in the struggle for recognition) cannot be accounted for in terms of 
external causality. For it is not until consciousness is established in which 
notions of self-determination and self-interest have their being and 
significance. 
Speculatively understood therefore, the concept of human nature offered by 
empirical theories of natural law, is a contradiction: it appears both as the 
contemporary threat which is the ground of political power and authority; and 
as the original precipitating cause of the natural law which determines ethical 
life. It is this double determination of an identical (human) nature as both 
progenitor and potential destroyer of the state, which for Hegel constitutes the 
basic contradiction at the root of contractarian thought. Ethical relations, in 
other words, are determined by a fundamentally anti-social `nature', which 
makes the contingency and indeterminacy of self-seeking the essence of moral 
and political authority. 
`Idealist' discourse on the science of rights (specifically that of Kant and 
Fichte) is presented by Hegel in the essay on natural law, as compounding the 
lack of unity which contractarian theories posit as the basis of the state. By 
treating civil association as the result of a pre-social (a priori) recognition of the 
self-interest actually constituted (a posteriori) in the system of needs, these 
empirical theories of natural law make the sphere of political legitimacy co- 
incident with constraint upon an anti-social human nature. Hegel's contention 
is that the contractarian idea of a perpetually self-seeking will is actually the 
Presentation, Misrecognition and Ethical Life 74 
reflection of inequality that exists (unacknowledged) in the system of needs; 
and that it is this inequality which determines the content of idealist natural 
law. 
Kant's critical ethics attempts to found the necessity of moral ends upon an 
individual whose a priori determining ground is simply `the form of lawfulness 
in general'. His claim is that the form of the categorical imperative, is such as 
to command unconditionally the obedience of rational subjectivity to its own 
objective law. The cognition given through the concepts of practical reason, are 
independent of the understanding's determination of phenomenal experience: 
the autonomy of the Kantian subject is thought as categorically distinct from 
the heteronomous causality. Thus, the legislative `realms' of critical philosophy 
constitute two separate, abstract relations of reason to its objects: practical 
reason, as the absolute unity of the categorical imperative, is radically opposed 
to nature; while theoretical reason remains relative to the multiplicity of 
particular appearances. Both practical and theoretical judgements presuppose 
an abstract relationship of `unity' to `multiplicity', which cannot form the basis 
of an ethical relation of identity. 28 
This lack of unity is reproduced in idealist theories of natural law. The 
ethical relations presented by Kant and Fichte are shown by Hegel to 
presuppose the same relative (a posteriori) determinations posited by the 
contractarians as the original ground of the state. The system of needs (the 
sphere of work, enjoyment and possession), in other words, is the 
presupposition of a moral autonomy which posits the individual as an atomistic 
unit externally related to the multiplicity of other (working, desiring and 
possessing) individuals. Bourgeois property law therefore, is the reflection of 
this `relative ethical life' in which the determinations of the system of needs 
appear both as the unifying principle of the totality, and as determining the 
separateness ( lack of identity) upon which `moral' agency depends. 
Critical ethics posits an exteriority of freedom (autonomy) and nature 
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(heteronomy) which reproduces the lack of identity present in the system of 
needs. The `content' determined through the moral law is socially conditioned; 
it is the reflection of actual social relations and their inequalities, rather than 
the asocial, ahistorical activity of pure will. 
Lyotard's reading of Kant's First Critique maintains that it is a metaphysical 
`negotiation' of the contingency of events. This understanding of Kant's 
epistemology however, presupposes an identity of the presentation immediately 
determined by the phrase, and an awareness of that presentation as `situated' 
within a particular generic litigation, that of `cognition'. The Kantian subject is 
conceived by Lyotard as a `juridical' relation of self-conscious faculties, which is 
originally constituted by its exclusion of the contingency of presentation. It is 
this attribution of reflective self-awareness to the faculties of cognition, which 
excludes recognition of the abstract difference presupposed by critical 
philosophy. Hegel's natural law essay expounds the Kantian moral will as a 
reflection of the utilitarian determinations (work, desire, possession) of 
subjective particularity: the rational spontaneity of practical cognitions is 
determined by the `caprice and physical necessity'29 which conditions 
consciousness' abstract particularity. Presentation of heterogeneity and 
contingency to the transcendental subject is constituted through its reflection of 
actual social relations; the representation of `heteronomy' (the non-ethical) is 
constituted in ethical life, 
This is the reflex which morality in the usual meaning, would 
more or less fit the formal positing, in mutual indifference, of 
the specific terms of the relation i. e. the ethical life of the 
bourgeois or private individual for whom the difference of 
relations is fixed and who depends on them and in 
them. [Natural Law, 114] 
This abstract separation and self-seeking, constitute the immediate 
determinations throl! h which acknowledgement of universality will take place; 
although, as the natural la_w essay specifies, the self-recognition of the Kantian 
subject is ultimately a reflection of the lack of identity actually present in civil 
society. Moral consciousness is speculatively conceived through its inability to 
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constitute a substantive ethical relation; the subjective difference, or natural 
inequality of utilitarian determinations, which it justifies, constitute the real 
contingency it is incapable of mediating (`negotiating'). The critical subject's 
ethical reception of difference presupposes the absence of unity constituted by 
phenomenal experience: it is heteronomy through which `otherness' emerges for 
the transcendental subject, not the immediate contingency of the phrase. 
The contingency and heterogeneity which the Kantian subject is unable to 
mediate, is the abstract self-subsistence of individuals in civil society. The law 
within which this `formal' freedom is positively determined, exists only as a 
`posited' legitimation of the real inequalities determined by bourgeois property 
relations; its concept is the abstract domination of ethical unity, 
Their association [i. e. individuals in civil society] is brought 
about by their needs, by the legal system [the means to security 
of person and property] and by an external organization for 
attaining their particular common interest. [Philosophy of 
Right, section 157] 
The cognitions of practical reason represent `heteronomy' as distinct from the 
legitimacy of formal property law: the opposition of autonomy and nature 
through which the moral activity of the subject is determined, legitimizes the 
inequality and domination which it presupposes. Lyotard's conception of critical 
subjectivity as conjoining heterogeneous representations, fails to recognize this 
presupposition of abstract difference. By transcribing the Kantian subject as a 
`juridical' relation of discrete faculties, Lyotard reinforces the abstract relation 
of subjectivity to the work, satisfaction and desire through which self- 
recognition develops. The immediate exteriority of each constitutive (a priori) 
function, which is posited in The Differend's account of the transcendental 
subject, is the precondition of Lyotard's reading of the sublime: the 
`incommensurability' which produces `litigations' within the subject, cannot be 
contained within the genre of cognition, and so must be `presented' through the 
spontaneous originality of phrasing. The ethical and political judgements 
whose necessity Lyotard expounds in his reading of the `Analytic of The 
Sublime', presupposes the lack of unity inherent in the critical subject as the 
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contingency of presentation which always springs from representation. 
Speculatively understood however, this lack of unity participates in the 
aporetic relations in which the other remains alien to, and estranged from, 
subjectivity: the abstract difference represented through the a priori categories 
of the understanding, is reflected in the moral law's reinforcement of abstract 
particularity and self-seeking. 
For Hegel, the substance, or being of ethical life, must encompass the 
external (`reflective') relations constituted in civil society; it must mediate self- 
seeking individualities within a relation which dominates neither concept nor 
intuition. This relation is the essence of the ethical; it is the transparency of 
social institutions through which self-conscious individuals are aware of their 
substantial freedom which cannot be determined through `idealist' conceptions 
of rational autonomy; for the phenomenology of legal forms set out in the 
Philosophy of Right, shows that moral spontaneity, in both its Kantian and 
Fichtean forms, merely reinforces the externality and contingency constituted 
in civil society. The substance of Sittlichkeit therefore, is realized in the 
mediated totality of social institutions through which self-consciousness 
recognizes itself, 
The state is the actuality of the ethical idea. it is the ethical 
mind qua the substantial will manifest and revealed to itself, 
knowing and thinking itself, accomplishing what it knows in so 
far as it knows it. [Philosophy of Right, 1257] 
The relation of ethical mediacy described by Hegel in the Philosophy of Right 
however, is not a posited `absolute'. His phenomenology of abstract legal forms 
is itself abstract in the sense of lacking an account of the `subjective 
dispositions' determined within a society based upon bourgeois property law. 
The actuality of ethical mediations, in other words, must encompass the 
totality of formative institutions; it must be a law in which self-consciousness' 
abstract particularity is cognized and `re-cognized'. Thus, Lyotard's claim that 
Hegel's conception of ethical life attempts to put an end to historical time3l, 
and that Kant's conception of Darstellung (`conjunction') is more faithful to the 
problem of contingency32, is conditioned by his misrepresentation of speculative 
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phenomenology. By failing to recognize that the concept of absolute ethical life 
must mediate the totality of self-consciousness' objective formations, Lyotard 
simply posits the (speculative) ethical relation as the final denial of contingency 
by universal subjectivity, 
The great story of history has its end in the extinction of names 
(particularisms). At the end of the great story, there will simply 
be humanity. The names humanity has taken will turn out to be 
superfluous, at least they will have designated certain stations 
along the way of the cross. [The Diffirend, 1221] 
This positing of (self-consciousness') speculative development as a `pure 
teleology' which leads to the domination of `thinking' by the law of the state, 
ignores the fact that Hegel's critique of Kant in the Philosophy of Right, is a 
critique of positing. The law of ethical life is a law in which the domination 
inherent in the abstract unity of practical reason is recognized; it is specifically, 
the critique of the `reflective' unity found in bourgeois property relations, 
This external state [i. e. civil society] is brought back to and 
welded into unity in the Constitution of the State which is the 
end and actuality of both the substantial universal order and 
the public life devoted thereto. [Philosophy of Right, 11571 
Hegel's concept of absolute ethical life is the explicit recognition of the 
finitude of self-consciousness; it is the speculative determination of the 
necessity inherent in all its contingent forms. The law of the notion does not 
constitute the utter domination of contingency; it is both the form and content 
in which (abstract) contingency is realized, 
It is only in its Notion that the object] is in its truth, whereas in 
the immediacy in which it is given it is only appearance and 
contingency; that the cognition that truly comprehends the 
object is the cognition of it as it is in and for itself, and that the 
Notion is its very objectivity. [Science of Logic, 5901 
The exteriority of object and notion which is presented in the critical 
philosophy, constitutes abstract `realms' of knowing and willing (theoretical 
and practical reason), neither of which can determine the substance of the 
subjectivity it posits. The truth of abstract practical reason is the loss of 
objectivity; for by taking its self-knowledge to be absolute cognition of the 
ethical, moral consciousness excludes all the actual determinations of its 
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purpose and activity. The morally spontaneous will, in other words, has no 
ethical `character' determined by an intuitive relation to the whole; it is the 
pure, or `formal', conception of `duty', through which the heterogeneity and 
contingency of the subjective particular is sustained. 
The true ethical life (Sittlichkeit) of the community therefore, cannot be 
expressed in the formal, legalistic determinations of abstract autonomy. The 
content of the ethical is determined only through a `re-cognition' in which the 
`concept' of unity has ceased to be an abstract domination of the mediatedness 
of the totality. Ethical recognition, in other words, must be actualized in all the 
(objective) institutional forms of the whole; it must be the equality of `intuition' 
(content, immediacy) and `concept' (universality, cognition), 
In custom, it [the ethical spirit] has its immediate existence and 
in the self-consciousness of the individual, in his being and 
activity, it has its mediated existence just as the individual 
through his conviction of the state as the essence, goal and the 
product of his activity, has his substantial freedom. [Phi]osophy 
of Right, ¶257] 
The concept of ethical recognition expounded in the Philosophy of Right 
therefore, is articulated through a discourse of positing which is grounded in 
the aporias of the Phenomenology: the abstract, legalistic categories through 
which Hegel expounds the mediation of difference in the Rechtstaat, have 
already been traversed in the development of natural consciousness. The law of 
ethical life must be grounded in the speculative development of subjectivity 
through its abstract forms; for it is only through this development that 
positedness and abstraction as such, are recognized as absolutely mediated. 
Absolute knowing is presupposed in the Philosophy of Right, only as the 
possibility of re-cognizing the aporias through which it is actualized: the labour 
of the concept does not finish in the Rechtstaat; rather it is the judgement of its 
own finitude. 
The phenomenological development of consciousness cannot be abstracted 
from the actuality of the state (ethical life, Sittlichkeit); for it is only through 
spirit's recognition of itself as `being', not simply as `having' reason, that it is 
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possible for self-conscious individuals to recognize their essential mediatedness. 
The concept of the State, in other words, is absolute mediation of objective 
particularity; it is the form in which the abstract contingent determinations of 
self-consciousness' work, desire and satisfaction are actualized. Thus, Hegel's 
exposition of the state in the Philosophy of Right, determines its concept as the 
moment of absolute mediation which brings `reflective' self-seeking back to its 
actual, ethical determination, 
The external state is brought back to ... unity in the 
Constitution 
of the State which is the end and actuality of both substantial 
universal order and the public life devoted thereto. [Philosophy 
of Right, ¶1571 
This account of the relationship of subjective particularity to the concrete 
universal, presupposes ideas of state and civil society as discrete, abstractly 
differentiated forms; it assumes, in other words, the historical development of 
self-consciousness to the point at which it recognizes its unity (universal 
dependency) through its particular needs, 
the interest of the idea... lies in the process whereby singularity [is] raised [through `natural' and `arbitrary' needs] ... to the formal freedom and universality of knowing and willing- the 
process whereby particularity is educated up to subjectivity [Philosophy of Right, 111871 
Hegel's assumption of this reflectively self-determining particular however, is 
made within the context of an exposition which is restricted to determining the 
relationship of the state to the bourgeois property form. The phenomenology of 
ethical and political life laid out in the Philosophy of Right, is concerned to 
show how the abstract rights of formally autonomous individuals, legitimate 
the domination and inequality constituted in civil society. By accounting for the 
presuppositions of reflective self-seeking, the Philosophy of Right grounds the 
work, satisfaction and desire constituted in ethical life, in the historical 
development of self-consciousness: the idea of the state is the fulfilment of a 
particularity which has evolved through its abstract relations to the universal. 
It is the phenomenological development of spirit therefore, which is the 
condition of the Philosophy of Right's account of the state. The subjective 
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particular whose abstract separation and difference is expounded in Hegel's 
account of civil society, has passed through the historical determinations of 
Consciousness, Self-consciousness and Reason; it recognizes itself as the 
`concrete person who is himself the object of his particular aims'. 33 This 
misrecognition of ethical substance is a necessary part of self-consciousness' 
ethical mediation; for the contingency of subjective determination which the 
Phenomenology expounds as externally constituting the universal ('Self- 
contained individuals associated as a community of animals'), is retraversed in 
Spirit as the destructive idealism of the French Revolution. Thus, the truth of 
the state emerges through its relationship to the subjective particular; for it is 
the form which must ultimately give substance to self-consciousness. Its 
concept is implicitly present throughout the Phenomenology: for it is the 
actuality which abstract reason cannot realize in the `spiritual animal 
kingdom', and which the pure subjectivization of spirit (the `terror' of absolute 
freedom) can only destroy and pervert. 
In the `Result' section of The Differend, Lyotard remarks that, 
the question `Auschwitz? ' is also the question [of] `after Auschwitz? '. The unchaining of death, the utmost obligation, from what legitimates if after the crime; scepticism and nihilism have every reason to feed off this endlessly. For it is not true, as Hegel believes, that afterwards it still remains for us to digest ... the extermination of the determined we. [The Differend, 1157] 
Auschwitz, in other words, is understood by Lyotard as disclosing the 
responsibility of thought to its own spontaneously originative power; a power 
whose ethical and political significance The Differend attempts to expound 
through the transcriptions of Kant's Third Critique and his political essays. 
The evil perpetrated at the Nazi death camps, is for Lyotard absolutely 
unsublatable. In order to attest to the enormity of the Nazi crime, thinking 
must become sensitive to its infinitude: it must phrase the absolute 
victimization of the other which the Nazi mythology enshrined in the law; and 
must reject even `negative' dialectics34, in which the critique of representational 
categories is reified as an end in itself. The `experience' (of unrepresentability) 
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which Lyotard attempts to abstract from Kant's notion of aesthetic finality, has 
`Auschwitz' as its sign: nothing cognitive or conceptual is adequate to express 
the event of the Nazi slaughter. For Lyotard, it is the absence of this radical 
evil from every testament and articulation, the fact that it can never `arrive' 
complete in its categorical form, that constantly re-originates the necessity to 
phrase and to judge, 
the waiting also traverses what arrives, as it were, mostly that 
which has not yet arrived. [Heidegger and "the jews", 401 
`Auschwitz' is presented in The Differend as a `Factum'35 which obligates the 
spontaneity of thought to judge the otherness co-presented with 
representational categories. `After Auschwitz' the (metaphysical) `we' through 
which speculative phenomenology `represents' the historical necessity of ethical 
life (Sittlichkeit), is dispersed: for Lyotard, nothing is necessary apart from the 
contingency of presentation and obligation to phrase the differends which occur 
among heterogeneous genres. 
The ethical significance of Lyotard's idea of the phrase, is dependent upon 
his conception of Auschwitz as the end of speculative mediation. The critique of 
speculative phenomenology which is set out in The Differend, expounds the 
historical event of the holocaust as the ethical disclosure of the sublime: the 
`experience' of unrepresentability and otherness is irreducibly disclosed as the 
necessity of judging in the absence of predetermined concepts and categories. 
This spontaneity of thought in relation to its `incarnations'36 however, cannot 
be conceived in absolute abstraction from the speculative development of self- 
consciousness. As I have shown in chapter one, the event of `Auschwitz' can 
only be judged ethically through the distortions and deformations of Sittlichkeit 
produced by the `culture' of Nazism. The substance of the state is destroyed by 
a violently re-formative subjectivity which can find no satisfaction in the 
elements of Sittlichkeit: ethical judgement re-cognizes the actual conditions of 
spirit's violence against itself. Lyotard's conception of the originative power of 
phrasing therefore, fails to recognize Hegel's speculative exposition of the 
historical conditions through which self-consciousness is immediately satisfied 
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and unsatisfied by its activity. The idea of ethical unity which is developed in 
the Philosophy of Right, is the absolute mediatedness of concept and intuition; 
it is the law in which the substantive will of each recognizes itself in all its 
differentiation. In the dialectic of `self-contained individuals' or the `spiritual 
animal kingdom'37 however, the differentiatedness of the subjective particular 
is without objective mediation: it is a point in the development of subjectivity, 
where it is the aporias of `reflection' which implicitly determines the 
development of self-consciousness. 
The self-contained individuality with which Hegel begins the dialectic of the 
spiritual animal kingdom, is the realization of the category of self- 
consciousness. Nothing exists for this consciousness which is not implicitly in 
its `original nature'. The action of this individuality therefore, is the mediation 
of reason's `observed' development of being in-itself, and its development as the 
`practical' determinacy through which consciousness attempts to exist `for 
itself. The distinction which this individuality makes between itself as explicit 
content (interest) and itself as conscious subjectivity (purpose), is the 
phenomenological appearance of spirit's necessity, that is, the unity of 
knowledge and objectivity. The content of this individuality however, excludes 
the possibility of ethical recognition; for it is always the unmediated `joy' of self- 
expression, 
knowing that he can find in his objective actuality nothing but 
his unity with himself ... and 
knowing that he thus always 
attains his purpose [the individual] can experience only a sense 
of joy in himself. [Phenomenology, 425] 
The `joy' which this consciousness experiences in the realization of its implicit 
essence however, is simply the transient satisfaction which accompanies each 
of its deeds. The immediate presentation of essence in every contingent act, is 
constantly `abandoned' by this consciousness; all of its work, satisfaction and 
desire is the reproduction of itself as pure negativity. Thus, consciousness' 
implicit essence (original nature), determines a negative self-relation in which 
its immediate knowledge is always of what is unessential to it. 
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This separation from original nature which self-consciousness suffers 
through the finitude and contingency of its deeds, produces an `honesty' of 
intent which encompasses all possible relations of the subject to the objective 
world. Each individual is infinitely modifiable in its real intent; each can `lay 
hold' of complete satisfaction in any one of its particular moments: `action (for 
actions' sake), `means' (as an end in themselves), or `purpose' (as pure, 
unrealized intent). The truth of this honesty however, is a universal deceit, in 
which the notion of purpose (that which is sustained through work, means and 
realization) is lost in an objectless volition that constantly evades 
determination: each individual confronts the other as a completely arbitrary 
activity, in which `consciousness is never where it thinks it is'. 38 
The dialectic of the spiritual animal kingdom is the point at which the 
development of self-consciousness is determined through the logical form of 
external reflection. 39 The historical emergence of subjectivity as `original 
nature', produces a form of misrecognition in which consciousness is 
immediately aware of itself through the complete loss of its actuality. None of 
the real determinations of self-consciousness (finite spirit), that is, the means, 
purposes and satisfaction through which it exists, have any objective 
significance for it: the transience (immediacy) of self-recognition determines it 
as an external essence which cannot produce an ethical relation. Ethical life 
therefore, is constituted as a `presentation' (that which consciousness `finds 
before itself) which remains external to the subjective reflection of each 
individual. This abstract interiority of real intent' leads each to deceive itself, 
and to be deceived by others. 
Lyotard's claim that the phrase always presents the immediate 
heterogeneity of `linkage' (onto the event), and that it constantly re-opens the 
question of legitimacy for each genre of discourse, constitutes the same lack of 
substantive difference constituted in the dialectic of self-contained 
individuality. The idea of obligation without conditions which Lyotard abstracts 
from the Second Critique, therefore, is grounded in the same external 
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separation and difference whose subjective reflection (universal negative self- 
certainty) Kant legitimates in the critical morality. The externality and 
contingency of self-seeking, is sanctioned by a formal property law through 
which consciousness misrecognizes itself, the other and the universality of its 
work: nothing which is done by individual consciousness has any concrete 
significance for the other who becomes interested in it. The possibility of an 
ethical relationship founded upon the immediacy of subjective presentation, in 
other words, is the moment at which reason's abstract individualism is 
recognized as fundamentally inadequate to its actuality (spirit). Ethical and 
political judgements must proceed from the recognition of self-consciousness as 
`being', rather than simply `having', reason. 
The abstract individuality constituted in the spiritual animal kingdom 
therefore, cannot remain in its condition of estrangement from the activities of 
others; although at this point in its development, self-conscious individuals are 
interested in these projects only in their direct relation to their particular `work 
and effort'. The motivation for `assisting' the other in his activity is to `see and 
manifest one's own particular powers and capacities, not the realization of 
ethical substance: consciousness seems occupied on its own account ... and 
hence it seems to let others keep to their own fact'. 40 
That which is actually `done' by this form of self-consciousness however, does 
have universal significance; for by its own action, the individual exposes the 
particularity of its purpose to the judgement of any one of the abstract 
individualities. This actualization, `is an exposing of what is ones' own in the 
universal element where it comes to be and is a fact for everyone'. 41 The self- 
deception which has developed in the contingency of abstract individuals 
therefore, does not deny the other as active negativity; rather, the abstract 
conviction of essentiality issues in particular, subjective judgements made on 
the others' capacity for self-realization. Thus, the true object of autonomous 
activity (the state) must encompass these contingently determined relations of 
individuals; it must mediate the external state of reflective self-seeking. This 
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object is neither a `fact' opposed to action, nor an action which is opposed to 
`permanence'42; it is a universal subjectivity in which each acknowledges the 
actuality of the other. It is, in fact, what Hegel calls `spirit'. 43 
The Phenomenology therefore, determines the absolute contingency and 
heterogeneity of (subjective) presentation (of essence) as the necessity of 
universal mediation. The immediate presentation of an `original nature' 
expounded in the dialectic of self-subsistent individuals, constitutes the 
necessity of universal recognition (spirit); while as an actual determination of a 
spirit, this immediate (individual) unity of consciousness' universal `matter' 
with its subjective presentation, is produced through, and reproductive of, the 
lack of unity of ethical life. The abstract individual's intuition of its `original 
nature' in all of its particular determinations becomes, in the `terror' of the 
French Revolution, an infinitely destructive redetermination of subjective 
freedom. Thus, the idea of immediate `presentation' presupposes an arbitrary, 
subjective difference (the universal `deception' of the spiritual animal kingdom, 
or the `lawlessness' of ethical life) in which the concept and intuition of 
substantive will are utterly without mediation. The (ethical) actuality of 
separation and difference cannot be recognized through this unmediated 
subjective `reflection'. 
It is Kant's morally spontaneous subject that appears in the Phenomenology 
as the moment of (abstract) reconciliation between consciousness and its 
objective determinations. Both the dialectics of the self-contained individuality 
and of the French Revolution, constitute universal self-recognition as an actual 
necessity; a necessity which the critical subject attempts to determine through 
the spontaneity of practical reason. The morally spontaneous will, which splits 
the actuality of the `good', and the subjective determination of `conscience', into 
two independent forms, is the active implicitude of ethical life. The abstraction 
of subjectivity and actuality posited in Kant's critical ethics, is precisely that 
through which the actuality of Sittlichkeit develops as their mediation, 
when both build themselves into independent totalities, they 
are annulled and reduced to moments of the concept which 
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becomes manifest in the [actual] unity. [Philosophy of Right, 
T141] 
Thus, the concept of Sittlichkeit is implicit in the activity of the moral will; for 
it is Kant's privileging of `reflection' over inclination which necessitates the 
realization of the `good' in the determinations of the `right' (law and custom). 
The development which occurs through the moral will therefore, is always 
concrete with the historical conditions which produce it. The universal 
`deception' of the spiritual animal kingdom, the `terror' of the French 
Revolution, and the `reflective' self-seeking of civil society, determine forms of 
abstract separation and difference which the moral will attempts to reconcile. 
This primacy of subjective reflection however, is incapable of realizing the idea 
of the ethical which is implicit in it; indeed, the abstract forms of individuality 
through which the moral will is phenomenologically determined, are actually 
reproduced through its activity. Thus, the self-determining consciousness 
which acknowledges only the formal universality of duty, recognizes the whole 
content (substance) of its life only as `unessentiality'. This fixation of 
consciousness on self-reflection, is retraversed in the Philosophy of Right's 
account of civil society: each individual simply regards itself and the other as 
`ideally' moral. while actively pursuing its actual wants and needs in 
abstraction from its moral ideality. Hegel remarks in the Philosophy of Right, 
Morality has its proper place in this sphere [civil society] where 
the paramount thing is reflection on ones doings, and the quest for happiness and private wants, and where the contingency in 
satisfying these makes into a duty even a single and contingent 
act of assistance. [Philosophy of Rights, 1207] 
It is only by `bringing back' the external separation and difference of civil 
society to the `Constitution of the State'44, that it is possible to mediate the 
abstract moments of subjectivity and actuality posited in the moral will. The 
account of civil society given in the Philosophy of Right demonstrates the 
necessity of the state, by expounding the relationship of the moral will, and 
immediate, contingent domination. 
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Lyotard's transcription of the critical philosophy as constantly disclosing the 
differend between `occurrence' and `cognition', obscures the actual 
determinations of (subjective) heterogeneity and contingency which are 
reflected in, and reinforced by, Kant's concepts of practical and theoretical 
reason. Contingent domination of each by the other, is perpetuated by a moral 
law which posits abstract separation and difference as its absolute 
precondition. It is in the state that this realm of self-reflection must be realized; 
for it is through the state that separation and difference ('subjective 
particularity') are recognized in their actuality. The law (of the state) in which 
formal subjectivity recognizes its absolute mediation (substantive freedom) is 
not simply posited; it springs from recognition of finite spirit as determining of, 
and determined by, its universal actuality. The idea of the state is the unity of 
self-consciousness with its objective formation; it is a recognition which is 
enshrined both in the law, and in every social institution. 
Hegel's phenomenological exposition of the Kantian subject demonstrates 
that the historical necessity of its appearance is produced through the 
contradictions of pure `presentation'. The actual significance of the Kantian 
subject is not its inability to `situate' the `occurrence' within the cognitive 
activity of the subject, but its re-positing of abstract separation and difference 
as the determining principle of ethical life. The necessity constituted through 
the lack of mediation expressed in the idea of Darstallung, or `conjunction', 
therefore, is the mediation of subjective contingency and heterogeneity. Ethical 
recognition cannot be immediately `presented'; in its concept it is a `mediation' 
of abstract individual difference which must include every objective formation 
of subjectivity. Recognition of the law of the state, in other words, is recognition 
of absolute mediation; the (ethical) unity of concept and intuition. 
Lyotard's reading of the critical philosophy as a cognitive negotiation of `the 
givenness of presentation', fails in its attempt to abstract the activity of the 
transcendental subject from speculative determinations. The phenomenological 
forms which are the precondition of this subjectivity (`sense-immediacy', `the 
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spiritual animal kingdom, ' and `the terror of absolute freedom') all determine 
separation and difference as contradictory moments which necessitate 
mediation through the universal. The cognition (misrecognition) of the Kantian 
subject is actually determined through the contradictoriness of pure 
presentation; for neither the `original nature' which is the fulfilment of reasons' 
abstract, individualized development, nor the unmediated `idealism' of 
individuality, can determine an ethical relation. Self-consciousness' work, 
desire, and satisfaction (the actuality of finite spirit) remains unmediated in 
these forms; and it is this lack of unity which is presupposed by Kant's 
transcendental subjectivity. The development of self-consciousness through the 
faculties and cognitions posited by the critical philosophy, participates in the 
constitution of a subjective particular whose contingent difference 
(heterogeneity) is realized in the ethical substance of the state. 
The historical event of `Auschwitz' does not, as Lyotard maintains, 
ontologically rupture the unity of ethical life (Sittlichkeit): the `Aryan' 
mythology simply deepens and reinforces the lack of unity (lawlessness) 
already present in the substance of the state. The possibility of universal 
mediation within the totality of social relations, customs and intuitions, is not 
posited by Hegel as a fixed `teleological' goal; it is produced through the 
abstract forms of separation and difference which determine the development 
of self-consciousness. The forms of (subjective) contingency and heterogeneity 
expounded in the dialectic of the `spiritual animal kingdom', produce a 
necessity which can only be fulfilled in the idea of the state, that is, in 
universal recognition., The immediate self-reflection of this moment produces 
an abstract recognition of universal dependency which must become explicit for 
self-consciousness. Phenomenologically therefore, Hegel's exposition of `self- 
contained individuality'45 is the point at which pure immediacy is shown to be 
constituted through the actuality of self-consciousness; and that as such, 
immediate presentation must `re-cognize' itself in the (objective) 
determinations of the state and ethical life. The event of Auschwitz therefore, 
signifies only the end of ethical life in this particular nation state (the Germany 
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of the `Thousand Year Reich'); it did not put an end to the substance of self- 
consciousness which must constantly `re-cognize' itself. It is this recognition of 
actuality (substance), not the presentation of heterogeneity, which is the 
necessary condition of ethical judgements. 
The Differend's account of the First Critique has attempted to show that the 
phrase is the irreducible occurrence of linkage which constantly re-situates 
thinking in relation to the legitimacy of genres of discourse. Presentations are 
conceived as atomistic `universes', or dispositions of addressor, addressee, sense 
and referent, which link onto the current phrase, but which, as `events', remain 
undetermined by it. The indubitability of the phrase is its simple irreducibility: 
being is always presented; is always re-formed through the spontaneity of the 
event. It is these metalinguistic `representations' of being, from the immediate 
`presentation' of the phrase, which informs Lyotard's notion of critical 
judgement as openness to the infinite possibility of the present. For Lyotard, 
therefore, Kant's doctrine of experience begins with the assumption that what 
can be known of the universe of events, must be reducible to faculties of the 
transcendental subject; and that knowledge as such always involves 
representation. 
Lyotard's reading of the `Transcendental Aesthetic' as an original negotiation 
of the occurrence, and his claim that transcendental faculties constantly 
`litigate' with one another, involves an attribution of self-consciousness to 
critical subjectivity which cannot be substantiated. Hegel's exposition of 
consciousness, set out at the beginning of the Phenomenology, shows that none 
of the subject-object relations presupposed by critical subjectivity are capable of 
producing concrete self-awareness. The Differend's `juridical' conception of a 
priori faculties, which posits an original judgement of the occurrence as an 
otherness to be incorporated, fails to recognize that the relationship of affection 
and understanding (cognition) excludes such an ethical reception of otherness. 
Speculatively conceived, the discursive and intuitive faculties posited in the 
critical philosophy, suppress substantive self-recognition; for it is through the 
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aporetic structure of phenomenal experience that the actuality of the self, its 
work, satisfaction and desire, becomes historical. Thus Lyotard's `juridical' 
conception of the critical subject abstractly posits an identity of self- 
consciousness with each of the subject's constitutive activities: the immediate 
occurrence of each critical phrase is presented as the necessity of an inner 
litigation which ruptures the unity of representation. Thus, it is only by 
abstracting the faculties of the Kantian subject from their speculative 
determination of self-consciousness, I have argued, that Lyotard is able to 
present the First Critique as a suppression of the absolute contingency of 
linkage onto the occurrence. 
Lyotard's conception of transcendental subjectivity fails to recognize the 
significance of Hegel's speculative critique of Kant's epistemology: that the 
negativity of consciousness which emerges from phenomenal experience, can 
only become self-conscious through confirmation in the other. What is 
represented in the forms of master and slave, are the conditions necessary to 
the development of self-consciousness through concrete misrecognition. The 
transitions which Hegel set out in the Phenomenology, expound the history of 
misrecognition: they articulate the aporias and contradictions determined by 
the abstract understanding (Verstande). Lyotard's attempt to abstract the pure 
immediacy of presentation from Kant's transcendental subject therefore, serves 
to reinforce the opposition between subject and object, obligation and law, 
which conditions Kant's concept of ethical necessity. 
In the final two chapters, I will examine speculatively the relationship 
between Lyotard's reading of Kant, and the concept of critical judgement 
articulated in The Differend's sections on `Genre, Norm' and `The Sign of 
History'. In chapter four, I will look at Lyotard's reading of the `Analytic of The 
Sublime', and his attempt to transcribe the `negative pleasure' of Kant's 
aesthetic sensibility as presenting the necessity of critical (`unpredetermined') 
judgement. Prior to this however, I want to examine the concept of `obligation' 
which Lyotard abstracts from Kant's critical ethics. Specifically, I will argue 
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that the exposition of subjective morality which Hegel articulates in the 
Phenomenology and the Philosophy of Right, shows that a volition which 
acknowledges only its immediate reception of the good, is incapable of making 
substantial ethical judgements; and that consequently, Lyotard's abstraction of 
the formal possibility of freedom from the Second Critique, conditions an idea of 
judgement which is incapable of recognizing the ethical significance of the 
other. 
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Chapter II 
Notes 
1. The Difi`erend, 1124. 
2. Ibid., 1113. 
3. The `matter' of sensible affection which, for Lyotard, is forgotten in the 
activity of the cognitive faculties, is abstracted from the `Transcendental 
Aesthetic' 
. as a pure 
`givenness' which cannot be (cognitively) represented. 
This unrepresentable condition is what Lyotard transcribes in The 
Differend as `presentation', or the immediacy of the phrase universe which 
cannot be abstracted from its heterogeneity. Thus, the reductive 
unrepresentability of the `libidinal band' which Lyotard posits in his 
Libidinal Economy, becomes in The Differend, the spontaneously originated 
and originating necessity of critical judgement. 
4. Phenomenology, 90. 
5. The Differend, 131. 
6. See chapter three's account of Lyotard's `obligation without conditions'. 
7. See chapter one. 
8. The Differend, 64. 
9. Ibid., preface, xi. 
10. See Kant's Critique of Judgement, Introduction. 
11. Ernst Cassirer's detailed exposition of the relationship between the self and 
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Kant's arguments for the necessity of the modes of intuition, points up the 
relationship between subjectivity and determinate judgements (of 
experience) which is developed in the First Critique. He remarks that inner 
and outer experience, self-consciousness and consciousness of the object, `do 
not comprise "halves" of experience as a whole, which subsist independently 
of each other, but are conjoined in the same ensemble of universally valid 
and necessarily logical presuppositions.... Now the expression for both 
"self" and "object" is one and the same: the lawfulness of "experience in 
general" signified in the concept of transcendental apperception' [Kant's 
Life and Thought, 198]. Theoretical reason's presupposition of an intuitive 
(spatio-temporal) foundation however, is understood by Lyotard as the 
original `annexation' of judgement to the principles of cognition. Kant's idea 
of the `self as the formal condition of determinate judgements, is presented 
in The Differend as dispersing self-consciousness throughout the discrete a 
priori conditions of (practical and theoretical) cognition. According to this 
reading therefore, the spontaneously originative relation of judgement to 
difference (incommensurability) disclosed in Kant's idea of the sublime, 
disperses the transcendental unity of the `self into the infinite possibility of 
phrasing (see chapter four). 
12 The Differend, 64. 
13. Encyclopaedia Logic, 9[225. 
14. This relation is expounded more fully in Lyotard's third `notice' on Kant. 
Here he develops the idea of `realms of legitimacy' (genres) as related 
through a `milieu' of spontaneous judgement, in the same way as the 
islands of an archipelago are related through commerce and conflict, each 
appropriating from and bartering with the others. 
15. See chapter three. 
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16. As Bennington makes clear in his Lyotard: Writing the Event, Lyotard's 
transcription of the `Transcendental Aesthetic' `attempts to problematize 
the necessity of the linkages through which the transcendental subject 
constitutes its phenomenal experience. The original "givenness" of the 
matter of intuition, is negotiated and re-presented by the subject through 
the "deictical" forms which allow the faculties of imagination, conception 
and sensibility to constitute it as (phenomenal) experience. It is this 
original "return" from the givenness of matter to the (cognitive) activity of 
the subject, according to Lyotard, that is re-presented in the Second 
Critique as "a description of justice as a state of affairs to be brought about' 
[Lyotard: Writing the Event, 137]. 
17. The Differend's account of the relation of intuition and concept 
(transcendental subjectivity), fails to recognize that the spatio-temporal 
`representation' of the givenness of matter, does not bring intuition within 
the determining activity of cognition. The Kantian concept of theoretical 
reason remains dependent upon and external to the (spatio-temporal) 
intuitions it receives; while the activity of practical reason determines itself 
over against the desires and inclinations of sensible affection. It is only in 
the final section of the `Subjective Logic', `The Doctrine of The Notion', that 
the necessity of unifying the abstract autonomy of the Kantian will with the 
content it has exteriorized as heteronomy, is re-cognized. This re-cognition, 
as Gillian Rose points out in her Hegel Contra Sociology, is `built out of ... 
the unity of the logic of being and the logic of essence' [186]: It is not until 
practical will has passed the Kantian and Fichtean moments of absolute 
finitude, that it can re-cognize itself in a substantive content: the `idea of 
the good'. Lyotard's reading of the critical subject's immediate 
appropriation of otherness through the `Transcendental Aesthetic' 
therefore, is a misrepresentation of the unifying power of critical 
`subjectivity'. 
18. The Differend, 62. 
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19. For Lyotard, the matter of intuition is an otherness which cannot be 
integrated into the activity of the subject, and which must be negotiated 
and forgotten. It is this otherness which is represented in the 
Nazi 
mythology as the destructiveness of the Jew; as that which constantly 
threatens the integrity of the `Aryan' race, and which must be liquidated. 
20. See chapter four, section two, on the relation of judgement to otherness. 
21. See Hegel's exposition of the transition from the abstract understanding to 
the consciousness of life, Phenomenology, 218-227. 
22. Richard Norman, in his Hegel's Phenomenology, A Philosophical 
Introduction, rightly identifies the subject-object relations expounded in the 
Phenomenology's section on consciousness, as expounding `a general 
characterization of all these first three stages of the Phenomenology [ie. 
`sense-certainty, perception and understanding'1[41]. Each, in other words, 
is characterized by a `reductionist' duality (of concept and object) which 
abstractly privileges the being of the particular [42]. 
23. Phenomenology, 197. 
24. Ibid., 203. 
25. Kojeve's concept of `anthropogenetic desire' is an abstraction imposed upon 
the speculative transition of consciousness into self-consciousness. For 
Kojeve, the desire which emerges in Hegel's concept of `life', ie. the desire 
for recognition by, and confirmation in, the other, presupposes the 
anthropological form of the herd: the immediately social moment appears 
as an external requirement for the transition to self-awareness. This 
analysis however, fails to recognize that it is the desire which springs from 
consciousness' development of its relation to the ('independent') object, 
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which is the condition of sociality as such: the universal negativity of 
consciousness (the Hobbesian war of all against all) is sufficient of itself to 
necessitate recognition of the possibility of submission to the other. 
Consciousness as such, produces the moment of immediate sociality, 
through desire's determination of historical contingency: the struggle for 
recognition does not occur within the `society' of the herd. (For a discussion 
of Lyotard's concept of primitive, or `pagan', communities, see chapter four, 
section two. ) 
26. Kojeve's anthropological reading of Hegel's dialectic of master and slave, 
posits the violence of immediate desire as producing discrete 
`anthropogenetic behaviours' from the immediate `multiplicity' of the herd. 
In doing this however, Kojeve's account of the development of self- 
consciousness expounded in the Phenomenology, depicts a multiplicity of 
`human desires' which is prior to the actual social moment. for as Gadamer 
remarks in his Hegel's Dialectic, Kojeve's example of human desire as 
desire for that which is desired, `is used too early, for it has its true value as 
an illustration of the later [social] states in Hegel's way... ' [note to 621. This 
`natural beginning' to human history, conditions Kojeve's representation of 
the Phenomenology as the movement towards a (posited) utopian social 
organization, `in which the interaction of Master and Slave must finally end 
in the "dialectical overcoming" of both of them' [Introduction, 9]. This notion 
of `dialectical overcoming', posits absolute knowledge as an end from which 
abstraction and positing are absent; that is, as the (immediate) unity of the 
`universal (ie. nonexpandible) and homogeneous (ie. non-transformable) 
state' [Introduction, 95]. Kojeve's reading of the Phenomenology, in other 
words, supplements the activity of spirit as natural consciousness, in order 
to derive a concept of the state which is completely non-speculative. 
27. Natural Law: The Scientific Ways of Treating Natural Law in Moral 
Philosophy, Arid Its Relation to the Positive Sciences of Law. 
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28. `This connection between the relations, the lack of identity, which arise in 
Kant and Fichte's philosophy and the real social relation to which the 
philosophical dichotomies correspond', Gillian Rose remarks in her Hegel 
Contra Sociology, `is the most important and difficult point in this essay on 
natural law' [56]. This idea of an originating a priority as a reflection of 
abstract separation and difference, is developed throughout my exposition 
of The Differend. I have argued that Lyotard's notion of the spontaneity of 
presentation and judgement, in fact reflects `the life of isolated individuals 
who exist in a relation to each other which excludes any real unity' [ibid., 
56]. 
29. Philosophy of Right, 1182. 
30. Avinieri, in his Hegel's Theory of the Modern State, makes the objective 
necessity of this development to the concept of the state, and the 
substantive difference which its activity sustains: `The [Logics] part on 
objective spirit is dealt with in much greater detail in the Philosophy of 
Right. It is the part which concerns itself with the law, morality and ethical 
life (Sittlichkeit) as the objective, institutional expressions of spirit' [132]. 
31. The Diüerend, ¶191. 
32. Ibid., 126. 
33. Philosophy of Right, ¶182. 
34. See note on Adorno, chapter one. 
35. Heidegger and "the jews , section 1. 
36. Ibid., section 8. 
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37. Phenomenology, 417. 
38. Ibid., 427. 
39. Science of Logic, 403-404. 
40. Phenomenology, 436. 
41. Ibid., 437. 
42. Ibid., 438. 
43. As Hyppolite points out in his account of the dialectic of self-contained 
individuality, `The double contradiction of content (the thing in general and 
my thing in particular) and form (being-for-itself and being-for-others) must 
be resolved in a higher synthesis, in which the thing itself rises from being 
an abstract predicate, to being a concrete subject' [Genesis and Structure of 
Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, 314]. The `honesty' of the abstract 
individual invokes the universal (the in-itself) as that which is pursued in 
the most self-serving of its actions (or contemplated in its reflection); while 
its methodical pursuit of (objectively) universal goals appears to it as the 
exercise of its pure individuality. It is this inability of self-consciousness to 
grasp its own universality, which demands its re-cognition of the 
spirituality of its object, ie. the universal mediation of its activity. 
44. Philosophy of Right, 157. 
45. Phenomenology, 413. 
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Chapter III 
Obligation, Morality and Authority 
The spontaneity of phrasing which Lyotard expounds in The Differend's 
section on `presentation', is the condition upon which his conception of ethics 
and philosophy is founded. The phrase `presents' the immediacy of linkage onto 
the event; it is the elementary form through which Lyotard articulates 
thinking's spontaneous relation to difference, and resistance to generic 
discourses. This spontaneity of linkage is the ontological condition to which 
thinking must become sensitive; for it is through this immediate sensitivity 
that the `affection' of congruent experience by difference and differend can be 
phrased in its uniqueness. Philosophical and ethical `genres' are for Lyotard 
related through their non-predetermination of `rules' of linkage; both expound 
the necessity of receiving and phrasing the heterogeneity to which thinking is 
ultimately responsible, 
[Philosophical discourse] has as its rule to discover its rule: its a 
priori is what it has at stake. It is a matter of formulating this 
rule, which can only be done at the end, if there is an end. Time therefore, cannot be excluded from this discourse without its 
ceasing to be philosophical. [The Differend, ¶98] 
This responsibility not to prejudge the contingency of the event, is presented in 
The Differend as uniquely ethical: for Lyotard it is the `conditionlessness' of 
pure obligation, and this alone, which is ethically related to difference and 
incommensurability. Obligation ought to be a matter of `sensitivity' to the 
unphrased. 
Lyotard's `preliminary' question regarding the idea of obligation, is how `the 
request emanating from this entity (God, The Reich &c. ) [is] received as though 
it were a law'. 1 The power of the prescriptive phrase is the immediate 
`situation' of an `addressee': the `I' of origination and initiation, is immediately 
displaced by the `you' which has always-already accepted its obligation to the 
same authority. The moment of obligation is unrelatable as such; for by 
`explaining', or `describing' the moment of submission to authority, one becomes 
the `addressor' (the `I') of phrases which cannot recall that submission. Thus, 
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the moment of prescription, the `you ought to', discloses the absolute 
`transcendence of the I': thinking, or `phrasing' is infinitely dispersed in its 
reception of the obligatory. Obligation can only be `signified' by the addressee of 
the prescriptive phrase. 
For Lyotard, obligation `situates' one as the `you', or addressee of a 
prescriptive phrase; it is the immediate acceptance of oneself as obligated. On 
this reading, there can be no `experience' of obligation: it cannot be explained, 
as it is simply the moment of submission, 
What you judge to be the Lord's call is the situation of you when 
I is deprived of experience, `estranged', alienated, disauthorized. 
You do not therefore, have experience of the Lord, nor even of 
his alienness. If you were to have that experience, it would not 
be the Lord, and it would not be ethics [The Differend, 1172] 
The concept of obligation which is set out in The Differend cannot be 
definitively phrased through generic ideas of `good' or `totality'. Such ideas, 
according to Lyotard, are abstractions which homogenize the contingency of 
linkage, and suppress the dispersal of obligation. For Lyotard, `Auschwitz' is 
the name which disperses obligation into the unexpressed-inexpressibility of 
wrong and the micrological significations of phrasing. The event of the death 
camps is conceived as disclosing an utter heterogeneity of legislation and 
obligation which cannot engender the speculative concept of law: the identity of 
formal (finite) and substantive (infinite) will. Thus, according to the conception 
of `ethical time' presented in The Differend, there is a homology between the 
`metaphysical' idea of the self (Selbst) developed in speculative thinking, and 
the mythology of `Aryan' race: both attempt to derive obligation from the 
establishment of the true. For Lyotard however, obligation `is not'; it `is' only as 
immediate responsibility to difference. 
The necessity of linkage onto the occurrence is not a matter of prescription: 
the necessity of the `and a phrase' is expounded in The Differend as 
`ontological', not ethical. For Lyotard, the possibility of obligation is the 
condition of generic discourses, each of which `prescribes' specific means to 
realize their particular ends. The possibility of generic narratives of 
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formulation and linkage among phrase regimes, is conceived as dependent 
upon the possibility of obligation, 
These [generic discourses] give rise, but do not more than give 
rise, to obligation. It is thus that Kant questions the capacity of 
the `ought' itself, without conditions. [The Differend, 1174] 
Obligation is presented as the condition of `ethical time', or the reception of 
`conditionless' obligation to difference. 2 For Lyotard, philosophy and ethics are 
the only discourses whose conditions cannot be made explicit, and which, as 
such, can receive the silence of wrong and differend: 
One's responsibility towards thought consists ... 
in detecting 
differends and finding the (impossible) idiom for phrasing them 
[The Differend, ¶202] 
In his account of the function of the `Transcendental Aesthetic' in Kant's 
First Critique, Lyotard attempts to show that the pure givenness of the `matter' 
of intuition is a moment (`idiom') which cannot be encompassed within the 
genre of cognition. 3 His argument is that a differend exists between the phrases 
that produce Kant's `representational' (phenomenal) form of knowledge and the 
phrase of absolute exteriority. The constitution of appearances, in other words, 
forecloses on the givenness of the event; linkage is homogenized in the cognitive 
negotiation of contingency entailed in Kant's `modes of intuition' (space and 
time). Lyotard's reading of the Second Critique maintains the same line of 
argument. His claim is that critical ethics is a generic privileging of cognition 
which involves reducing obligation to the validity of a particular form of 
authority (the republic of rational beings pursuing rational ends). 
`A phrase', according to Lyotard, `is obligatory [simply] if the addressee is 
obligated': explanations merely `situate' the addressee of a prescriptive phrase 
within other, heterogeneous regimes in which he or she is the `addressor'. 4 The 
concept of an authority which obligates through the (universal) explicability 
and communicability of `idea' therefore, is explicitly opposed to The Difi`erend's 
exposition of obligation. For Lyotard, both Kant and Hegel suppress the 
heterogeneity and contingency of the obligation by attempting to show that it is 
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entailed in the `cognition', or recognition, of a rational authority. Both critical 
and speculative thought give rise to a differend which is signified by a 
particular dilemma: either the addressee of a prescription can explain his or 
her obligation, in which case the addressor of authority ceases to obligate, or he 
or she explains that his or her law is inexplicable to the (cognitive or 
speculative) tribunal, in which case it is arbitrary an not obligatory. Thus the 
`rules' of cognitive and speculative thinking, by which The Differend 
distinguishes Kantian and Hegelian philosophies, both attempt to ground 
obligation in a universally communicable `truth', 
This tribunal [that of the `cognitive genre'] requires that the 
obligatory be only that which the obligated one can reasonably 
account for in argumentation. It therefore supposes that I can 
occupy the place of addressor in prescriptives, that I can assume 
them. They are obligatory because I can understand their sense 
and explain them to the tribunal. The value of the explanation is 
its truth value, which is universal. Through this dilemma, the 
family of cognitive phrases annexes the family of prescriptive 
phrases, the I effaces the you. [The Differend, ¶176] 
This `rational' annexation, according to Lyotard, depends upon ideas of selfhood 
and community which cannot be sustained `after Auschwitz': thinking, after the 
events of the death camps, ought to acknowledge only the infinite possibility of 
differends. 
The issues that will be examined in this third chapter are, firstly, the 
misreading to which Lyotard subjects Kant's Second Critique in order to 
develop his particular conception of `obligation', and secondly, his failure to 
recognize the significance of Hegel's speculative reading of critical ethics. The 
question of why Lyotard conceives Kantian morality as ultimately non-ethical, 
will be considered in the light of the speculative critique of presentation set out 
in the preceding chapter. The latter question, that of how the logical and 
phenomenological elements of Hegel's philosophy disclose the actual 
significance of critical ethics, will be developed through the notion of 
speculative recognition expounded in chapters one and two. This section will 
show that Lyotard's conception of obligation cannot constitute an actual ethical 
relation; and that it is only through speculative exposition of critical morality 
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and its presuppositions, that such a relation is possible. 
The transcription of Kant's critical ethics which Lyotard presents in The 
Differend's second `Kant notice', is focussed primarily upon the relationship 
between moral obligation, and the `cosmological' idea of the will's spontaneous 
causality. s For Lyotard, the impossibility of `deducing' the noumenal autonomy 
of the will from any of the phenomenal, or `objective', conditions which it 
produces, leads the argument of the Second Critique to presuppose the 
existence of a rationally autonomous will. The discourse of the moral law, what 
Lyotard refers to as its critical `metalanguage', posits this law as the 
authorization of the `object' phrase which asserts the freedom of the will. Thus, 
consciousness of freedom is conceived by Kant as a fact of reason; for, although 
it cannot be established through the deduction of cognitive principles, it is 
given a priori through the discourse of the moral law, 
of all intelligible objects ... nothing [is known] except freedom, 
and even this only insofar as it is a presupposition inseparable 
from the moral law. [Critique of Practical Reason, 73] 
The `You ought to' of moral obligation, in other words, is received not as a 
sensibly determined appearance, but `in an ideal nature by the faculty of 
desire'. 
The philosophical task which is undertaken by Kant in the Critique of 
Practical Reason, is to deduce the spontaneity of the will from the necessity of 
its obligation to duty, or the moral law. For Lyotard this enterprise must 
inevitably founder on the differend that exists between the `cosmological' 
discourse of spontaneous initiation, and the `ethical' phrase of reception and 
obligation, 
The question to put to [the] critical metalanguage [of practical 
reason] is knowing whether the you in You ought to and the you in You are able to are the same you, whether the entity that is 
obligated and the entity that is the first cause are the same 
entity. [ The Differend, 121] 
Kant's postulation of the `ought' (sollen) as a `fact of reason', is presented in The 
Differend as implying an `incomprehensible' power which is free in and for 
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itself: the divine `I' of God beyond cognitive explanation. This power, according 
to Lyotard, is what is disclosed, or `signified', in the feeling of respect 
engendered a priori by the moral law. On this reading of the Second Critique, 
the addressee (subject) of moral obligation, or prescriptive phrases, cannot be 
the author: the Kantian subject can only receive the moral law as `dependence', 
`constraint', or `coercion', 
The addressor [God/Freedom] is the one who is able to, who is 
the power. And if the addressor, in the universe of the phrase of 
obligation, were to speak about him or herself, he or she would 
say I, as he or she would say you in obligating the addressee 
(you ought to). [The Differend, 121-2] 
This problem of the `compossibility' of moral law and autonomy, which Kant 
attempts to resolve in the Second Critique, is transcribed in The Differend as a 
`dispossession' experienced by the addressee who is faced by the unknowable 
power of first causality (God, cosmological freedom): `All that is known is that 
freedom does no more than announce itself to the addressee of the law through 
the feeling of obligation'. 6 The solution which Kant offers to the claim that good 
will is simply the negation of efficient ('heteronomous') causality, is what 
informs Lyotard's reading of the Second Critique as encountering, negotiating, 
and ultimately suppressing the spontaneity of linkage and phrasing. The 
introduction to the Critique of Judgement states explicitly that there is a `gulf 
separating the realms of practical and theoretical reason. On Lyotard's 
transcription, this separation is the condition of the independence (autonomy) 
of reason's practical and theoretical forms: each is dependent upon the 
autonomy of the other in the determination of its `realm' in the `territory' of 
critical philosophy7, 
there is no abyss [gulf] ... except because of each party - to dip back into the forensic or warrior symbolism - grants itself a right 
of inspection over the other's argumentation, and so extends its 
pretensions over the borders. It is at this price that each party discovers its borders. [ The Differend, 123] 
On this reading, Kant's argument `by analogy' with the First Critique, that 
spontaneous causality must entail the production of effects in the phenomenal 
world, is an attempt to empower good will at the moment of obligation. The 
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`You' of obligation is no longer `coerced' or `dispossessed'; the compossibility of 
noumenal and phenomenal causality allows a simultaneity of agency and 
obligation, 
The I is ideal, but it is presented (as absent) in the universe of 
this phrase as what makes it mediately effective: at the same 
time (the time of obligation) as the you ought to, the I is able to. 
[The Differend, 122] 
Kant's idea of treating the principles of practical reason `as if they were laws 
of nature therefore, is read by Lyotard as the disclosure of a judgement, made 
within the territory of critical philosophy, which acknowledges their respective 
realms as actively heterogeneous. The relationship of theoretical to practical 
determinations of reason, is `critical', on Lyotard's reading, because the `abyss' 
between them is `neither filled in nor hollowed out'8, 
The `as if depends upon the transcendental imagination for the 
invention of comparison, but it depends upon the faculty of 
judgement for its regulation. [The Differend, 123] 
The solution to the problem of moral agency which is offered in the Second 
Critique is understood by Lyotard as disclosing the difference of cognitive and 
ethical discourses (`genres'), and the necessity of judgement in legitimizing 
boundaries and functions. 
This disclosure of `incommensurability' between the faculties of practical and 
theoretical reason, is not received as an ethical demand within the Second 
Critique. For Kant, the will must be able to know its particular duty in relation 
to the universality of the moral law; and so there must be a determinate 
principle through which the will can establish unconditionally the content of its 
obligation. This is Kant's idea of the `type', or the `form of lawfulness in 
general'. 
The rule of judgement under law of practical reason is: Ask 
yourself whether if the action you propose should take place by a law of nature of which you yourself were a part, you could 
regard it as possible through your will. [Critique of Practical Reason, 72] 
The introduction of this idea into the Second Critique, is for Lyotard the point 
at which he abandons the ethical possibility disclosed in the concept of the 
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`abyss' (between practical and theoretical reason), for the idea of a 
`suprasensible nature' which dominates spontaneous judgement of difference. 9 
Kant's demand that one should `act as if [you] were at all times a member of 
a realm of [human] ends ... 
'lo, is transcribed in The Differend as constituting 
an identity of the `addressor' (`I') and the `addressee' ('you') of the moral law. 
For Lyotard, the `typic' of the categorical imperative, by commanding 
recognition of oneself and others as ends in themselves, reduces `obligation' to 
the interactivity (consensus and exchange) determined in Kant's analogy with 
the serial cause (the theoretical determination of appearances). On this reading 
the Second Critique ends up by deducing the authority of the moral law from 
its production of a dialogical community of addressor/addressees. Critical ethics 
is presented in The Differend as dependent upon the positing of a republic of 
rational beings in which each individual recognizes him/herself as both 
legislator and subject. Lyotard remarks, 
Isn't an abyss filled in there, from the fact of this perfect 
symmetry? And isn't the regimen of obligation annexed right down to the form of its phrases by the regimen of cognition... Hasn't the commentary on the ethical phrase, here the critical, but nevertheless still descriptive, once again obtained the inevitable result ... of reducing ethical legitimation to cognitive legitimation, in particular by imposing onto the former the rule 
of the latter, namely the result of consensus and the 
exchangeability between partners, the rule of dialogue. [The Differend, 1251 
For Lyotard, Kant's assumption of spontaneous `free will' as the undeducible 
condition of the moral law, immediately forecloses on the possibility of such a 
community. Autonomy is presented in The Differend as the absolutely 
unconditioned moment of judgement which obligates through its pure 
immediacy, 
causality through freedom is immediate, that is, without 
mediation, but also without recurrence. Its efficiency is instantaneous, pure will obligates and that is all. It is but beginning. [The Differend, 126] 
The essence of Lyotard's reading of the Second Critique is presented in this 
conception of the absolute discontinuity of `ethical time' and serial causality. 
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`Performative causality' is immediate resistance to homogenization and 
communicability: for Lyotard there can be no necessary production from the 
ethical phrase, not even the `suprasensible idea' of a realm of human ends. 11 
Kant's postulation of `compossibility' between `natural conditions' and moral 
prescription therefore, is read by Lyotard as an attempt to suppress the 
spontaneity of obligation through its production of a determinate end: the 
`ethical community. The heterogeneity of cognition and obligation which Kant 
encounters and negotiates in his idea of the `abyss' is suppressed in the notion 
of an ethical `nature' which is the consequence (end) of moral autonomy, 
No `nature', not even a suprasensible one, not even as an idea, 
can result from obligation. The imperative does not command 
one to act so as to produce a community of practical, reasonable 
beings, but as if the maxim of action were supposed to be a law 
of this community. As a sign, the ethical phrase is without 
sequel, and thus final. [The Differend, 127] 
The possibility of cognitive referentiality is not excluded by The Differend's 
presentation of obligation. However, Lyotard's conception of the `non-transitive' 
nature of ethical time, such a linkage must necessarily exclude a `world' of 
ethical phrases: there is `either implication or obligation'. 
Speculatively read, the `heteronomy' constituted through Kant's 
transcendental faculties, presupposes the lack of concrete self-recognition 
which is produced and sustained in civil society. The abstract separation and 
difference which is the condition of critical ethics however, discloses an 
objective dependency which, although only at the level of (external) reflection, 
participates in the development of substantive will. The self-consistent 
universality of Kant's moral law in other words, is originally implicated in the 
objective forms through which that presentation occurs, Thus, the 
transcendental activity through which Lyotard expounds the critical 
philosophy's ethical `negotiation' of the occurrence, constitutes an aporetic form 
of willing which reinforces the lack of mediation in bourgeois property 
relations. 
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The lack of unity presupposed by Kant's critical epistemology, i. e. the 
domination of the concept by the necessity of its relation to intuition, is for 
Hegel reproduced in the critical morality as the subjective concept's 
reinforcement of the inequality of bourgeois property relations. The self-seeking 
of the abstract particular, is re-presented through moral maxims which can 
spontaneously legitimate any act of appropriation or disposal. The relationship 
of critical subjectivity to the substance of ethical life, discloses a presupposition 
of abstract separation and difference in which the primacy of spontaneous self- 
determination is rooted. Speculatively read, the immediate `presentation' of 
obligation cannot be abstracted from the historical conditions in which it is 
formed, and which it reinforces. Thus, the Phenomenology's expositions of 
Consciousness (Force and the Understanding), Reason (the `spiritual animal 
kingdom') and Spirit (Absolute Freedom and Terror) explicate estrangements of 
concept and intuition, whose mediation appears as the activity of Kant's critical 
subject. 
The Differend's attempt to show that speculative phenomenology 
presupposes a `metaphysical' idea of identity (the Selbst), depends upon the 
notion of an unsublatable moment of prescription. The obligation of the 
deportee simply to die, is read as the absence of the concept from secular life: 
`Auschwitz' is a community which is not a community. The question of 
obligation `after Auschwitz' cannot have recourse to speculative sublation; for 
the identity of the law and substantive will is absolutely dispersed. Lyotard's 
analysis of thinking's ethical response to the Nazi slaughter, is to make the 
unconditioned `freedom' presupposed by Kant's moral autonomy, immediately 
responsible to the possibility of wrong and differend constituted through 
`representation'. For Lyotard, both critical and speculative discourses attempt 
to articulate the `conditions' of obligation; and so neither can command without 
dominating, 
Certainly someone who decides the law instead of being its 
addressee, cannot be a judge but is necessarily a criminal. And 
someone who submits to law decided in this way can only be a 
victim. [The Differend, 11611 
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On Lyotard's transcription, the force of the moral law is experienced as the 
feeling of `constraint' and `coercion': the `freedom' which Kant formally allows 
the critical subject to disobey the command of the categorical imperative, 
always does violence to the spontaneity of obligation, 
The addressee may indeed link on with an I won't do it, but he 
or she was still first a you grabbed hold of by the obligation. 
Obligation is analogous to a constraint insofar as it is the 
displacement of an I onto an addressee instance, its being taken 
hostage. [The Differend, 121] 
The Differend's presentation of the Second Critique, begins by trying to show 
that the formal (transcendental) conditions of critical ethics, inevitably `situate' 
the subject of prescription in a `non-performative' relation to the ethical 
command. For Lyotard, the `I' of spontaneous freedom is originally alienated by 
Kant to the `inscrutable' being of God, only to be brought back into the universe 
of moral autonomy by the idea of `compossibility' between practical and 
theoretical determination. Kant's notion of the `type', by its claim that the 
production of effects is necessary to any concept of causality, including that of 
the good will, is what `conjoins' the ideas of'suprasensible' nature and freedom. 
This notion of conformity to the form of lawfulness in general, is conceived by 
Lyotard as suppressing the contingent judgements through which the 
immediacy of obligation occurs: `spontaneous' will becomes subject to the 
presumption of a universally `explicable' authority in which the `I' is both 
`addressor' and `addressee'. 
Kant's admission of the impossibility of deducing the moral law therefore, is 
read by Lyotard as disclosing the pure immediacy of obligation, or `ethical 
time'. 12 The `transcendental illusion' which is engendered by the Second 
Critique, is presented in The Differend as the `situation' of the ethical moment 
in serial time: the concept of a realm of absolute human ends, for Lyotard, 
suppresses the beginning of ethical time precisely because it determines a 
necessary end. Any `production', or `implication', attributed to ethical time, 
constitutes its suppression; the ethical is the absolute exclusion of `discourses' 
of recognition and mediation, 
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The blindness, or transcendental illusion resides in the 
pretension to found the good or the just upon the true, or what 
ought to be on what is. [The Differend, 1166] 
The speculative questions raised by Lyotard's non-conceptual `obligation' to 
difference, must be approached through his transcription of Kant's critical 
ethics. The preceding chapter has expounded how critical subjectivity, through 
the lack of unity in its practical and theoretical forms, reflects and sustains the 
dominance of subjective particularity in social relations. Thus, the fundamental 
question arising from The Differences transcription of the Second Critique, 
concerns how the `power' of spontaneous causality, which Kant attributes to the 
purely formal independence of the will, contributes to the historical 
development of consciousness towards self-recognition. I will argue that the 
forms of agency and passivity, through which the moral will is expounded in 
the Phenomenology, constitute aporetic relations of concept and object, 
subjectivity and actuality, which can only be explicated speculatively. The 
necessity which emerges in consciousness' `moral view of the world'13 
constitutes an implicit recognition of the law as active mediation of subject and 
object: critical morality is the form through which spontaneous reception of the 
right, is sublated in the concept of the law. It is this sublation which is the 
historical condition of the logical, ethical and political necessity which Hegel 
expounds in the law of the notion. By extension of this critique of abstract self- 
legislation to The Differend's idea of obligation, I will show that Lyotard's 
spontaneous reception of difference is afflicted by the same aporias and 
contradictions as Kant's moral will. 
For Lyotard, the law to which Kant's moral consciousness understands itself 
as subject, is originally received as coercion and constraint. The moment of 
obligation to the moral law is understood as determining God as an absolute 
power (`addressor') who victimizes the subject (`addressee') through the form of 
the categorical imperative (the absolute command: `You ought to'). This 
conception of the relationship between the power of God, and the agency of 
moral consciousness however, fails to recognize the presuppositions upon which 
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consciousness has become morally disposed towards its activity. 
Hegel's speculative account of the French Revolution has shown that it is the 
absence of formal property law which determines the destructive relation of an 
abstract, indeterminate `matter' of humanity to the substance of ethical life. 
With the institution of formal property relations there emerges the illusion of 
universality through which the moral self-consciousness masks the conflict and 
antagonism of particular interests. The unconditional command of the moral 
law determines an apparent universality within the atomism of civil society. 14 
The relative ethical life in which moral self-consciousness participates 
therefore, reproduces the externality of the Phenomenology's `spiritual animal 
kingdom' ('Self-contained individuals associated as a kingdom of animals'15): 
the `spirituality' of the relation between universal and particular is only 
apparent, for each is concerned to `produce' only for its own particular needs, 
and not the whole of society. Ethical life is an `animal kingdom', in which each 
is excluded from the `matter in hand', in which the other satisfies its needs. 
This self-certain consciousness which creates the actuality of its work, also 
destroys it; for what is produced, is produced simply for its own particularity, 
and so has no objective existence for the other or itself. In being true to itself, 
consciousness cannot help but deceive those who become interested in its work; 
for its `honesty' of purpose (moral autonomy) always conceals particular 
interest. Since this deception is universal however, the `joy' of absolute self- 
recognition in each particular action, comes to be displaced by a limited 
experience of the non-actuality of work. The content of Kant's critical morality 
is a reflection of the subjective particularity which dominates ethical life: each 
form of its universalizing, `Reason as Testing Laws', and `Reason as Law Giver', 
presupposes an exteriority and separation which it serves to reinforce. The 
demand for universal recognition inherent in the moral consciousness is 
expounded in the Philosophy of Right as possible only through the development 
of a relative ethical life in which the law has its actuality. 
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Moral consciousness' establishment as a `culture' dominating ethical life, is 
expounded in the Phenomenology as a negative relation of subjectivity to 
actuality: nothing which is done by consciousness is acknowledged by it in its 
relation to the substance of ethical life. 16 Kant's definition of freedom as 
originally opposed to the heteronomy of nature, constitutes the moral law as an 
infinitely unrealizable task which can find no satisfaction in the elements of 
Sittlichkeit. The critical subject, unable to produce a unity of its moral actions 
and the actuality of `nature', can only think, or `postulate' this unity as the 
absolute condition upon which self-determination can take place. Thus, God is 
related to moral consciousness as the guarantor of the moral law, 
Consciousness 
... places pure 
duty in another form of being than 
its own consciousness ... 
In the same way it affirms itself to be 
that whose actuality, not being in conformity with duty, is 
transcended, and qua transcended, or in the idea of the Absolute 
[God's view], no longer contradicts morality. [Phenomenology, 
6241 
Lyotard's transcription of the critical ethics fails to recognize that Kant's 
postulation of `the existence of God as necessarily belonging to the possibility of 
the highest good'17 presupposes a form of domination which is not designated 
simply by the structure (`universe') of the moral imperative. Obligation to the 
moral law can be presented as pure `constraint' and `coercion' only when critical 
subjectivity's speculative relation to ethical life is abstractly excluded: it is 
consciousness' certainty of itself which constitutes the power of the moral 
imperative in relation to Sittlichkeit, 
It [self-consciousness] is absolutely free in that it knows its 
freedom; and just this very knowledge of this freedom is its 
substance, its purpose, its sole and only content. [Phenomenology, 614] 
The moral law cannot create the power of an absolute `addressor' (God); for it 
is the expression of consciousness' abstract self-certainty. The God of morality 
is actually determined through consciousness' creation of a law which is both 
absolutely transparent to it, and absolutely abstract: duty, the object of the 
moral law, is always unrealized, non-actual. Kant's idea of God is not an 
absolute power over the subject (`addressee'); it is rather a contradictory 
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`thought' in which the harmony of nature and morality is posited `beyond' the 
actual determinations of ethical life, 
Therefore, the supreme cause of nature, insofar as it must be 
presupposed for the highest good, is a being which is the cause 
.. of nature through understanding and will i. e. 
God [the 
highest good]. Now it was our duty to promote the highest good, 
and it is ... a necessity connected with 
duty to presuppose the 
possibility of this highest good. [Critique of Practical Reason, 
130] 
Speculatively conceived, the God which ought to be assumed in the 
enactment of one's moral duty, is the non-actual `thought' of unity which is 
inherent in the moral law. Self consciousness is in a state of constant striving, 
whose end, the idea of God, is posited as a mere `thought' beyond its secular 
existence. The Differences account of the Second Critique however, expounds 
the cognitions of the moral will as homogenizing forms which suppress the 
spontaneity of obligation. The categorical imperative is taken simply as a non- 
historical moment of domination, which requires the compossibility of 
`performative' and `serial' causality in order to allow the possibility of 
rationalizing its authority. The critical notion of God, or the idea of an absolute 
`addressor', is the agency by which Kant attempts to appropriate `performative' 
obligation to the authority of a rational (dialogical) community. This reading of 
the problem of moral autonomy, fails to recognize that all particular 
satisfaction and enjoyment is alienated from subjectivity; and that 
consequently the power of Kant's postulated God lies in the universal deception 
of self-consciousness in regard to its actuality. 
Kant's conception of the relationship between free will and obligation does 
not, as Lyotard maintains in The Differend, produce a subject which is 
immediately dominated by the command of the moral law. Rather, moral self- 
consciousness has no concrete recognition of itself, or of the other: it is the 
universal `dissembling' of its motivations through the positing of a God who 
guarantees the unity of duty with the `highest good'. Such a God however, is a 
contradiction. He cannot be `actual' and `beyond the actual'; He cannot be 
`moral' and beyond the struggle with nature which determines duty as an 
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`infinite task'. Moral consciousness has no phenomenal or noumenal object; its 
judgements can determine no concrete relation between the good as such, and' 
the particularity of the actions in which it is realized. The subjection of moral 
self-consciousness to external domination does not have the transparency of the 
master-slave relation: the critical subject is dominated by contingent wants and 
desires which it re-presents, through the categorical imperative, as morally 
legitimate. 
The reading of critical morality which Lyotard presents in The Differend 
tries to show that the attempt to secure the effectiveness of moral 
determinations in the world, is part of a process by which Kant reduces the 
contingency of ethical linkage. The analogy which Kant draws between the 
concept of a causality expounded in the First Critique, and the spontaneity of 
the will posited in the Second, is understood by Lyotard as the precondition of a 
rational authority, under which the subject of the moral law because both its 
`addressor' and `addressee'. This misrecognition of critical ethics, presupposes 
The Differend's critique of Hegel's speculative phenomenology as a 
methodological suppression of difference which is unable to sustain itself after 
the end of spiritual community at `Auschwitz'. Both critical and speculative 
ethics are expounded as teleological discourses which exclude the heterogeneity 
to which thinking ought to be responsible. Difference, for Lyotard, has no 
substantive being through which contingency can be judged; and so the 
obligation to phrase the `unphraseable' is always `other' than the `conditions' of 
obligation. I will argue that Hegel's concept of law, is the form through which 
obligation to difference and differentiation becomes ethically necessary. 
According to Lyotard's transcription of Kant's analogy between `serial' and 
`performative' causality, the idea of treating the determinations of practical 
reason `as if they were laws of nature, discloses a judgement, made within the 
`territory' of critical philosophy, that shows their respective realms as actively 
heterogeneous. The relationship of theoretical to practical determinations of 
reason, is `critical', on this understanding, because the `abyss' between them is 
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`neither filled in nor hollowed out'18: each realm of legitimacy is judged and 
rejudged through contingent linkages onto the occurrence. This notion of the 
`abyss' in other words, is understood by Lyotard as disclosing the differend that 
exists between cognitive and ethical discourses, and the necessity of 
'non- 
predetermined' judgements in establishing and sustaining the integrity of 
generic `boundaries'. 
Obligation is presented in The Differend as the unconditional 
incommunicability of linkage: it is the command of an ungroundable authority. 
As such, it cannot be explained or related without violating the integrity of the 
ethical moment. Thus, the freedom, or non-predetermination, of judgement is 
related identically to the ethical; for it is only in the absence of communicable 
`rules' of discourse, that obligation can occur. Philosophy and ethics are for 
Lyotard the only `genres' whose conditions cannot be made explicit, and which, 
as such, can receive and phrase the `silence' of wrong and differend. 
The Phenomenology's exposition of morality shows that the abstractness of 
the moral law cannot be overcome simply by positing the analogy between 
phenomenal and noumenal causality. God is required to guarantee the 
necessity of duty; and His guarantee reinforces the abstraction and domination 
to which self-consciousness is subject in the `spiritual animal kingdom' of use 
and disposal. It is this power of reinforcing the domination of contingent 
differences which is of crucial significance in expounding critical ethics. On 
Lyotard's reading, Kant's Second Critique is conceived as a suppression of 
difference because the `thought' of God is taken as sufficient to `annex' the will 
to a community of beings. Speculatively conceived however, this thought 
reinforces subjectivity's abstraction from the substantive forms in which 
difference has its ethical significance. Kant's attempt to provide the a priori 
conditions of moral autonomy is contentless: the categorical imperative cannot 
command because its formal criterion of ethical validity can justify any 
particular action. Thus, the practical cognition expounded in the Second 
Critique can never. fill in the `abyss' between practical and theoretical reason: 
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speculatively conceived, both Kant and Lyotard's conceptions of obligation 
presuppose the arbitrariness of subjective particularity. 
The fundamental point which Lyotard attempts to make through his reading 
of the Second Critique, is that Kant's approach to the problem of 
`compossibility' of agency and moral obligation, both discloses and suppresses 
the immediate relation between spontaneity (of `linkage') and obligation. 
For 
Lyotard, the power of `performative' causality is immediately heterogeneous 
and contingent; nothing is `implied' by the `prescriptive phrase', as 
its 
occurrence determines nothing beyond itself. Thus, Kant's 
idea of a 
`suprasensible' realm of human ends as the production of moral activity, is 
understood by Lyotard as fundamentally at odds with the possibility of ethical 
judgement; for `ethical time', as pure `beginning', cannot realize itself as nature 
or idea. 
By radically distinguishing the pure immediacy of `ethical time' from the 
Kantian idea of a realm of universal human ends, Lyotard determines a form of 
subjectivity which is, a fortiori, incapable of recognizing any necessity other 
than its own self-conviction. The reading of critical ethics presented in The 
Differend, fails to recognize that the moral law's abstraction of the subject from 
the actual determinations of Sittlichkeit, produces a form of self-consciousness 
which is dominated by the contingent wants, desires and satisfactions of 
subjective particularity. This `moral' consciousness does not experience the 
`thought' of God as the unity of its activity with the world: its experience is that 
of estrangement from the posited condition of its obligation. This is the 
phenomenological significance of absolute ethical spontaneity; for having come 
to a limited awareness of the antinomy of action and realization, moral 
consciousness retreats into itself, reinforcing the abstraction of the moral will. 
Morality passes over into the pure self-conviction of `conscience', whose duty is 
no longer re-cognized as divinely ordained, 
In the forms of conscience, with its certainty of self, it [moral 
consciousness] finds the content to fill the former emptiness of duty as well as the emptiness of right and the empty universal 
will. And because this certainty of self is at the same time 
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immediacy, it finds in conscience definite existence. 
[Phenomenology, 645] 
It is this displacement of the postulate of God, which both guaranteed and 
thwarted the necessity of duty, which expounds the arbitrariness and 
immediacy of the subjective particular which recognizes only its own 
immediacy as law. 19 
Conscience as such, is aware that it is directly responsible for its acts; that 
its duty, of which it is immediately self-certain, is a content that can be 
realized. It is through conscience that the universal law loses its abstract unity: 
it is split into the plurality of empirical duties between which the subject must 
choose an the basis of pure conviction. Thus, conscience turns out to be an even 
more indeterminate determination of the ethical than pure moral law. Its 
action is constituted through an awareness of duty which is completely without 
objective mediation; for each acts on the basis of an `individual conviction' 
which cannot determine a universal content. The conscientious individual can 
justify all of its actions precisely because it can actually justify none of them. As 
Hegel remarks, 
Spirit certain of itself is at rest within itself in the form of 
conscience, and its real universality, its duty, lies in its pure 
conviction concerning duty. This pure conviction as such is as 
empty as pure duty, pure in the sense that nothing with it, no definite content, is duty. [Phenomenology, 653] 
The moral conscience, by autonomously constituting duty as a particular 
conviction, determines itself in opposition to the substance of ethical life. This 
opposition is a `culture' of self-consciousness: it is an active resistance of 
subjectivity to the mediations in which law and right have their actuality. The 
emptiness of Kant's moral law produces a state of inner self-certainty which 
recognizes no objective necessity: `In the strength of its certainty of itself, it has 
the majesty of absolute self-sufficiency, of absolute autarky, to bind or to 
loose'. 20 It is this absolute self-certainty, and the aporias produced through its 
activity, which are reproduced in The Differend's understanding of ethical 
necessity. For Lyotard, obligation is a moment of pure subjective conviction 
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which cannot be actualized or communicated, 
Above all, the question, which is so to speak preliminary, is that 
the request emanating from this entity [the `addressor', what or 
whoever this is] be received as though it were a law. The only 
sign capable of guiding a third party in this is that the addressee 
is obligated. [The Differend, 1164] 
The moment of obligation is violated by discourses which attempt to explain 
and legitimize the uniqueness and contingency of the prescriptive phrase. The 
Differences transcription of the Second Critique as cognitively suppressing the 
spontaneity it `cosmologically' attributes to free will, retraverses the 
phenomenological transition from moral will to conscience. Lyotard's exposition 
of the moral law as negative in relation to the contingency of linkage and the 
infinite possibility of differends, discloses the same return to subjective 
contingency expounded in the dialectic of conscience. His writing of ethical 
spontaneity ignores the domination of contingent difference presupposed by 
Kant's critical morality: thus The Differend's subjectivization of the `ethical', 
fails to recognize the power of the unmediated particular (satisfaction, desire, 
appropriation and disposal) over the formation of judgements. Hegel's 
speculative exposition of morality discloses the subjective legitimation of 
external difference as constituting a `spiritual animal kingdom' of antagonistic, 
self-seeking individuals. 
The exposition of civil society which Hegel sets out in the Philosophy of 
Right, expounds the necessity of re-cognizing and mediating the subjective 
particularity of the will. This exposition takes the form of showing that moral 
autonomy presupposes the `caprice and physical necessity'21 which determines 
abstract self-seeking; and that it is this abstract exteriority and domination of 
contingent differences which must be mediated through the law of the state. 
The speculative necessity constituted through Kant's moral law, is of a relation 
in which self-consciousness recognizes itself in all its particular elements, 
The will's activity consists in annulling the contradiction between subjectivity and objectivity and giving its aims and 
objective instead of a subjective character, while at the same time remaining by itself even in objectivity. [Philosophy of Right, 1281 
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Hegel's concept of law as the `annulling' of the opposition between subjectivity 
and objectivity, is the realization of the substance of the will. The 
Phenomenology expounds this relation through the forms in which subjectivity 
misrecognizes the universality of its particular work, satisfaction and desire. It 
is Lyotard's failure to appreciate this exposition of the representation and 
misrecognition of difference, which conditions The Differences aporetic account 
of the relationship of authority and autonomy. 
The event of `Auschwitz' is presented in The Differend as demonstration of 
an absolute heterogeneity of `addressor' and `addressee' of the law. The 
Holocaust is understood by Lyotard as the end of `obligation' to a rational law 
which `situates' the subject as both legislator and citizen of a community. 
`Auschwitz' is presented as the end (termination) of the `transcendental illusion' 
of community, in which ethical mediation is the object of the law, 
it is ... illusory ['after Auschwitz'], in the Kantian sense of transcendental illusion, to suppose a subject substance that 
would be both a subject of the uttering (even though it is not the 
addressor in the prescriptive) and the permanence of a self (even 
though from one phrase to the next it leaps from one instance 
situation to another). [The Differend, 1155] 
The law of the SS is presented in The Differend as absolutely resistant to 
speculative exposition. Its consequences can, for Lyotard, only be attested to by 
phrasings which `remember' the uniqueness of Nazism's attempt to `forget the 
other' of representational and foundationalist discourses. 22 The attempt to 
annihilate the physical and historical being of the Jewish people, is conceived 
as the end of sublation as such: the SS and the deportee disclose a non- 
relationship of obligation and legislation which is the end of `metaphysical' 
identity. `Auschwitz' however, can only `block' the abstract `method' of 
speculative thought which Lyotard posits in the `Result' section of The 
Differend. The obligation to phrase the wrong and victimization perpetuated at 
`Auschwitz' in disparate, `micrological' presentations, can be maintained only 
where speculative exposition is required to produce new forms of sublation. The 
evil of Nazism's absolute victimization of the Jewish people, is itself a 
profoundly speculative moment which obligates spirit to judge the violence of 
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its own distortion. The identity of spirit is produced and reproduced through 
substantive judgement of misrecognition. 
The idea of obligation which Lyotard presents in The Differend, situates both 
Kantian and Hegelian discourses on law, autonomy and justice with the genre 
of cognition; or representation. Kant's positing of the moral law is conceived as 
violating the integrity of ethical time through the `congruence' of the 
suprasensible realm of human ends. For Lyotard, this `metaphysical' unity 
becomes fully deterministic in Hegel's speculative thought: the experience of 
non-moral contingency (heteronomy) is integrated into a method of positive 
sublation. Both critical and speculative philosophies are non-ethical in the 
sense of imputing universal explicability and communicability to the reception 
of obligation: on Lyotard's reading, both attempt to prescribe the spontaneity of 
ethical judgement by positing a universality which is produced through the 
freedom of the will. This conflation of Kant and Hegel under the rules of the 
cognitive genre however, presupposes the abstraction of pure subjective will 
from the discourses of law and necessity in which it is embedded. Lyotard can 
maintain that speculative thinking dominates ethical reception of difference, 
only by positing an abstract, objectless volition as the `addressor' of right. 
Speculatively conceived absolute spontaneity is pure negativity; and it is 
through the history of positing that ethical judgement and law are mediated in 
Sittlichkeit. 
The ideas of right and law which Hegel expounds in the Philosophy of Right, 
are constituted in their actuality through the `re-cognition' of ethical life 
(Sittlichkeit) as the substance of free will, 
An existent of any sort embodying free will, this is what right is. Right therefore, is by definition freedom as idea. [Philosophy of Right, 1291 
Hegel's concept of the state is a relation of unity through mediation: the 
individual, constituted in its particularity, re-cognizes its substantive being in 
the universal. It is in this sense that the Philosophy of Right expounds a 
relationship of authority to obligation which is `rational': the institutions and 
Obligation, Morality and Authority 122 
relations of civil society are re-cognized as formative of the subjective 
particularity which the state must mediate. This mediation however, is never 
complete; it is always `posited', and so contradictory of the infinite idea (of the 
notion) which it attempts to realize. Thus, the authority of the state. neither 
constitutes the `actual' as dominant over the self-reflection of consciousness, 
nor determines subjectivity itself as an absolutely negative demand (the sollen 
of duty) ranged against the `heteronomy' of ethical life, 
The crucial point in the Kantian definition of right is the 
`restriction' which makes it possible for my freedom or self-will 
to co-exist with the self will of each and all according to a 
universal law. ... Once this principle is adopted ... the rational can come on the scene only as a restriction of the type of freedom 
which the principle involves, and so not as something 
immanently rational but only as an external, abstract universal. 
[Philosophy ofRight note to 1291 
Lyotard's reading of Kant attempts to show that the `spontaneity' of the will, 
which he postulates as the fundamental premise of the moral law, is ultimately 
suppressed by the idea of a realm of universal human ends. The infinite 
possibility of `linkage', which for Lyotard is the condition of an ethical reception 
of difference, is excluded by the idea (representation) of congruent finality. It is 
precisely this positing of unity as a mere `thought' which for Hegel constitutes 
the impossibility of critical ethics. The objective relations through which 
consciousness develops the universality of its work, satisfaction and desire, are 
excluded from the recognition of moral necessity: critical ethics cannot 
recognize concrete difference, and reinforces the exteriority of the other in civil 
society. The truth of self-recognition is not abstractly posited in speculative 
thought; it is developed through the, misrecognition and misrepresentation by 
which external authority sustains itself. The relationship of state authority and 
subjective will expounded in the Philosophy of Right, recognizes the objective 
conditions of domination and inequality presupposed by critical ethics. 
Speculatively conceived, authority and recognition are identical; neither can be 
adequately conceived without the other, 
The state is absolutely rational inasmuch as it is the actuality of the substantive will which it possesses in the particular self- 
consciousness once that consciousness has been raised to consciousness of its universality. The substantial unity is an 
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absolute unmoved and in itself, in which freedom comes into its 
supreme right. On the other hand this final end has supreme 
right against the individual, whose supreme duty is to be a 
member of the state. [Philosophy of Right, 1258] 
Kant's idea of a `suprasensible realm' of human ends therefore, which 
Lyotard presents as the complete `annexation' of obligation to the cognitive 
genre, is an abstraction which has its actual significance within the historical 
development of consciousness toward substantive self-recognition. Within this 
development, it is the accidentality (contingency) of private possession 
enshrined in bourgeois property law, which constitutes the work, desire, and 
satisfaction of civil society, as domination and lack of unity. Thus, by 
consigning self-consciousness' recognition of its own finitude to the realm of 
heteronomy, Kant's moral law produces an utterly non-actual ('suprasensible') 
conception of ethical necessity. The moral law, through its reinforcement of the 
dominance and inequality of bourgeois property relations, also reinforces the 
necessity of mediation: the aporias of the `moral view of the world' show Kant's 
moral autonomy as infinitely reproducing the finitude and limitation of 
subjectivity. 
The Differences writing of obligation as the spontaneous reception of wrong 
and differend, reduces political activity as such to the reproduction of the 
`transcendental illusion' of community: for if `prescriptives' cannot be 
`transitive' then the normative phrase must `situate' its addressee within a 
community of universally obligated and obligating entities. This 
normativization of prescriptives is presented in The Differend as a universal 
agency of the subject in its reception of an obedience to the law: `legitimate' 
authority is deduced from narratives about racial and national origins, divine 
right, the idea of humanity, historical necessity etc. This `deduction' of 
authority from the narratives of identity however, is conceived by Lyotard as 
the suppression of ethical linkage by representational forms of thinking. The 
`annexation' of ethical judgement to legitimate authority discloses this 
incommensurability: obligation to wrong and differend is immediacy as such, 
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and cannot be included in normativizing representations, 
The aporia of a deduction of authority, or the aporia of 
sovereignty, is the sign that the phrase of authorization cannot 
result from a phrase stemming from a different phrase regimen. 
It is the sign of an incommensurability between the normative 
phrase and all others. [The Differend, ¶203] 
For Lyotard the immediacy of ethical time is always unrepresentable within 
narratives of legitimate authority. The ethical moment, `this threat, this 
marvel, and this anxiety, of a "what-is-to-be-linked"'23, cannot be reduced to the 
foundational assumptions of a rational humanity, revolutionary proletariat, 
universal self (Selbst) etc. The heterogeneity of the normative phrase, consists 
in the impossibility of `deducing' its authorization of prescriptives from other 
forms of sentences: it is always concerned with the realization of the concept of 
justice represented in its particular narration of true ethical necessity. It is this 
attempt to ground obligation in the law of an immanent community, which is 
presented in The Differend as the goal of political discourses, as opposed to the 
political, 
Its [the narrative's] metalinguistic constitution marks the 
function of authority: to throw a bridge over the abyss between 
heterogeneous phrases. [The Differend, 1207] 
Authority as such subjects the spontaneity of prescription to a concept of justice 
achieved within a representable idea of community. 
For Lyotard, obligation is the spontaneous unity of differend and the 
necessity of phrasing, which cannot be explained or legitimated through any 
other regimen. Ethical necessity therefore, is presented in The Differend as a 
sensitivity of thinking to the silence which `signs' wrong and differend; as the 
necessity of finding `idioms' in which to phrase the unphraseable. This ethical 
`sensitivity' of thought to the incommensurability of discourses, is suppressed 
by the normative phrase: the spontaneity of linkage onto the present is 
excluded through the constitution of an ethical community in which justice is 
represented as a congruent finality. On this reading, normative phrases, which 
for Lyotard constitute the transcendental illusion of community, impose a 
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sanctioned, legal citizenship upon the named individualities who are dispersed 
throughout a plurality of heterogeneous discourses and phrase regimen. The 
law as such, is imposed upon individualities who are ontologically dispersed, 
and which, for Lyotard, have the responsibility of delegitimizing the law. 
The law should be respected with humour because it cannot be 
completely respected, except at the price of giving credence to 
the idea that it is the very mode of linking heterogeneities 
together, that it has the necessity of total being. ... 
The `people' 
is not the sovereign, it is the defender of the differend against 
the sovereign. [ The Differend, 1208] 
Lyotard's concept of individuality's relation to the law, constitutes a `culture' 
of subjective judgement which is rooted in his reading of Kant's Third Critique. 
The critical philosophy's separation of autonomy and heteronomy is reinforced 
by Lyotard's positing of the subjective moment of taste (the free play of 
imagination and understanding) as independent of the Third Critique's 
immanent development of finality. However, it is the `Analytic of The Sublime', 
with its account of the aesthetic antinomy of representation and conception, 
that Lyotard takes as the crucial moment of disclosure in Kant's philosophy. 
For it is here, according to The Difi`erend's final `notice' , that the 
impossibility 
of `passages' between different `genres' and `phrase regimes' is formulated 
within the terms of transcendental idealism. For Lyotard, the experience of 
incommensurability which Kant expounds as the (a priori) ground of sublime 
affection, is the experience of the `unpresentable' as such: the antinomy of 
reason and imagination discloses thinking's ethical and political responsibility 
to its (ontological) experience of heterogeneity. I have argued that this 
subjectivizing of Kant's aesthetic finality, fails to acknowledge the speculative 
necessity constituted in the idea of negative pleasure; and that the historico- 
political problematic which Lyotard abstracts from the `Analytic of The 
Sublime', constitutes an aporetic opposition of the subject to the formative 
actuality (Sittlichkeit) in and through which it exists. Lyotard's attempt to 
expound obligation as a spontaneous reception and origination of difference, 
fails to acknowledge Hegel's critique of the Kantian subject's negative relation 
to the law. The Absence of objective recognition which Lyotard abstracts from 
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moral spontaneity, and which lies at the core of his exposition of the `Analytic 
of The Sublime', conditions a concept of judgement which is incapable of giving 
ethical substance to the other. 
The logical determination of this relationship of subjectivity of the law, is 
expounded by Hegel in the Science of Logic's section on `Limitation and the 
Ought'. 24 For Kant, pure reason, employed in relation to the world of sensible 
appearance, cannot be satisfied merely with the process of efficient causality 
which confronts it; it is concerned to discover the absolute conditions upon 
which those appearances are founded. It is through this fundamental 
determination, according to Kant, that pure reason is able to establish its 
`boundaries' as implying the existence of an unknowable realm (noumenal, or 
things-in-themselves) beyond mere appearance. This concept of the `boundary, 
which pure reason establishes between phenomena and noumena, is contrasted 
by Kant to the concept of a `limit', which is simply a finite gradation within an 
infinite (mathematical) series that implies no possibility of completion. Kant's 
idea of the limit, in other words, is the speculative `bad infinite' which has no 
substantive actuality; and it is this constant re-establishment of finitude which, 
for Hegel, is implied in the critical notion of boundary. 
The Kantian boundary is the way in which something distinguishes itself 
from something else; it is the interiorization of its own opposition to the `other' 
from which it distinguishes itself. The thing, in this case Kant's moral subject, 
sustains its self-identity through its opposition to the other: `it relates itself to 
itself by knowing itself to be its own non-being'. 25 This is the Kantian limit: the 
complete displacement of the actual which constitutes the demand of critical 
morality, the categorical `ought', as an unrealizable task. The other remains 
irreducibly exterior to the law of self-determination (autonomy), as it is both 
the condition and the negation of the critical subject's being for itself. The 
moral self-consciousness knows itself only as the perpetual absence of 
satisfaction in its actual desires, wants and satisfactions; and it is this absence, 
and its aporetic relation to the elements of Sittlichkeit, which is reproduced in 
Obligation, Morality and Authority 127 
Lyotard's reading of moral obligation 26 
This `essential' negative self-relation, is the logical condition of Kant's moral 
imperative, the `ought'. Thus, the `obligation' under which the Kantian subject 
is placed, constitutes its essence as a simultaneity of being and non-being: the 
good will has the power of an essential being, pronounced in the `ought to be', 
but also posits its own negative, pronounced in the `ought to be'. 27 This non- 
being (limit) is momentarily transcended through moral action (the enacting of 
the ought); but it is only as the non-being constituted by the ought, that it has 
its moral nature. This perpetual overcoming and recreation of the limit is the 
essence of the good will; for its adherence to the moral law involves it in an 
infinite series of negations which relate its negativity to itself. The `boundary' 
between the autonomous self and heteronomous causality, which Kant claims 
is established by the categorical imperative, actually implies the infinite 
finitude of the limit, from which he wished to distinguish the moral will 
absolutely. 
The ought implies a finitude, or `non-being', of the subject, which limits its 
power to the constant re-establishment of its own non-actuality. The critical 
subject cannot realize its `being-in-itself-to-be' (the ought to be), precisely 
because it is the `ought' and not the `is'. By presupposing the boundary set upon 
reason in its theoretical determination of appearances, that is, the positive 
implication of noumena beyond the phenomena, the Second Critique excludes 
the possibility of a substantive, differentiated recognition of autonomy. 
Understood as a purely formal demand, the boundary through which the self 
sustains its identity has no actuality; it is simply a limit, or `regulative idea', 
which, as inferior to the actual, merely `ought to be'. 
Kant's concept of duty therefore, is, absolutely opposed to the actuality 
through which the unity of Sittlichkeit is made possible 28 The work, desire and 
satisfaction of the particular, is reduced in the critical morality to a nullity and 
limitedness which is completely subject to the categorical demand of the moral 
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law. The abstract finitude of the particular is set over against its own objective 
mediation in the law, 
But in the world of actuality itself, Reason and Law are not in 
such a bad way that they only ought to be ... any more than the 
ought is in its own self perennial and, what is the same thing, 
that finitude is absolute. [Science of Logic, 1361 
The fundamental concern of this speculative reading of Kant's idea of moral 
obligation, is to demonstrate the impossibility of an ethical relation founded on 
the opposition of subjectivity to the objective world. Lyotard's transcription of 
critical ethics attempts to show that the conjoining (Darstallung) of spontaneity 
and moral necessity expounded in the Second Critique, ends up by subjecting 
the spontaneity of `linkage' to the domination of cognition (through the idea of a 
dialogic community of rational individuals). The heterogeneity of `ethical time' 
is for Lyotard constituted through the absolute immediacy of prescription; for it 
is only in its complete abstraction from the necessity constituted in the 
objective forms of `Reason and Law', that the subject is receptive to `obligation' 
as such. This concept of `ethical' spontaneity (the `contingency' of linkage) 
cannot be objectively differentiated from the logic of the Kantian `ought': both 
Kant and Lyotard abstract the ethical demand from the speculative necessity 
constituted through subjectivity's relation to the objective forms of ethical life 
in which it is embedded. 
Hegel's account of the presuppositions of critical ethics in the Science of 
Logic, has shown that the demand of the moral law, the `ought', establishes as 
absolute the negative finitude of the subject. The boundary through which it 
maintains its self-identity, is actually a `limit', which constantly returns the 
subject to the `non-being' of abstract opposition to the objective world. 29 For 
Lyotard, Kant's moral law, as a representational form of the `cognitive genre', 
must posit a `true' referent in order to validate its necessity; that is, the idea of 
a realm of universal human ends. The spontaneity of linkage which Lyotard 
conceives as the condition of an ethical reception of difference, is distinguished 
absolutely from every discourse of validation and legitimation. Obligation as 
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such occurs only as a pure submission to the necessity of phrasing the 
unphraseable, which is the abstract immediacy of Lyotard's `ethical time'. The 
spontaneity which Lyotard expounds of the possibility of the ethical, 
presupposes the same positing of subjectivity as infinite finitude which 
underlies Kant's idea of moral self-determination. For by setting the experience 
of prescription as such beyond objective recognition, that is, beyond the 
universality of work, satisfaction, and desire, Lyotard constitutes a non- 
subjectivity which is essentially opposed to the other from which it 
distinguishes itself. 
Obligation is presented in The Differend as the immediate unity of a demand 
(from God, the race, humanity) with obedience: this, for Lyotard, is the general 
condition of the generic discourses which seek to suppress the contingency of 
linkage onto the occurrence, 
Above all, the question which is so to speak preliminary, is that 
the request emanating from this entity be received as though it 
were a law. [The Differend, 1[164] 
Prescription as such, that is, obligation without conditions, is an `ethical time' 
which cannot be represented or communicated through the rules of any generic 
discourse. The ethical moment as such, is for Lyotard essentially bound up with 
the unpredetermined reception of the differends that arise from the 
heterogeneity of discourses and regimen. The ethical, or the spontaneity of 
thinking's relation to the representation of presence, is the condition upon 
which the `legitimacy' of discourses is constantly re-established. This moment of 
unpredetermined reception is the sensitivity of thought to wrong and differend; 
for it is only in the pure abstraction of `ethical time' that the silence of the 
unphrased (the unrepresentable) can be received. 
For Lyotard, the boundaries constituted among generic discourses, are 
reproduced through a communication (war, or commerce) of ideas, rules and 
protocols, in which each gives itself the right to appropriate the initiations of 
the other. It is the immediate reception of the differends which spring from 
these discourses that constitutes the ethical responsibility of thought: the 
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occurrence constantly discloses the wrong and victimization `legitimized' by 
particular genres, which ought to be phrased. This ethical reformation of 
generic boundaries however, constitutes the same `non-being' of subjectivity as 
the Kantian `ought'; 
the ethical genre is the one whose rule is to admit no rule but 
that of obligation without conditions... [The Differend, 1175] 
This `ethical' determination of generic boundaries however, constitutes the 
same `non-being' of subjectivity as the Kantian `ought'. The truth of Lyotard's 
conception of the ethical, is that his attempt to determine the boundary as 
established and re-established through the spontaneity of prescription, cannot 
avoid the negativity of the `limit'. For by defining the prescriptive phrase 
through its opposition to all homogenizing teleologies, or specific genres of 
discourse, Lyotard produces the ethical as limitation: the `addressee' of 
obligation is always returned to its abstract `ethical time' as the non-being of 
`this' particular genre. 
The Difterend's attempt to expound the ethical independently of the concrete 
elements of Sittlichkeit, reproduces the aporias of critical morality. The non- 
being of the `addressee' which receives the prescriptive phrase is maintained 
throughout its activity; it cannot realize its ethical reception of difference in 
any objective form. Thus Lyotard's transcription of ethical spontaneity, by 
failing to recognize Hegel's exposition of critical morality, constitutes a 
subjective culture which is absolutely opposed to the laws and institutions 
which form it. What this postmodern ethical consciousness thinks and does, is 
again a question of imposing its own ironic negativity upon the substance of the 
ethical. 
The final part of the Phenomenolog/s exposition of morality, is concerned to 
show that `conscience', in its universal uncertainty about the action of the 
other, comes to depend entirely upon what it is told, that is, upon the language 
of self-legitimation. Here conscience merely speaks its ethical conviction' and 
does not act: it is the pure unity of self-conviction which dare not sully its 
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purity in the world, 
This cessation of activity is self-willed impotence, the 
impassivity of a beautiful soul which will not besmirch its 
beauty by acting. [Phenomenology, 6761 
Conscience, as absolute self-conviction, produces the beautiful soul: its 
incertitude about the other's self-certain activity, produces a community in 
which each constantly reflects upon its essential divinity. Action in the world is 
degraded to pure exteriority: what is of absolute importance is the language of 
legitimation through which each assures the other of the purity of his heart. In 
contrast to the Kantian moral consciousness, which is the infinite task of 
negative determination, the beautiful soul is a pure inward satisfaction of 
subjectivity with its reflection upon all life and spiritual essentiality. 30 The 
beautiful soul has no self it is a pure reflectiveness which refuses the objective 
necessity of acting in the world. As such, it does not move outside the circle of 
its own self-reflection, and transform its thought into recognition of the being of 
difference. 
The absolute certainty of self thus finds itself, qua 
consciousness, converted directly into a dying sound, a mere 
objectification of its subjectivity. But this world so created is the 
utterance of its own voice, which in like manner it has directly 
heard, and only the echo of which returns to it. This return does 
not therefore mean that the self is there in its true reality: for the real is, for it, not an inherent being ... 
but its very self. [Phenomenology, 6661 
Lyotard's attempt to set the moment of obligation beyond the conditions 
posited in representational discourses, reduces ethical responsibility to 
expression of a feeling which is the perpetual other of substantive difference 
and community. The hypocrisy of the beautiful soul, is its refusal to 
acknowledge the objective forms into which subjectivity is deployed and 
transformed through action. Its ultimate confession, is a confession of this 
hypocrisy; that is, of its self-deception in merging its actual satisfactions and 
desires into an immediate reflection upon its own divine essence. The beautiful 
soul therefore, reinforces a hostile accidentality of particular interests: `each is 
opposed to the other under the guise of furthering their particular interests as 
if they could be a universal law'. 31 Lyotard's exposition of ethical time as the 
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moment of `obligation without conditions', reproduces this hypocritical relation 
of subjectivity to the other. The ethical moment can only be articulated as 
thinking's reception of the non-being of community; that is, as the phrasing of a 
wrong immediately disruptive of the categories through which community is 
represented. The ethical language of The Differend, which purports to 
articulate an absolute respect of difference, is originally abstracted from the 
objective forms through which the being of difference is recognized. Lyotard's 
account of wrong and victimization as expressible only in `micrological' accounts 
of otherness, fails to acknowledge the suppression which is presupposed by 
ethical spontaneity: a language which legitimates ethical judgement in 
abstraction from substantive difference, reinforces the domination of subjective 
particularity and self-seeking. 
Lyotard's conception of ethical necessity therefore, fails to move beyond the 
phenomenological determinations of the beautiful soul. The inner voice, or `call', 
through which thought receives its immediate responsibility to the differend, is 
still a subjective absolute which cannot recognize the objective necessity 
constituted in the elements of ethical life. The concept of obligation `without 
conditions' is related to every generic discourse as a `law' which cannot be 
mediated; it is the subjection of objectivity to the `caprice and physical 
necessity' of finite will. Thus, the `disauthorized' experience of 
incommensurability which Lyotard expounds as the moment of obligation, is a 
negative power which subordinates the actual to the spontaneity of `linkage'. As 
with the `divine' voice of conscience, the actual motivations of the subjective 
particular are obscured by a language of ethical integrity which misrecognizes 
the substance of Sittlichkeit. 
This account of the unconditioned moment of obligation, from which the 
objective forms of law, work, satisfaction and desire are excluded as 
representational `conditions', is the immediate sensitivity to difference which is 
at the core of the political problematic worked through in the last two sections 
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of The Differend, `Genre, Norm', and `The Sign of History'. For Lyotard, any 
authority whose conditions are representable through the rules of generic 
discourse, constitutes a form of heteronomy which is the other of spontaneous 
linkage onto the occurrence. The possibility of representing freedom and justice 
is absolutely excluded by the idea of immediate necessity; the forms through 
which community or ethical life is thought, are conceived as suppressive a 
priori. The political is presented by Lyotard as an activity constantly 
undermining the legitimacy of established forms and institutions; it is the 
obligation to phrase the differends which spring from the presence of authority. 
The Differend's attempt to expound the ethical independently of the concrete 
elements of Sittlichkeit, reproduces the aporias of critical morality. The non- 
being of the `addressee' which receives the prescriptive phrase is maintained 
throughout its activity; it cannot realize its ethical reception of difference in 
any objective form. Thus Lyotard's transcription of ethical spontaneity, by 
failing to recognize Hegel's exposition of critical morality, constitutes a 
subjective culture which is absolutely opposed to the laws and institutions 
which form it. What this postmodern ethical consciousness thinks and does is 
again a question of imposing its own ironic negativity upon the laws and 
institutions which actually form it. 
For Hegel, the law of ethical life cannot be stated independently of the 
discourse of positing, that is, independently of the displacement of actuality 
expressed in the doctrines of `being' and `essence'. The absolute can only be 
thought as the infinite demand that thinking should re-cognize the finitude of 
its relation to its substance. The absolute is a demand, or sollen, which is both 
grounded in, and independent of, the structures of abstraction in which it is 
posited. -Hegel's conception of the relationship between law and obligation, is 
developed through the aporias of `being' and `essence' he expounds in the Logic, 
and through the legal and political structures of the Philosophy of Right. 
Speculatively conceived, the political activity of the state is the infinite re- 
cognition and re-integration of finite will into the concrete universality of 
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Sittlichkeit: the authority of the law is dispersed throughout and and active 
within each contingent form of knowing and willing. 32 Thus, the relationship of 
freedom and justice cannot be directly represented: the abstract exteriority of 
being, which is presupposed by Kant's critical morality, is the disclosure of a 
positing which opposes subjectivity to the authority of the law. This authority 
cannot be definitively thought; for it is only through its recognition of the 
objective elements which emerge in ethical substance, that the law `is' in its 
truth: the idea of mediation between objectivity and subjectivity, 
the universal ... 
does not achieve completion except along with 
particular interests and through the co-operation of particular 
knowing and willing; and individuals likewise do not live as 
private persons for their own ends alone, but in the very act of 
willing these they will the universal in the light of the universal 
... 
[Philosophy of Right, ¶260] 
The relationship which Lyotard presents between law and the spontaneity 
of ethical time, posits the former as an immediate being which suppresses the 
reception of difference and contingency. This suppression however, is the 
presupposition which Hegel expounds in the Logic's account of Kantian 
morality, `Limitation and the Ought'. Kant's positing of the moral law is a 
constant reproduction of subjectivity in its finite, negative relation to the other: 
it is the exclusion of every objective form from the moral activity of the will, 
Duty is an ought directed against the particular will, against 
self-seeking desire and capricious interest and it is held up as an 
ought to the will in so far as it has the capacity to isolate itself 
from the true. [Science of Logic, 136] 
This positing of law and objectivity as abstractly opposed, is shown to be the 
complete absorption of subjectivity in its particularity; it is the absolute 
exclusion of otherness (difference) from ethical recognition. It is this exclusion 
which is sustained in Lyotard's transcription of Kant's moral spontaneity, an 
which informs the political problematic set out in The Differend. The 
recognition of substantive difference is excluded by a spontaneity of linkage 
which constantly reproduces itself as the negative of presence. The law cannot 
directly represent the substance of freedom; yet without its finite authority, 
thinking is without satisfaction. 
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According to Lyotard, ethical thinking `after Auschwitz' must be satisfied 
with `micrological' testimony to the wrong and victimization which is produced 
through representational, `foundationalist' discourses. The relationship of law 
and obligation constituted at Auschwitz is an unsublatable moment of 
victimization which it is the responsibility of thought not to subsume under 
representational categories. The law of the SS, which demands only the death 
of the deportee, and the obligation of the deportee to die, attests to the 
otherness which representation always redetermines: the mediation of law and 
self-recognition cannot be salvaged from the `disauthorization' produced at 
`Auschwitz'. For Lyotard, `the jews' are a `Factum' which signifies the 
responsibility of thought to the phrasing of wrong and differend independently 
of the being of the law. 33 
It is this abstract demand that thinking should always experience obligation 
over against the being of the law, which places Lyotard's idea of the ethical 
within the ambit of Hegel's critique of morality. As has been shown in this 
section of the thesis, the speculative exposition of critical ethics set out in the 
Logic, Phenomenology, and Philosophy of Right, are all concerned to show that 
the concept of a rational law is immanent in the positing of an abstractly self- 
determining subject. The logical, historical and juridical forms through which 
Hegel expounds the aporias of a critical ethics, in other words, are the forms 
which produce the mediatedness of ethical substance (Sittlichkeit). Thus, by 
abstracting Kant's notion of freedom from the ('cognitive') discourse of the 
moral law, Lyotard expounds the ethical as a pure immediacy which reproduces 
the aporias of absolute subjective finitude. Rational mediation of authority 
through the law is still possible and necessary after the event of Auschwitz; for 
it is only by positing speculative thought as an abstract `method' of sublation, 
that Lyotard is able to present the Holocaust as the moment to which thinking 
is infinitely responsible. The conditions which produced the Nazi slaughter 
must be recognized as a deformation of the relationship of law and subjectivity 
which the Logic and Phenomenology have shown to be necessary. Obligation to 
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the substance of Sittlichkeit, that is, to the law of the state, is the only form in 
which ethical activity can find satisfaction in the other. 
Lyotard's attempt to expound an ethics of spontaneous responsibility to 
difference, is an attempt to question the very possibility of an ethical politics. 
The forms and categories through which the concept of community is 
`represented' in political discourses, are problematized by Lyotard as 
suppressive, a priori, of the obligation without conditions he abstracts 
from the 
Second Critique. Judgements which are entailed in the rules of particular 
discourse cannot be ethically related to difference, as difference has already 
been excluded through an explicitly communicable necessity. The criticism of 
this notion of `ethical time' which I have developed in the present chapter, has 
shown that it presupposes the same abstract separation and difference as the 
Kantian moral subject. The speculative exposition which Hegel gives of the 
relationship of practical cognition to subjective particularity, I have argued, 
discloses oppositions of law and authority, ethical activity and satisfaction; 
duty and actuality, which are reproduced a fortiori in The Differend's 
presentation of obligation. For Lyotard, `obligation without conditions', or 
immediate sensitivity to differends, is the condition of a political problematic in 
which judgement is presented as a reformative power originally opposed to 
every element of ethical life. This abstract politicization of thought, I will argue 
in the following chapter, fails to recognize the unity immanent in Kant's critical 
philosophy. Lyotard's presentation of a conditionless obligation constitutes a 
subjective culturing of judgement which he attempts to validate through the 
aesthetic moments of the Third Critique. The concept of reflective judgement 
which The Differend attempts to abstract from the Third Critique however, is 
embedded in a discourse of aporetic mediations which are incapable of 
reconciling law and subjectivity. The reflective finality of the Critique of 
Judgement, and Kant's political essays, I will show, necessitates the 
recognition of work, desire, satisfaction and law as the substantive forms 
through which difference must be ethically judged. 
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Chapter III 
Notes 
1. The Differend, 1163. 
2. Ibid., 1174. 
3. Lyotard remarks in Just Gaming, `The "you must" is an obligation that is 
not even directly experienced. Because experience by itself always supposes 
its description, and thus the privilege granted to the play of the descriptive. 
And so the "you must" is something that exceeds all experience' [461. Moral 
judgement, in other words, is conceived by Lyotard as unrepresentable; the 
spontaneous origination of the will cannot be described in conceptual terms. 
Thus, the `totality of reasonable beings' [931, which Kant posits as the object 
of moral autonomy, violates the independence it is supposed to represent: 
thinking is ethically originative only when it is presented with the 
contingency ('givenness') of the event. For Lyotard therefore, it is in the 
`Analytic of The Sublime', where thinking is left conceptless by the 
unrepresentability of aesthetic affection, that judgement emerges as 
ethically receptive to difference: `The form that it [judgement] will take in 
the last Critique, is that of imagination. An imagination that is 
constitutive. It is not only an ability to judge; it is a power to invent criteria' 
[17]. 
4. The Differend, 11164. 
5. Cassirer, in his Kant's Life and Thought, remarks that `where action comes 
under the idea of autonomy, under the requirement of obligation ... [the] 
earlier instant is not carried over into a succeeding instant, but instead we 
take or stand in a non-temporal contemplation, in which we bind past and 
present into one event as we anticipate the future' [251]. It is this notion of 
a spontaneous abstraction of practical reason from the (cognitive) 
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continuum of events in space and time, through which Lyotard attempts to 
articulate the (ethical) necessity of judgement without concepts. As 
Cassirer points out in his account of critical ethics however, `the concept of 
a rational being ... 
leads directly to the correlative conception of a 
community of rational beings in a `realm of ends' [248-249]: the spontaneity 
of the will is reason's practical determination of itself over against 
heteronomous causality. It is the aporias of this opposition which Hegel 
expounds throughout the body of his work, and which are reinforced by 
Lyotard's abstraction of free will ('obligation without conditions') from 
critical ethics. 
6. The Differend, 122. 
7. See the introduction to the Critique of Judgement. 
8. The Diß`erend, 123. 
9. In the lecture entitled `Gaps', published in the collection Peregrinations: 
Law, Form, Event, Lyotard attempts to show that Kants articulation of the 
moral law as regulating the pathological desires of the (empirical) self, 
articulates the constraint and coercion which is entailed in cognitive 
legislation: `It being assumed that the will of such a self is the desire for 
self, the call coming from the law cannot affect it otherwise than by 
thwarting and dismissing it' [36]. This account of the suppression and 
coercion in the moral law's negation of desire however, fails to recognize the 
actual conditions (of inequality) which are presupposed and reinforced by 
that law. Lyotard's `ethical' turn to Kant's aesthetic judgement, which `has 
nothing to do with the fulfilment of any need whatsoever' [36], simply 
reinforces the self-seeking of abstract particularity (see chapter four, 
section two). 
10. Critique of Practical Reason, 129. 
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11. Bennington remarks, `On Lyotard's reading of Kant, the categorical 
imperative does not prescribe that one act so as to bring about a community 
of rational beings, but as if the maxim of action were to be a law for such a 
community. Kant insists that obligation should give rise to a phenomenon 
in the world, but this passage is not inscribed in the ethical sentence' 
[Lyotard, writing the event, 1391. Kant's notion of the categorical 
imperative therefore, is conceived by Lyotard as presenting an immediacy 
of linkage, ie. the `act as if (your maxim were a law of nature), which 
cannot be re-presented as cognitively necessary. The Differences concept of 
`ethical time', in other words, is the pure spontaneity of thinking's 
originative power in relation to heterogeneity and difference. The 
implication of such a reading of Kant, as Lyotard says, `will return'; 
although, I believe, it must be speculatively expounded in its relation to 
Hegel's critique of moral subjectivity. 
12. See Phenomenology of Mind, `Spirit certain of itself: Morality, 611-679. 
13. Lyotard argues in Just Gaming that the finality posited in Kant's critical 
ethics, discloses the spontaneity of ethical judgement through its freedom 
from determining (`metaphysical') finality: `(Kantian finality] would be a 
metaphysics if the finality were presented as a determinate concept. But it 
is simply one of reason's Ideas. It is a maximization ... not what impels us 
to judge, but what regulates our judgement' [47]. On this reading, Kant's 
attempt to bring the moment of obligation within the conceptual totality of 
cognition, is already sensitive to the impossibility of an ethics of 
`congruence': the formal freedom of he will which Kant presupposes in his 
critical ethics, is a power which must originate its own (ethical) 
responsibility. 
14. Lukacs remarks in The Young Hegel that `the illusion that bourgeois 
society, in its ideal state, contains no self-contradiction, and that the 
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contradictions that actually appear arise partly from social institutions 
which have been imperfectly transformed into bourgeois institutions, and 
partly form the imperfections of man, and especially from the surrender to 
the claims of the senses, of individual members of society' [1511. Thus it is 
that the `good will' is abstracted from the concrete life of the individual 
subject: the moral law is posited over against the actual formative 
institutions of Sittlichkeit. Kant's hypostatization of civil society as the end 
of moral culture therefore, reinforces the abstract separation and 
domination actually present in the bourgeois property form: the possibility 
of `reconciling' the contradictions of subjective self-seeking, is excluded by 
Kant's original division of human nature into homo noumenon and homo 
phenomenon. It is Hegel's `engagement' with, and opposition to, this 
abstract division, which Lukacs rightly identifies as the source of his 
historico-phenomenological exposition of the relationship between law, 
subjectivity and ethical life. 
15. Phenomenology, 417-483. 
16. As Gillian Rose remarks in Hegel Contra Sociology, `we are left with the 
realization of the barbarism of our abstract culture, of how we have 
reproduced that barbarism by denying the ethical, by fixing (positing, 
setzen) the illusion that we are absolute or pure moral consciousness in our 
moral law or in the law of our hearts' [181]. 
17. Critique of Practical Reason, 129. 
18. The Differend, 123. 
19. As H. A. Reyburn' remarks in his Hegel's Ethical Theory, `In place of a will 
purged of all sense and devoted only to the pure form of duty, we have the 
living concrete will of the subject, full of latent content ... ready to spring to 
life and assimilate any material presented to it by some objective situation' 
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[178]. Speculatively conceived, in other words, conscience is the realization 
of duty; it is the absolute opposition of concrete will to the substance of 
ethical life. 
20. Phenomenology ofMind, 628. 
21. Philosophy of Right, 1182. 
22. See Heidegger and "the jews , section 8. 
23. The Differend, 126. 
24. Science of Logic, 131-137. 
25. Ibid., 137. 
26. Gillian Rose remarks that, `understanding makes a boundary into a limit 
because it makes thought superior to actuality and says that thought can 
only be an ought to be, inferior to actuality. In this ways an untrue and 
contradictory relation to actuality is maintained' [Hegel Contra Sociology, 
191]. 
27. See Hegel Contra Sociology, `Beyond the Bounds of Morality', 185-192. 
28. Charles Taylor makes a fundamental mistake in his exposition of the 
relationship between the Hegelian notion of Sittlichkeit, and the Kantian 
idea of Moralität. He remarks that `The crucial characteristic of Sittlichkeit 
is that it enjoins us to bring about what already is .... Hence ... there is no 
gap between what ought to be and what is, between Sollen and Sein .... In 
Moralität the opposite holds. Here we have an obligation to realize 
something which does not exist. What ought to be contrasts with what is' 
[Hegel, 376]. This is a misrecognition of the speculative nature of the 
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relationship between state and civil society. For Hegel, the concrete 
universality of the law is always posited; it is always articulated through 
forms which are recognized as inadequate to its concept. Thus, the activity 
of spirit in the Rechtstaat retains the sollen of Moralität in its activity; 
although the object of this activity is now the mediatedness of the universal 
(the idea). The absolute cannot be thought outside the discourse of positing. 
29. As Stanley Rosen remarks in his G. W. F. Hegel, `practical desire ... 
is 
"unself-conscious" about its self-centred consciousness. Unobstructed by 
theoretical presuppositions, it throws itself upon the world in order to 
satisfy itself. Hence it regards itself as actual and the world as non-actual' 
[252-253]. Hegel appropriates this Kantian idea of practical reason as an 
activity which is constantly seeking satisfaction; although the infinite 
(indefinite) progress which Kant attributes both to scientific and historica; - 
development, demands mediation with the abstract finitude it constantly 
re-determines. Thus the good as such is split into autonomous practical and 
theoretical `realms' which Kant expounds in the First and Second Critiques: 
there is no unity, and each form opposes and contradicts the other. Thus for 
Hegel, the development of world history is the development of practical 
reason's re-cognition of objective forms in which it is actualized: `This is 
what Hegel means when he says that, in degrees of emptiness depending on 
a stage of world history, the rational is actual' [254]. 
30. As Hyppolite remarks in his account of the `beautiful soul', `this self- 
consciousness has lost its consciousness; the object that appears to it is no 
longer distinct from itself' Genesis and Structure of Hegel's 
Phenomenology of Spirit, 516]. Self-consciousness, in other words, has no 
cognition of substantive difference: it acknowledges only the immediate 
certitude of its own transparency. 
31. Hegel Contra Sociology, 180. 
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32. Marcuse's claim that `[Hegel's] political philosophy surrenders society to 
nature, freedom to necessity, reason to caprice', and that it `mirrors the 
destiny of the social order that falls, while in pursuit of freedom, into a 
state of nature far below reason' [Reason and Revolution, 218], fails to 
recognize the phenomenological necessity through which bourgeois 
individualism is constituted. His analysis of the state authority expounded 
in the Philosophy of Right, reifies the power of civil society as a destructive, 
disintegrative force which must be restrained by the negative power of the 
state. For Marcuse, the individuals who exist in civil society, `exist only as 
private owners, subjects of fierce processes of civil society, cut off from 
common interest by selfishness and all it entails' [Reason and Revolution]. 
The authority of the Rechtstaat however, develops through the concrete 
(universal) forms of work, satisfaction and desire: it cannot be abstracted 
from the relations of subject and object through which its actuality is 
formed. Thus, the Rechtstaat is the form in and through which the 
subjective self-seeking of civil society is recognized and mediated: it has 
authority over it, but only as the re-cognition of its universality. For Hegel, 
the contingency of bourgeois property relations and subjective self-seeking 
is the finitude with which the state is always afflicted. 
33. See Heidegger and "the jews , section 1. 
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Chapter IV 
The Politics of Judgement 
In chapter one of my thesis, I argued that Lyotard's claim to discriminate in 
speculative thinking an abstract method dependent upon the presupposition of 
a `metaphysical' self (Selbst), distorts and misrepresents the spirituality of 
Hegel's writing. The Differences transcription of speculative phenomenology as 
a set of rules whose necessity is finally `blocked' at `Auschwitz', fails to 
recognize that the radical alienation of law and obligation which produced the 
holocaust, must be understood through the concrete historical contradictions 
which produced National Socialism. Nazism, in other words, necessitates 
speculative re-cognition of violence and abstraction; and as such, it cannot put 
a definitive end to the speculative critique I have opposed to Lyotard's ideas of 
`presentation' and `obligation' in chapters two and three. 
In chapter two, I have argued that Lyotard's attempt to transcribe the 
necessity of immediate `presentation' from the (phenomenal) experience of the 
critical subject, re-presents the lack of unity inherent in the critical subject as a 
`juridical' play of discrete faculties. This `litigation' (of transcendental faculties) 
is understood by Lyotard as disclosing judgement as the activity through which 
legitimacy is established; although in terms of The Differend's transcription of 
critical epistemology, judgement remains within the `genre of cognition'. The 
very possibility of this re-presentation of the transcendental subject however, is 
dependent upon Lyotard's failure to recognize the -historical conditions 
necessary to the emergence of self-consciousness: his rupturing of Kant's 
`transcendental unity of apperception', presupposes discrete interior realms of 
(juridical) `representation', which are posited as independent of their historico- 
political actuality and significance. 
The critique of Lyotard's notion of `ethical time' developed in chapter three, 
showed that the concept of obligation articulated in The Differend, is violently 
abstracted from Kant's critical morality. For Lyotard, the necessity of the moral 
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law excludes the `ethical' reception of difference (differends): its presupposition 
of a congruent realm of human ends, is transcribed as fixing the subject in a 
relation to the other which is infinitely exclusive of its difference. This reading 
of critical morality, I have argued, through its representation of the critical 
subject as suppressive of the immediate freedom of the will, fails to recognize 
the lack of unity through which the aporias of pure practical reason are 
constituted. The contradictions which Hegel sets out in his exposition of critical 
morality (i. e. the insubstantiality of pure practical will, its reinforcement of 
abstract self-seeking and the infinite redetermination of subjective finitude), 
are reproduced, a fortiori, in Lyotard's account of the immediacy of `ethical 
time'. This speculative exposition of Lyotard's attempt to situate the necessity 
of critical ethics within a limiting and suppressive genre (cognition) however, is 
incomplete. For the ethical, political and philosophical questions which Lyotard 
raises in The Differend disclose their Kantian genealogy most explicitly in the 
transcriptions of `reflective judgement' set out in `Genre, Norm' and `The Sign of 
History'. 
In the first section of this final chapter therefore, I will expound 
speculatively the violence of Lyotard's abstraction of aesthetic sensibility from 
the concept of finality; and show that the subjectivity which the judgement of 
taste presupposes, is part of the necessity made explicit in the transition from 
subjective to objective notion. The second section of chapter four is concerned 
with the question of politics and community which arise from Lyotard's reading 
of the `Analytic of The Sublime'. I will show that the relationship between `the 
political' and Kant's exposition of the sublime which is set out in The Differend, 
presupposes and reinforces the critical philosophy's opposition of subjectivity 
and objectivity. Lyotard's idea of thinking's obligation to difference 
(heterogeneity, incommensurability) in other words, radically abstracts self- 
consciousness from recognition and misrecognition of its actuality; and his 
appropriation of the `experience' of heterogeneity from the Critique ofAesthetic 
Judgement, retains the aporetic immediacy of pure subjective conviction. 
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Section One 
Reflective Finality And The Logic of Subjective Judgement 
Kant's Critique of Judgement is the completion of his philosophy of 
subjective faculties. The realms of theoretical and practical reason which he 
delineates in the First and Second Critiques, posit distinct a priori relations 
between the mental and cognitive faculties of the subject: understanding 
(Verstand) and reason (Vernunft) are transcendentally related to their 
particular objects, i. e. phenomenal cognition and the faculty of desire. It is this 
autonomy of theoretical and practical reason which constitutes the necessity of 
a `critique' of reflective judgements; for neither of the cognitive faculties, 
understanding and reason, is capable of producing unity in the experience of 
the subject. The determinate judgements which proceed from the universal 
concepts of the cognitive understanding (through the schemata) and the 
autonomy of the moral law (through the type) cannot sufficiently reduce the 
contingency permitted by the general (a priori) conditions of experience. Both 
produce an `other' to which its particular analytic unity is opposed. 
The transcendental necessity of the cognitive understanding is expounded by 
Kant in the First Critique, as providing the general conditions for nature as a 
possible object of sense; while the Second Critique expounds the conditions 
under which the Idea of freedom can become regulative of the faculty of desire. 
Neither of these faculties unify the activity of reason with its object. The 
understanding cannot immediately determine the occurrence of `each particular 
thing in nature'; its laws are always universal and require articulation into the 
apparent contingency of phenomena. Practical reason, on the other hand, can 
only determine the Idea of freedom in relation to particular empirical desires 
and actions; it cannot actualize its necessity in the realm of phenomena. The 
transcendental principle expounded in the Third Critique is the unity of these 
opposed and empirically contingent realms. 
The critique of this unifying activity is an attempt to establish a 
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transcendental principle by which experience can, in the absence of 
determinate concepts, represent a conformity of nature to the faculties of 
cognition. The a priori necessity which is at stake in Kant's Third Critique, is 
the capacity of the subject to proceed from the empirical contingency of 
cognitive experience, to the reception of a non-cognitive universal in which the 
contingent becomes necessary, `final'. It is only through this `reflective' 
experience of empirical appearances as final, as embodying the intention of an 
absolutely self-determining understanding, that cognition can maintain its 
objective determination of experience. By presenting nature under the 
`principle of finality', reflective judgements provide a ground of possible 
empirical laws which is neither a concept of nature nor of freedom, `but a 
unique (subjective) principle of unity, 
This [reflective] judgement, ... 
is equipped with an a priori 
principle for nature, but only in a subjective respect. By means 
of this it prescribes a law, not to nature (autonomy) but to itself 
(heautonomy), to guide its reflection upon nature. This law may 
be called the law of the specification of nature in respect of 
empirical laws. It is not one cognized a priori in nature, but 
judgement adopts it in the interests of a natural order, 
cognizable by our understanding, in the division which it makes 
of nature's universal laws when it seeks to subordinate them to 
a variety of particular laws. [Critique of Judgement, 25] 
That the power of reflective judgement constitutes an independent faculty of 
the critical subject, is for Kant vouchsafed by the necessity of finality to the 
determination of a unified cognitive experience. For without judgement's 
`reflective' attribution of an aesthetic or teleological finality to particular 
representations, the realm of appearances determined by the faculties of 
understanding and intuition alone, would present `an endless multiplicity of 
empirical laws, which are yet contingent so far as our insight goes i. e. cannot be 
cognized a priorf. 1 Kant's account of reflective judgement however, is related to 
the objects of cognitive experience only as a moment of subjective attribution. 
The `finality' through which contingent appearances are reappropriated by 
cognition's principle of conformity to law, cannot be represented through 
concepts: reflective judgement's discrimination of a unity of cognition and 
intention in experience, is cognitively undeterminable. This transcendental 
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association of the (non-cognitive) Idea of finality with reflective judgement 
therefore, is a subjective necessity constituted through cognition's inability to 
actualize its own a priori principle, i. e. universal conformity to law. It is this 
cognitive unrepresentability of the `object' of judgement (the Idea of unity), 
which for Kant constitutes its a priori necessity to cognitive experience, 
our judgement makes it imperative upon us to proceed on the 
principle of the conformity to nature to our faculty of cognition, 
so far as that principle extends, without deciding - for the rule is 
not given to us by a determinate judgement - whether bounds 
are anywhere set to it or not. [Critique of Judgement, 28-29] 
The substance of Kant's Critique of Judgement is concerned to establish the 
independence of two distinct moments in which this unrepresentable unity is 
manifest. In the first of these moments, the aesthetic, it is the independence of 
the formal representation of the object from the desire to `use it for the purpose 
of cognition', which constitutes the subject's discrimination of finality. The 
feeling of pleasure which is immediately coupled with such a representation, 
does not derive from the possibility of subsuming the immediate apprehension 
(intuition) of the object under a particular concept. This purely formal pleasure 
in the object, is for Kant referable solely to the subject, 
In such a case the pleasure can express nothing but the 
conformity of the object to the cognitive faculties brought into 
play in reflective judgement, and so far as they are in play, and hence merely subjective, formal finality of object. [Critique of Judgement, 30] 
Kant's critique of the aesthetic, taken in general, is an attempt to establish 
the reality of a pure, disinterested affection. The Third Critique's account of the 
relationship between aesthetic judgements and the mental faculty of `pleasure 
and displeasure' maintains that if the object represented in imagination (the 
faculty of intuition's a priori) presents in it form, an immediate unity of 
imagination and understanding, then this representation of the object must be 
regarded as `final'. When the form of an object occasions pleasure merely 
through reflection upon it, that is, independently of cognitive or moral 
concepts, the pleasure resulting from this representation is for Kant both 
subjective and universal. The possibility of aesthetic affection is grounded in 
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the faculties of human cognition; although its occasion is always a matter of 
particular reflective judgements, 
This is why judgements of taste are subjected to a critique in 
respect of their possibility. For their possibility presupposes an a 
priori principle, although that principle is neither a cognitive 
principle for understanding nor a practical principle for the will, 
and is thus in no way determinant a priori. [Critique of 
Judgement, 32] 
Teleological judgement, or the `logical representation of finality in nature', on 
the other hand, is not concerned with the immediate apprehension of finality in 
the form of the object. The empirical ground of this moment of reflection 
belongs to the theoretical part of philosophy; for the determination of the object 
as embodying a `natural end', requires the subsumption of particular instances 
under a general concept. Teleological finality is not conceived through a 
principle independent, a priori, of the aesthetic. For although its judgement 
does not immediately discern the unity in nature to which 'pleasure- 
displeasure' is spontaneously responsive, the concept of a natural end 
organizing the contingent appearances of an object, depends upon the reception 
of an empirical (temporal) multiplicity as unified in its form. It is the same 
subjective a priori principle which produces the judgement of taste, that 
prepares the understanding `to apply to nature the concept of an end (at least 
in respect of its form)'? Teleological judgement, in other words, reduces the 
contingency of particular appearances through reflection upon their formal 
finality; and it is this subjective apprehension of unity in multiplicity which 
contributes to the understanding's cognitive determination of objects, 
The teleological is not a special faculty, but only a general 
reflective proceeding, as it always does in theoretical cognition, 
according to concepts but in respect of certain objects of nature, following special principles - these, namely, of a judgement that is merely reflective and does not determine objects. [Critique of Judgement, 36] 
For Kant therefore, reflective judgement is the faculty through which `the 
legislations of Understanding and Reason' are joined, without either losing its 
independence. Theoretical cognition of nature determines a `boundary between 
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the `sensible' world of conditioned appearances, and the `supersensible' realm of 
`things-in-themselves' which is beyond cognitive apprehension. It is this 
boundary which is presupposed by Kant's critical ethics: moral actions are 
expounded in the Second Critique of Reason exercised against the 
heteronomous causality of appearances. The faculty of judgement, by its 
attribution of aesthetic or teleological finality to the realm of cognition, conjoins 
the realms of practical and theoretical reason. For in discerning a formal unity 
of cognition with its objects, reflective judgement provides the `supersensible 
substrate' implied in Kant's doctrine of experience, with a `determinability' that 
implies freedom (autonomy) as the finality manifest in nature. The demand 
that `causality by freedom' (the `noumenal' activity of the will), ought to be able 
to take effect in the world is met, albeit subjectively, by teleological and 
aesthetic judgements of finality, 
Judgement, by the a priori principle of its estimation of nature 
according to its possible particular laws provides the 
supersensible substrate ... with 
determinability through the 
intellectual faculty. But reason gives determination to the same 
a priori by its practical law. This judgement makes possible the 
transition from the realm of the concept of nature to that of the 
concept of freedom. [Critique of Judgement, 38]. 
Reflective judgement's attribution of finality to nature, constitutes the 
incorporation of its apparently contingent particular laws, into a thoroughgoing 
self-determination (freedom, autonomy) of transcendental understanding. It is 
the subjective, unrepresentable idea of God which guarantees the unity of 
reason and understanding, while leaving them `objectively' irreconcilable. 
In the third of The Difi`erencis `Kant notices', Lyotard attempts to show that 
the critique of the faculty of judgement discloses a `critical activity' through 
which the a priori necessity of reason and understanding is completely 
dispersed. Lyotard's claim is that the objectivity of cognitive experience is 
entirely dependent upon this critical activity; and that as such, it is only 
through the act of `judging' that objects can be legitimately included either 
within the realm of moral autonomy, or heteronomous causality. The 
transcendental faculties which Kant deduces from the nature of cognitive 
experience, are presented in The Differend as establishing their legitimate 
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objects (`referents') through a process of constant `litigation'. Each faculty, on 
this reading, appropriates forms and principles established in the others, in 
order to validate its particular `objective' determination, 
In point of fact, though, judgement already and necessarily 
intervenes each time that it is a question of saying `this is the 
case', in order to validate a phrase, or in order therefore to 
present an object as permitting this validation. [The Differend, 
1301 
For Lyotard, judgement's want of a determinate object, and the absence of a 
specific set of rules to which its activity is permanently `annexed', disclose it as 
the critical activity presupposed by Kant's subjective faculties. It is only in its 
non-predetermination, that thinking is `free' to phrase the 
legitimacy/illegitimacy of `established' discourses. The Diß`erend's reading of 
the Third Critique therefore, presents judgement as the `faculty of the milieu'3; 
the spontaneous power through which the legitimacy of genres is constantly 
called into question by the current phrase4, 
This is the faculty [i. e. judgement] which has enabled the 
faculties and territories to be delimited, which has established 
the authority of each genre on its island. And this it was only 
able to do thanks to the commerce or war it fosters between 
genres. [The Diß`erend, 1311 
It is this idea of judgement that is at the core of Lyotard's notion of politics, or 
`the political'. His claim is that it is only through the constant re-formation of 
`legitimacy' through spontaneous sensitivity to the occurrence, that thought 
becomes `politically' concerned with its own freedom. And so it is judgement 
`freed' from transcendental necessity, which Lyotard posits as the condition of 
an ethical politics. 
The significance of Kant's Critique of Judgement for the political problematic 
which Lyotard presents in The Differend, is its admission of `passages' between 
the transcendental faculties of the subject. The possibility of representing 
objects through faculties which did not originate them, that is, of appropriating 
`rules' of linkage and formation; for Lyotard discloses the primacy of `critical 
activity' (judgement) over the transcendental deductions of the First and 
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Second Critiques. The moment of `symbolic' representation expounded by Kant 
in the Third Critique, is read by Lyotard as disclosing judgement's power to 
discern an analogy between the feeling of disinterested pleasure accompanying 
aesthetic finality, and the feeling of respect accompanying obedience to the 
moral law. The rules which allow verification of beauty or morality, in other 
words, retain their difference in this `critical symbolism'; for it is only through 
judgement's production of the `analogon' that ethics and aesthetics establish 
their objective legitimacy, 
Symbolization, then, does not occur through a substitution of 
objects, but through permutations of instances ... what allows the critical judge to say, This is the case - or convicting the 
exhibit - is not necessarily a fact. [The Differend, 132-133] 
By attempting to `supplement' the realms of practical and theoretical reason 
with a subjective power of (aesthetic and teleological) discrimination, Kant is 
unable, on Lyotard's reading, to sustain the a priori necessity of those realms. 
The transcendental unity of Kant's critical faculties is conceived as an 
abstraction from the temporality of the `passage': the symbolic forms ('analoga') 
through which judgement establishes and re-establishes legitimacy, discloses 
thinking's political freedom in relation to determinate forms of authority. 
The `passages' which Kant supposedly allows in the Critique of Judgement, 
are set out in The Differend as moments in thought's spontaneous relation to 
generic discourses. Judgement, on Lyotard's reading, cannot be subordinated to 
the rules of the `cognitive genre'; the subjectivization of its principle proposed 
as the solution to the `antinomy of judgement', is conceived as compounding the 
abstraction of critical `faculties' from the (undeterminable) necessity of 
judgement. The antinomy of judgement which Kant expounds in the Third 
Critique, is between the mechanical determination of nature, and the idea of a 
production of effects which can only be explained in terms of finality. The 
antinomy of mechanical and rational causality however, is for Kant founded 
upon a failure to recognize the distinction between reflective and determinant 
judgements. The reflective judgements through which particular empirical laws 
are represented as conforming to a final end, do not `supersede' the determinate 
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judgements of the understanding through which knowledge of nature is 
actually constituted. For the independence of reflective judgement, in its 
attempts to unify the heterogeneity of particular laws, is a purely subjective 
principle (a natural law cannot be known cognitively) which guides the 
discovery of unity in mechanical productions. There is an antinomy of 
judgement only so long as the faculty of reflective judgement is conceived as a 
principle which is in opposition to, and seeks to take the place of, the 
heteronomous causality of the understanding. For Lyotard, the concept of 
`nature' constituted through the faculty of understanding, sets the `critical 
activity' of reflective judgement to work: `supplementation' of phenomenal 
causality by the idea of an `end', is produced through the latter's symbolic 
representation of the former. The rules of formation and linkage `originated' in 
the cognitive understanding, are re-presented through an autonomous 
judgement ('passage') disclosing the differend between the discourses of 
mechanism and finality, 
if the activity of discerning, ... or the attention paid to differends at work in the critique, can take on this supplementarity by 
invoking the objective finality of nature, it is because it (critical 
activity) is itself a means set to work by nature in order to 
prepare its final end. [The Differend, 134] 
The `supplementarity' of reflective judgement to the rules of cognition, cannot 
re-establish the a priority of the critical philosophy's realms and territories. 
The differends which reflective judgement discerns among them in its reception 
of finality, are the sign of a heterogeneity which is always-already not 
determinately existent. 
On Lyotard's reading of the critical philosophy, it is in the treatise on 
`Perpetual Peace's that Kant discloses and negotiates the indeterminacy and 
spontaneity of thought's political activity. The freedom which is presupposed in 
Kant's exposition of the moral law, cannot be cognitively determined; and it is 
this indeterminacy which ought to provoke each particular state into 
spontaneous judgement of the other's political constitution. Perpetual peace 
among republics is sustained by this `agitated' condition of reason; war ought 
always to be forestalled by judgement's preservation of its own spontaneity. 
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This apparently spontaneous independence of thinking from the 
`transcendental illusions' of community and subject however, is for Lyotard the 
point at which Kant commits judgement completely to the demands of an 
`absolute addressor'. After opposing his `agitated', cosmopolitan judgement to 
the laws and institutions of particular states, Kant regulates what Lyotard 
understands as thinking's critical activity, through the idea of nature 
promoting universal right. 
In answer to Kant's question, `What does nature do in relation to the end 
which man's own reason prescribes him as a duty? '5, Lyotard contends that it 
acts as a `supplement' to the `legal' (national) existence of the subject. `Nature', 
according to this reading, is the non-cognitive `addressor' which perpetually re- 
establishes the legitimacy of relations between states. It is the idea of nature as 
an ethico-teleology, which affectively `signifies' the necessity of judging in the 
absence of laws. On Lyotard's understanding, Kant's cosmopolitan judgement 
has always already received its goal from an ethically purposive nature, 
One cannot pass judgement on signs without presupposing such 
an intention, be it problematically? That is, without pre-judging 
that an unknown addressor not only delivers but also addresses 
them to us to be decoded. [The Differend, 135] 
The notion of a `guiding thread' of finality, for Lyotard entails a generic `pre- 
judging' which dominates receptiveness to the event, and the differends which 
spontaneously arise from it. Kant's `acceptation' of a purposive moral nature is 
transcribed in The Differend as just such a domination; for political judgement 
ought constantly to rephrase the incommensurability of genres without 
reference to any predetermined necessity, 
whatever acceptation is given to the idea of nature, one's right of 
access is only through signs, but the right of access to signs is 
given by nature. Not even a denaturalized nature and signs of 
nothing, not even of postmodern non-teleology, can escape this 
circulus. [The Differend, 1351 
The ethical and the philosophical are presented in The Differend as `non- 
generic' genres, whose rules of formation and linkage cannot be predetermined. 
Both are related to the event as an openness, whose spontaneity is absolutely 
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distinct from and incompatible with generic ideas of historical finality. An 
ethical politics is for Lyotard dependent upon the preservation of this non- 
predetermined judgement throughout the `community' of particular individuals. 
His concern is that the `transcendence of the I', that is, its abstraction from the 
discourses of totalization which constitute the community as a determining 
agent (`addressor'), should be active as an absolute ethical demand. Lyotard's 
reading of Kant's essay on `Perpetual Peace' has attempted to show that the 
idea of a natural teleology suppresses the autonomy of judgement; that this 
concept, even when understood only as a `guiding thread', presupposes an 
immanent purposiveness addressed to the subject. Kant's idea of finality 
overpowers the critical judgement disclosed in the introduction to the Third 
Critique; for even in its `reflective' form, teleology places the `political' under 
the control of an historically constituted necessity (i. e. the development of 
humanity's `moral culture'). 
Lyotard's ideas of community and the nature of the political, I will argue, 
presuppose an abstractly subjectivizing account of Kant's Critique of Aesthetic 
Judgement. My claim is that by positing aesthetic harmony (the `Beautiful') 
and vacillation (the `sublime') among the `critical faculties' as the experience of 
the incommensurable as such, Lyotard fails to acknowledge the aporias 
constituted in Kant's immediately subjective reception of finality. In the 
account of the `Analytic of The Beautiful' which Lyotard develops in The 
Differend's third `Kant notice', and his essay `Sensus Communis', he attempts 
to show that Kant's judgement of taste discloses a principle of autonomy which 
cannot be encompassed by any particular discourse. The `unrepresentable' free 
play (harmony) of understanding and imagination is posited as the `experience' 
of incommensurability: the judgement of taste is read as the spontaneous 
response of thinking to the irreducible difference of the discourses. Lyotard's 
abstraction of the immediate'indeterminacy of thought which is the condition of 
Kant's judgement of taste, is compounded in his `political' appropriation of the 
judgement of the sublime. The `Analytic of The Sublime' is understood as 
disclosing the impossibility of `passage' between the critical faculties of 
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imagination and reason. The unrepresentability of the idea of freedom, which 
Kant expounds as the ground of sublime affection, is transcribed by Lyotard as 
the `obligation' under which the critical activity of thought is placed. The 
political, as it is presented in The Differend, is thinking's infinite capacity for 
phrasing the unphrased ranged against realms of `established' necessity. It is 
this conception of the relationship between judgement and freedom, that is the 
presupposition of Lyotard's idea of `the political'. I will argue that his 
transcription of the a priori conditions of Karat's aesthetic finality, constitutes a 
political problematic which abstracts subjectivity from the objective conditions 
of its being and activity. The `heterogeneity' of postmodern culture cannot 
displace the substantive forms of work, satisfaction and desire through which 
self-consciousness develops: and it is only through recognition of these forms 
that `rational' political judgement can be made. 
Kant's account of aesthetic finality in the `Analytic of The Beautiful', 
maintains that if the object presented in imagination presents, in its form, an 
immediate unity of apprehension and cognition; this object must be regarded as 
`final'. When the form of an object is determined as occasioning pleasure merely 
by reflection upon it, that is, as independent of cognitive determination; the 
pleasure attending such a representation is deemed subjective and universal: 
`The object is then called beautiful; and the faculty of judging by means of such 
a pleasure (and so with universal validity) taste'. 6 For Kant, the judgement of 
taste is made without a concept; and yet at the same time is a demand for 
universal assent. It is through his reading of Kant's `antinomy of taste', that 
Lyotard sets out the relationship of judgement to `presence', or `establishment', 
which informs his notion of the political. The `antinomy of taste' is expounded 
by Kant as a confusion of `determinate' and `indeterminate' concepts. The 
apparent contradiction which follows from the claim that judgements of taste 
are both subjective and universal, is resolved when it is acknowledged that the 
universality of aesthetic judgements bears upon the `supersensible' conditions 
of knowledge, rather than upon phenomenal experience itself. Aesthetic 
`finality' is concerned with the transcendental possibility of knowledge. The 
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concept through which aesthetic judgement receives the object as an end in 
itself, cannot be deduced from the conditions of phenomenal knowledge; its 
`object' is the `supersensible substrate' which is presupposed as the necessary 
ground of cognitive experience. Thus, for Kant, the judgement of taste does 
have universal validity; for the concept upon which aesthetic pleasure bears (in 
both the beautiful and the sublime) is the `indeterminate' possibility of 
knowledge as such. Kant remarks `that the removal of the antinomy of 
aesthetic judgement... compels us, whether we like it or not, to look beyond the 
horizon of the sensible, and to seek in the supersensible the point of union of all 
our faculties a priori'. Kant's Third Critique therefore, is an attempt to reduce 
the apparent contingency of empirical phenomena. As such, the a priori 
principle of reflective judgements must produce a harmony of the critical 
faculties through which experience is made possible. For if pleasure in the 
beautiful is brought about by a harmonization of understanding and 
imagination, then the demand of universality asserted by aesthetic judgements, 
is grounded in the transcendental conditions of there being knowledge at all. 
for Lyotard, aesthetic pleasure, by `signifying' the necessity of reflective affinity 
to knowledge in general, discloses aesthetic judgement as a `sensus communis' 
which demands the assent of everyone; `the sensus communis called forth by 
taste is a sign "lying in" the subject of an idea which relates to that subject'.? 
This inaccessibility of the principle of aesthetic judgement to the cognitive 
knowledge it guarantees, is, for Lyotard, the crucial point in the `Analytic of 
The Beautiful'. For Kant, the `transcendental unity of apperception' which 
underlies phenomenal representations, can only be grasped as an analytic 
unity present in time. This is the `I' of cognition's determinate judgements. 
Aesthetic pleasure, on the contrary, is produced by a synthesis which is 
reflective, not determining; it is occasioned by'... the conformity of the object to 
the cognitive faculties brought into play by reflective judgement' 8 On Lyotard's 
reading, this conformity of the object and its cognition, is understood as an 
`equalling out's of the faculties of imagination and cognition, in which it is the 
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very impossibility of aesthetic pleasure being `annexed' by the understanding, 
which is the condition of its possibility. Kant's notion of the judgement of taste, 
for Lyotard discloses the spontaneity (conceptlessness) of thought in relation to 
the immediate presentation of the phrase, 
When understanding tries to take over this `affiancing' [the 
simultaneous `defiance' and confidence `among faculties 
sustained by the activity of judgement] it can only determine the 
schematism, only the form which is already determined and 
prepared for the concept. And it can only attribute the 
determinate synthesis to the determining faculty, that is to 
itself. [`Sensus communid, 21] 
Lyotard's reading of Kant's judgement of taste, attempts to show that the 
critical subject is dispersed throughout its heterogeneous acts of reflection, and 
that it cannot be thought as a determinate unity. The feeling of pleasure which 
accompanies representations of objects as aesthetically final, is produced, for 
Lyotard, by a spontaneity of judgement which cannot be subsumed under 
determinate concepts. The sensus communis which he abstracts from Kant's 
aesthetic judgement, is affective; it is conceived as a universal feeling that 
accompanies the irreducible `experience' of heterogeneity, 
Feeling isn't transcribed in the concept, it is suppressed without 
relief (Aufhebung). This sublation is the presupposition of the 
concept. ['Sensus commun. is', 221 
The communicability of this abstract `sensus' therefore, cannot be `determined' 
as an object of cognitive or dialectical knowledge: for Lyotard, the dispersal of 
the subject through judgement's immediate sensitivity to difference, produces 
community only as an analogy with the `euphony' (harmony, affinity) of the 
faculties which is the ground of Kant's judgement of taste. The communis of 
Lyotard's idea of sensus communis, `is only in principle communicable'lo; it `is' 
only in the sense of the constant reformation of legitimacy, 
Thus it [sensus communis] is a region of resistance to institutions and establishment, where is inscribed and hidden 
what happens `before' we know what it is and before we want to 
make it in to anything at all. {'Sensus communis', 24] 
For Lyotard, judgement is the political response of thinking to the experience 
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of difference as such: it is an `unpreparedness' which produces legitimacy in 
momentary, contingent forms, which are always-already subject to the sensus 
communis. This `milieu' of critical activity, spontaneously re-forms and re-re- 
forms the discourses which `situate' the subject: it has no history and no 
substance, subjectivity remaining `unrepresentably' dispersed through 
contingent realms of legitimacy. For Lyotard, thinking is responsible only to 
the unforeseen, the undetermined, the unphrased; and so an ethical politics can 
only take the form of expounding the necessity of judgement's spontaneous 
reception of the event, Lyotard's Arrive-t-il? 
In his discussion of the role of `narratives' of legitimation in The Postmodern 
Condition, Lyotard attempts to show that it is the `little narratives' which 
threaten accepted scientific conventions, the produce and reproduce `legitimate' 
scientific practice. His claim is that the `inventive imagination'11 of the scientist 
is always already opposed to `grand narratives' (ontological legitimations); and 
that consequently, the aim of scientific discourse as such, is not consensus, but 
dissensus (`paralogy'). This is the basis Lyotard's critique of Habermas' Theory 
of Communicative Action, 
[Habermas'] second assumption is that the goal of dialogue is 
consensus. But as I have shown in the analysis of the 
pragmatics of science, consensus is only a particular state of 
discussion, not its end. Its end, on the contrary, is paralogy. [The 
Postmodern Condition, 65-66] 
This claim however, is itself a transcendental (non-speculative) assumption - of 
`paralogy' as the goal of discourse. Lyotard's development of the idea of 
dissensus (`heterogeneity') in The Differend's notion of political judgement, 
retains a posited opposition to actuality which is profoundly non-ethical. By 
abstracting self-consciousness' knowledge from the concrete formations (and 
deformations) of its work, satisfaction and desire, Lyotard's political 
problematic is left with no substantive concept of difference or necessity. 
The conceptions of politics and community which Lyotard develops in The 
Differencfs section `Genre, Norm', and in his essay `Sensus communis', are 
informed by the idea of `obligation' which is speculatively criticized in chapter 
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three. `The political' is understood by Lyotard as entailed in the possibility of 
the ethical: the pure, subjective spontaneity of thinking in relation to 
established realms of legitimacy (genres), is the end, or non-end, of political 
discourse. The fundamental problem with this conception of politics, stems 
from the lack of objectivity which Lyotard privileges in his reading of the 
Critique of Judgement. By abstracting the non-cognitive (undeterminable) 
moment of aesthetic finality from the body of Kant's Third Critique, and 
attempting to establish its reception as the disclosure of genuinely `critical' 
judgement, Lyotard forecloses on the possibility of an ethical politics. The 
exposition of judgement set out in the Science of Logic, and in the 
Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences, and the place which this occupies 
in the development of the Notion as such, constitutes a profound critique of 
Kant's subjectivization of, finality, and, a fortiori, Lyotard's notions of politics 
and community. 
For Hegel, the `faculty' of judgement is necessitated by Kant's abstract 
separation of practical and theoretical reason. The `ought' which is the 
determining contradiction of the critical philosophy, is produced and sustained 
through the separateness of the subjective and objective moments of the 
Notion. Kant's account of judgement as a transcendental condition of 
experience, i. e. as subjectively unifying the contingency allowed by the faculties 
of cognition, is expounded in Hegel's logical writings as a necessity belonging to 
the concept of cognitive experience as such. The a priori principles of the moral 
will, and of nature as an object of cognition, can be (non-aporetically) 
established only in the actual mediations of the notion: it is only through an 
objective recognition of the good as idea, that moral autonomy can become 
ethical, 
The defect of Kant's philosophy consists in the falling asunder of the moments of absolute form ... there is lacking the negative, the abrogation of the `ought', which is not layed hold of. But thought and thinking had come once for all on the absolute 
requisite that could no longer be set aside. [Lectures On The History of Philosophy, 4781 
It is with judgement therefore, that Hegel begins his exposition of the Notion. 
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The transition from the `Doctrine of Essence' to the `Subjective Notion', is 
necessitated by the exclusive determination of `nature' through heteronomous 
causality. The `reciprocity' of the discrete moments of cause and effect, cannot 
realize the `freedom' inherent in external causality; and so it is judgement, as 
the form through which this relation becomes one-sidedly subjective, that 
initiates the Notion's actual mediation of the aporias of being and essence. The 
concept of judgement belongs to the `Idea of thought as such'12 its true 
necessity, the mediation of subjectivity and objectivity, universal particular and 
individual, freedom and necessity, is actualized in the absolute idea. 
It is the subjective side of the notion which is developed through judgement 
and syllogism; while it is through the necessity inherent in teleology, that the 
mediations of the Idea (life, cognition, volition, absolute idea) are produced 
from the categories of objectivity (the object). Judgement is a necessity which is 
produced, in its subjective form, by the reciprocal negativity (implicit freedom), 
constituted at the end of the Doctrine of Essence. This necessity, from the point 
of view of the Notion, is universal; for judgement is the form in which its 
particularity and individuality are specified and re-specified. The mediated 
differentiation through which judgement fulfils Hegel's claim that it is `all 
things'13 however, is unrecognized in the subjective notion. It is through the 
aporias of its subjective forms, that the activity of judgement develops the 
actual mediations constitutive of the being (unity) of its subject, 
Far from occupying the same level, and being of equal value, the 
different species of judgement form a series of steps the 
difference of which rests upon the logical significance of the 
predicate. [Encyclopaedia Logic, 9171, note] 
Subjective judgement develops substantive differentiation through its 
qualitative, reflective, and necessary forms, ultimately taking the notion, or 
concrete universal, as its content. This universal is initially determined as 
simple assertion, whose `want of right' is made explicit in the problematical 
judgements which set each `asserting' judgement against the other. The 
universal is non-immediate; its concept requires an `inference' of the conformity 
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of the individual to its particular genus. Attribution of both moral and aesthetic 
`finality', requires that the individual subject of judgement have its articulation 
with the (relative) universality of the genus made explicit. It is this explicitude 
which the `apodeictic' judgement attempts to express, 
All things are a genus in an individual actuality of a particular 
constitution: And they are finite, because the particular in them 
may and also may not conform to the universal. [Encyclopaedia 
Logic, 11791 
It is in the form of the syllogism that subjective thought develops the 
relationship of differentiation (individuality and particularity) to the concept of 
identity (the universal). Apodeictic judgement is the form in which the unity of 
the Notion is initially posited; the particular is put as the mediating term 
through which individual and universal are brought into unity. Further 
specification of the unity of distinctions `consists in the fact that the universal 
and particular also occupy this place of mean'. 14 This again paves the way for 
the passage from subjectivity to objectivity. The universal mediation which is 
developed through the `qualitative' and `reflective' forms of the syllogism, 
produce a necessity which cannot remain purely subjective, but which must 
pass over into the object as such. The syllogism's final form articulates the 
necessity of the universal to the constitution of individuality and particularity: 
the `disjunctive' moment in which the universal becomes both the totality of its 
differentiated elements, and a concrete individuality, is produced through the 
`categorical' and `hypothetical' forms in which the individual and particular 
disclose their universality. 
Speculatively conceived, critical aesthetics belongs exclusively to the notion's 
subjective side. The aesthetic form of Kant's reflective judgement is founded on, 
and reproductive of, the separateness of judgement and notion; that is, on a 
lack of mediation among the forms through which the actual is thought. 
Judgement's inability to reconcile the universal, which it apprehends in 
qualitative, reflective, necessary and notional forms, with particularity and 
individuality (differentiation), is the logical condition of Kant's immediately 
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subjective reception of `finality', 
Because Kant places it [the unity of universal and particular] in 
the subject, it is limited, and as aesthetic, it ranks even lower, in 
as much as it is not the unity as Notion. [Lectures, 470] 
Kant's idea of aesthetic finality constitutes a complete abstraction of objectivity 
from cognition. By fixing the identity of subject and predicate, which is the 
content developed in the logical forms of judgement, exclusively in the subject, 
the judgement of taste `isolates' the two realms (practical and theoretical 
reason) that it claims to unite. 15 Subjectivity receives the harmony of its 
faculties (imagination and understanding) only as a pleasurable feeling of unity 
in multiplicity, which is beyond cognition as such. This critical `Idea' of the 
aesthetic, abstracts subjectivity from the logic of its own re-cognition: the 
critical subject's discrimination of the beautiful, is, in principle, always the 
rejection (negation) of the `matter' which speculative logic discloses in its 
aporetic, autonomous development. Kant's critique of the aesthetic, expounds 
an absolute rejection of the actual: the syllogistic forms which `set judgement in 
reality' and develop the mediation of subject and object into its higher 
categories, are excluded by the formality of taste. 
The possibility of an ethical politics is, for Lyotard and Hegel, dependent on 
the idea of `subjectivity' which is `immanent' in the Third Critique. On 
Lyotard's reading, it is aesthetic judgement which discloses the subject as 
dispersed throughout the `events' of its spontaneous linkage. The faculty of 
judgment is abstracted from the a priori principles of cognitive experience, and 
set out as the power ('critical activity') in which the `realms' of Kant's 
philosophy are established and re-established as legitimate. For Lyotard, 
reason and understanding have no transcendental necessity; their a priori 
principles are always-already established through acts of judgement, or an 
inner `litigation' of the faculties. 
The power of Hegel's reading of the Third Critique, is that it does not 
abstractly privilege or exclude either of the forms of finality through which 
Kant expounds the faculty of judgement. The Differend's `forensic' 
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understanding of Kant's critical subjectivity is founded upon exactly this kind 
of abstraction. For in trying to rid `critical activity' of its attachment to the goal 
of a unified experience, Lyotard externally privileges the aesthetic moment in 
which judgement is based only upon the formal, subjective reception of unity. 
The Critique of Judgement comprises the aesthetic and teleological forms of 
reflective judgement; it expounds the reception of finality in both formal and 
theoretical moments. Theoretical cognition of nature as an `object of sense' 
cannot determine a unity of appearances apriori: its constitution of the object 
produces a `boundary' between things-in-themselves and phenomena. 
Judgement is the faculty through which noumenal and phenomenal causality is 
(subjectively) mediated; for it provides a substrate of unity in particular 
empirical laws which, for Kant, is `merely reflective and does not determine 
objects'. 16 It is in the notion of teleology, or nature's thoroughgoing 
purposiveness, that the Third Critique discloses the necessity immanent in 
reflective judgement: that the objects of practical and theoretical reason 
(rational freedom and phenomenal nature) are `unreal' abstractions which must 
be brought into differentiated identity. 
The fundamental significance of Kant's idea of reflective judgement, is 
expounded in the subjective notion. The contradiction inherent in each of the 
moments of Hegel's logical exposition of judgement, is the separateness of 
subjectivity and actuality. Qualitative, Reflective, Necessary, and Notional 
forms of judgement, are all, as Lyotard maintains of Kant's judgement of taste, 
`only in principle communicable'17: it is not until the activity of judging is `set in 
reality' by the syllogism, that subjective thought begins the transition to 
objectivity, i. e. begins to think itself as constitutive of actuality. 
Communicability as such, is possible only where thinking has universally 
recognized itself in the content mediated through its logical categories. This 
recognition is realized in the forms of objectivity that are produced from the 
development of the syllogism; teleology, the highest of these forms, is the 
category in which the concrete unity of notion and objectivity (the Idea as such) 
is made explicitly necessary. 
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The development which occurs through the logical elements of teleology 
leads to the realization of finality as such: it produces the fulfilment of the 
mediation immanent in the Critique of Judgement. The `End' is the form in 
which the mediatedness of the notion if brought into a negative relation with 
the immediately objective. Its initial form is subjective: the end appears as 
posited in complete independence of the objectivity it is supposed to unify. 
`Teleology', Kant maintains, `is merely reflective and does not determine 
objects'. 18 As the identity running through all its `specific characters' 
however, the end cannot remain in an abstract relation to the content it unifies. 
The `reflective' self-identity which Kant attributes to `natural ends', cannot be 
maintained in a category, teleology, whose purpose is the unification of 
objectivity, 
The End 
... is a contradiction of its self-identity against the 
negation stated in it i. e. its antithesis to objectivity, and being 
so, contains the destructive activity which negates the antithesis 
and renders it identical with itself. [Encyclopaedia Logic, 12041 
The end, is the `single particular or exclusive individuality' which maintains 
itself throughout the production of all its particular effects. 
The logical transition of the end into the mediatedness of the Idea takes 
place through three determinate stages. The first of these is the `Subjective 
End', in which the content of particular aims and intentions is brought into 
commerce with an immediate objectivity. The second is the `End in the Process 
of Accomplishment', where the object is constituted as `means' to the realization 
of particular ends. It is through the utilitarian necessity inherent in the second 
moment that the individual becomes constituted as the `negativity in which the 
being of the object is characterized as wholly and merely ideal'. 19 The final 
moment of the syllogism, the `End Accomplished' however, is still unable to 
unify end and object. Finite subjectivity is not concrete with its objective; it 
requires the mediation of the immediately appropriated object (the means) to 
unify its end with a material objectivity presupposed' 20 The end projected 
`outwards' onto an objectivity to which it is related externally. 
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This estrangement of subjectivity and actuality is abrogated in the realized 
end only insofar as the two are no longer thoroughly `one-sided': the syllogism 
of the teleological relation `specifies' the subjective notion as the power which 
realizes itself in objectivity through the immediately appropriated object. The 
subjective notion emerges as the internally self-conversant form (the identity of 
the end) which appropriates specific objects for definite purposes. At this stage, 
the end is the implicit unity of subjectivity and actuality; for while the 
mediation of the appropriated object (found `ready to hand') is required, 
objectivity remains exterior to subjective judgements, 
We have got, therefore, only a form extraneously impressed on a 
pre-existing material: and this form, by reason of the limited 
content of the End, is also a contingent characteristic. 
[Encyclopaedia Logic, 12111 
The unity implicit in the designated `end' however, has made the fusion of the 
concrete law of the (subjective) notion with the actual, an absolute necessity. 
For by removing all form characteristics from the object as such, the end is the 
category through which the notion `coalesces' with itself, and becomes the 
exclusive and explicit progenitor of its content. This dynamic unity through the 
preservation and abrogation of otherness, is the speculative Idea. 
Lyotard's idea of autonomous judgement, thought's `critical activity', depends 
upon a misrecognition of the relationship between communicability and 
cognition. The idea of nature through which the unity of contingent 
appearances is received in the Third Critique, cannot, on Lyotard's reading, 
permit the critical activity of spontaneous judgement. Kant's `logical' 
representation of finality, unlike the aesthetic, requires the subsumption of 
particular instances under a general concept. The certain element of 
contingency in the constitution of our understanding' ( acknowledged by Kant, 
is the condition of the judgement which `reflectively conjoins finality with the 
possibility of objective experience. This subsumption, on Lyotard's reading, is 
always-already `prepared' by the rules of the cognitive genre. The `special 
principles' which teleological judgement employs, are communicated to critical 
The Politics of Judgement 167 
subjectivity by an `Idea' (addressor) which cognition cannot determine i. e. an 
absolutely unified and purposive nature. For Lyotard the critical subject is no 
longer dispersed throughout the contingent moments of aesthetic judgement. It 
is unified (homogenized, dominated) by the commands of the purposive nature 
(`addressor') entailed in the `rules' of cognitive representation. 
The idea of `paralogy' as the end of scientific discourse, which Lyotard 
expounds in The Postmodern Condition, is developed in its ethical significance 
in his discussions with Jean-Loup Thebaud, published in English as Just 
Gaming. In the section entitled `Majority Does Not Mean Greater Number But 
Greater Fear', Lyotard attempts to show that the Kantian notion of a 
`regulative Idea' entails the proposition of a `congruent' finality in which 
particular moral, juridical, and political judgements are unified: `In Kant, the 
Idea that will serve as a regulator for the discussion of justice is that of a unity 
or totality. In morality, to a totality of reasonable beings; in politics the unity of 
humanity .... 
For Kant the idea of justice is linked to that of finality'. 22 The 
necessity propounded in Just Gaming that we abandon this idea of congruence 
and put in its place the idea of' "discrepancy" ... of a politics in which justice is 
not placed under a rule of convergence, but rather divergence'23, is developed in 
The Differend through Lyotard's reading of Kant's aesthetic finality. The 
analytics of `The Beautiful' and `The Sublime', are conceived as disclosing a 
spontaneous critical activity of thought which is infinitely sensitive to the 
unrepresentability of ideas. The idea of `minority', which Lyotard posits as the 
other of `congruence' in Just Gaming, cannot be found complete in Kant's 
account of either the Beautiful or the Sublime. The Diferend's attempt to 
demonstrate the necessity of thought's experience of heterogeneity (the 
`incommensurable' as such), violently abstracts the critical subject's (aporetic) 
indeterminacy from the Critique of Judgement. Speculative exposition of the 
Third Critique recognizes the aporias produced through Kant's subjectivization 
of finality, and constitutes a demand for substantiation of the critical 
philosophy's ideas of totality and mediation. 
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This reading of the Critique of Judgement as the (aesthetic) disclosure and 
(teleological) loss of spontaneous judgement, reveals the misrecognition of the 
relationship of subjectivity to actuality which is the precondition of The 
Differend's political problematic. By abstracting the formality of the aesthetic 
from the substantive development of cognition `immanent' in the Third 
Critique, Lyotard forecloses on the possibility of recognizing (mediating) 
difference as ethically and politically significant. Kant's notion of teleology 
postulates the idea of the concrete; it is the point at which the reflective 
judgement comes closest to recognizing the unity of notion and reality 
immanent in the realms of practical and theoretical reason. Teleological 
judgements unify subjectivity (notion) and reality through their organization of 
the particular, contingent appearances which must be brought under 
determinate judgements of the understanding. The immediate formality of the 
aesthetic is developed into an immanently objective mediation through the idea 
of purposive nature. Kant, however, fails to recognize the necessity of the 
mediation inherent in the concept of natural finality; he insists that thinking 
`remain at what is one-sided, at the very moment [it] is passing out beyond it' 24 
The concept of the political which Lyotard abstracts from Kant's idea of 
aesthetic judgement is afflicted, a fortiori, with the lack of a concrete, 
communicable recognition of difference and particularity. 
Hegel's `Subjective Logic', in which mediation inherent in the forms of 
judgement' and `syllogism' is developed, expounds a law which is identical with 
its content. This law, which is both universal and particular, is never 
`determined' by the abstract categories in which it is posited: it is the negative 
activity which abrogates (mediates) the abstract forms which it produces. The 
subjective form of the Notion establishes abstraction as both the precondition 
and impossibility of `determining' a law in which universal and particular are 
concretely identical. The development which Hegel expounds in the object, is a 
fusion of the subjective notion's concrete law with actuality, which necessitates 
the self-transparency of the Idea. Life and teleology develop the reciprocity 
inherent in objectivity; and it is through this mediation that the absolute 
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negativity of the law is active in ethical life (Sittlichkeit). The unity of the `good' 
and the `true' which is expounded in the Idea as such, is the infinite activity of 
the Notion re-cognizing itself in, and differentiating itself from, the abstract 
forms in which it is posited. All speculative exposition is exposition of the want 
of identity between actuality and its specific, limited content, 
The absolutely concrete is mind - the notion when it exists as 
notion distinguishing itself from objectivity, which not 
withstanding the distinction still continues to be is own. 
[Encyclopaedia Logic, 12131 
The development of the notion through its abstract forms into the negative 
relation of self-conversance, is the development of absolute communicability. 
`Judgement' and `syllogism' are the categories in which this communicability 
appears to subjective thought; each form develops the mediatedness of its 
content to the point where its exteriority to the `object' can no longer be 
sustained. `Mechanism', `chemism', and `teleology' develop this mediatedness in 
an objective form which cannot remain estranged from the higher `subjective' 
forms of the idea. The whole of this development, from the notion's pure 
subjectivity, to the re-cognition of its own infinitely negative self-relation in the 
forms of the Idea, is the realization of difference (otherness) as identity i. e. as 
recognizably and communicably part of the universal, 
Such is the explicit or realized inseparability of the functions of the notion in their difference - what may be called the clearness 
of the notion, in which each distinction causes no dimness or interruption, but is quite as much transparent. [Encyclopaedia 
Logic, 11641 
Read speculatively, Kant's assertion of the possibility of synthetic 
judgements a priori, is inconsistent with his claim that content is given 
externally to the cognitive understanding. The syntheses which the 
Transcendental Analytic attempts to determine as prior to phenomenal 
experience, are produced through forms which speculative logic shows to be 
inseparable from content (substance) as such. The Third Critique is an implicit 
recognition and immanent development of this content: aesthetic and 
teleological judgements `reflectively' acknowledge the mediatedness 
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necessitated by the aporias of practical and theoretical reason. Lyotard's 
understanding of the political is conditioned by a violent abstraction of the 
aesthetic from the Third Critique; an abstraction which makes difference the 
activity and responsibility of subjective mind. The political problematic which 
follows from this move, is a perpetual rejection of the finite difference through 
which the Absolute Idea re-cognizes (communicates with) itself. The desire, 
work, and satisfaction of real individuals, cannot be recognized as necessary to 
the substance of ethical life: necessity is dispersed into contingent `feelings' for 
the `unphrased', for the `silence' of the differend. 
By expounding the displacement of actuality presented in the critical 
philosophy as the precondition of the notion's negative self relation, Hegel 
discloses the necessity of `thinking' an ethical life which is not assimilated to, or 
reinforcing of, the domination inherent in external separation and difference. 
The notion is the notion of a law which is absolutely identical and non-identical 
with a content which it has produced; it is the infinite re-cognition of its own 
identity in difference. The Phenomenology has shown how the development of 
'natural' consciousness is the history of misrecognition, in which difference and 
identity appear in abstract, non-spiritual relations to each other. The idea of 
judgement set out in The Differend presupposes the same lack of mediation 
which the Phenomenology sets out in its exposition of moral consciousness (see 
chapter three), and which Kant attempts to reconcile in the Third Critique. By 
abstracting the reflective judgement of taste from its cognitive preconditions, 
Lyotard's notion of a spontaneous `critical activity' of thought, fixes difference 
as a pure subjective contingency which is never actual. 
Politics, and the question of ethical political judgement, for Lyotard, `consists 
in the fact that language is not language, but phrases, or that Being is not 
Being, but There is. It is tantamount to being that is not. It is one of its 
names'. 25 Nothing is ever present as such; there is only the immediacy of the 
current phrase which has always-already engendered the question of linkage 
and differend, that is, of non-predetermined judgement. `The political' is 
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presented in The Differend as the other of being and establishment; it is the 
constant return to the temporal present as undetermined possibility of linkage 
and differend. Every genre is political in the sense that is finality is formulated 
both through differends with other genres (i. e. with other strategies for gaining 
control of the current phrase), and through the `internal' disputes by which 
artistic, literary, technical, etc., `success' is established and re-established, 
Everything is political if politics is the possibility of differend on 
the occasion of the slightest linkage. Politics is not everything 
though, if by that one believes it to be the genre that contains all 
genres. It is not a genre. [The Differend, 1192] 
On Lyotard's understanding, political judgement cannot proceed from any 
`generic' determination of reality: it is a spontaneous activity which ought to 
establish and re-establish `realms of legitimacy' in the absence of ontological 
presence (being). 
The notion of ontological presence (being) is expounded in The Differend as 
the basis of a politics of positive good (the just society, absolute ethical life) 
which suppresses the heterogeneity of the event. On Lyotard's reading, the 
Phenomenology presents a relationship of state and the differentiated elements 
of ethical life, whose development presupposed a metaphysical self (Selbst) 
which excludes the (ethical) reception of difference. This reading of speculative 
politics is an elaboration of Lyotard's remark on Hegel's phenomenological 
`method' in The Differend's section on the operation of the `Result'. 26 It re- 
presents the misrecognition of self-consciousness' development as finite spirit, 
as an homogenization of (historical) events which are absolutely distinct from 
the presence (being) of the state in ethical life. 
The historical development of subjectivity which Hegel sets out in the 
Phenomenology, does not presuppose the self (Selbst) as a metaphysical 
identity. Absolute knowledge is a `Resultät' only in the sense of its being 
concretely produced and sustained by the aporias of misrecognition, and their 
displacement of self-consciousness' actuality (work, desire and satisfaction). For 
Hegel there is neither a `natural beginning' nor a `utopian end' to history; spirit 
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knowing itself is subjectivity's recognition of the `elements' in which its 
relationship to the infinite is both realized and unrealizable. In absolute 
knowledge, the abstract moments through which natural consciousness 
misrecognizes itself, become identical with the recognition that the substance of 
spirit is concrete with its historical differentiation. Historical events do not 
come to an end with this recognition; it is merely that contingency and 
particularity are re-cognized (judged) in relation to the totality of subjective 
and objective conditions which produce them, that is, the actuality of the 
historical form in which they appear. 
Ethical political judgements proceed from the unity of the constitution with 
the difference and particularity which constitute ethical life. As the 
`permanent, underlying mean in which individuals have and receive their 
fulfilled reality, intermediation and persistence'27 the state does not, as Lyotard 
maintains, constitute the absolute suppression of difference, particularity an 
ethical judgement. The concept of right (Recht) which Hegel expounds in the 
Philosophy of Right, is the activity of concrete mind, or `substantial will', in 
relation to the subjective moments in which it is both actual and non-actual. 
The realization of subjective willing in the `objective freedom' of the notion does 
not suppress the `volition of particular ends'28; these `ends' constitute the actual 
particularity and difference through which the authority of objective mind is 
recognized. Absolute knowing, as it is actualized in the Rechtstaat, is not the 
oppressive `being' of a determined and determinate authority; it is the infinite 
activity of spirit cognizing and re-cognizing, judging and re-judging, its 
appearance in the substance of ethical life. 
Political judgement is always passed on the `relatively' ethical; on the 
externally mediated contingency of civil society (or the forms of Sittlichkeit 
which develop in other nation-states). The unity of this `reflective' self- 
recognition with substantive will is the infinite task of the state; it must 
constantly reunify the subjective formation produced by external necessity, 
with substantive will. Neither the state nor the idea is absolute as such; both 
The Politics of Judgement 173 
are infinitely `afflicted' with finitude. The state's deliberation on and 
actualization in the law, always involve a non-recognition which `ought' to be 
integrated into its `permanence'. Rational authority can never have done with 
the contingent forms of subjectivity; for the contingency of self-consciousness' 
differentiation can only be re-cognized politically in its concrete relations to the 
substance of ethical life. 
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Section Two 
The Politics of The Sublime And The History of The Ethical 
The spontaneity of thought which Lyotard presents in The Differend and 
`Sensus Communis' as resistance to institutions and establishment, depends 
upon abstraction of the aesthetic from the totality of Kant's exposition of 
judgement. The critical philosophy's separation of autonomy and heteronomy is 
reinforced by Lyotard's positing of the subjective moment of taste (the free play 
of imagination and understanding) as independent of the Third Critiquets 
immanent development of `finality'. However, it is the `Analytic of The 
Sublime', with its account of the aesthetic antinomy of representation and 
conception, that Lyotard takes as the crucial moment of disclosure in Kant's 
philosophy. For it is here, according to The Differend's final `notice'29, that the 
impossibility of `passages' between different `genres' and `phrase regimes' is 
formulated within the terms of transcendental idealism. For Lyotard, the 
`experience' of incommensurability which Kant expounds as the (a priori) 
ground of sublime affection, is the experience of the `unpresentable' as such: the 
antinomy of reason and imagination discloses thinking's political responsibility 
to its (ontological) experience of heterogeneity. I will argue that this 
subjectivizing account of Kant's aesthetic finality, fails to acknowledge the 
speculative necessity constituted in the idea of negative pleasure; and that the 
historico-political problematic which Lyotard abstracts from the `Analytic of 
The Sublime', constitutes an aporetic opposition of the subject to the formative 
actuality (Sittlichkeit) in and through which it exists. The differentiation which 
Lyotard posits as absolutely heterogeneous and incommensurable, can only be 
truly expounded by self-consciousness' misrecognition of its (universal) work, 
desire and otherness. 
The negative pleasure of Kant's sublime affection is produced through the 
impossibility-necessity of representing ideas in imagination (Vorstellung). This 
unrepresentability, which Lyotard privileges in his exposition of the political, 
presupposes the abstract separation of understanding and imagination 
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(Verstand and Vorstellung) posited in the Critique of Judgement. In the 
`Analytic of The Beautiful', this separation is expounded as a `harmonious play' 
of the faculties which is purely subjective in its reception. It is this aesthetic 
`suspension' of thought between the contingency of affection and the necessity 
of cognition, which Lyotard reads as disclosing judgement as the `milieu' of 
legitimation which never makes its `passage' into any particular genre. In the 
`Analytic of The Sublime', the separation of understanding and imagination is 
productive of a feeling of `pleasure-displeasure' which is the result of the 
imagination's inability to find a direct representation for the Idea of freedom, 
In a literal sense and according to their logical import, ideas 
cannot be presented. But if we enlarge our faculty of empirical 
representation; reason inevitably steps forward, as the faculty 
concerned with the independence of the absolute totality, and 
calls forth the effort of the mind, unavailing though it be, to 
make the representation of sense adequate to this totality. This 
effort, and the feeling of the unattainability of the idea by means 
of the imagination in the interests of the mind's supersensible 
province, and compels us to think nature itself in its totality as a 
presentation of something supersensible, without our being able 
to effectuate this presentation objectively. [Critique of 
Judgement, 119] 
Lyotard's understanding of Kants judgement of the sublime -'the elevation of 
nature beyond our reach as equivalent to a presentation of ideas'30 - is of an 
experience of incommensurability as such: it is the disclosure of judgement as a 
`critical activity' in a permanent state of `agitation' among different genres of 
discourse and phrase regimes. 
Kant's exposition of the sublime in the Third Critique however, is not an 
original (a priori) reception of incommensurability; it is conditioned by a 
positing of imagination and understanding as abstractly separate. The 
`reflective' reconciliation of subject and object which Kant expounds in his idea 
of the sublime, presupposes the First Critiques positing of understanding and 
sensible affection in a relation of abstract opposition. The Third Critique's 
concept of a sublime vacillation between pleasure in the capacity for ideas, and 
pain at their unrepresentability, is possible only on the presupposition of an 
`experience' produced through the domination of concept (Verstand) over 
intuition (Vorstellung). The Kantian subject, in its a priori exclusion from the 
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content of phenomenal representation, can recognize itself only in its infinite 
failure to represent nature as a self-determining totality. Critical philosophy's 
abstract separation of understanding and intuition forecloses upon the 
possibility of re-cognizing substantive freedom. Thus, the relation of the subject 
to the constitution of objectivity expounded in the `Analytic of The Sublime', is 
the Third Critique's most explicitly aporetic moment: the object, nature as 
totality, is disclosed as thinkable only through mediation of concept and 
intuition, sense and idea, which Kant posits as impossible a priori. The 
empirical reflection through which sensible affections are presented to the 
faculty of Ideas, posits an external relation of thinking and actuality: each 
empirical predicate `appears' as part of an infinite series which never discloses 
the substance of subjectivity, 
The predicate in this judgement no longer inheres in the subject; 
it is rather implicit being under which the individual is 
subsumed as an accidental. [Science of Logic, 645] 
The speculative development which is immanent in the Third Critique, is a 
substantiation of the relationship between subjectivity and actuality. Kant's 
account of the sublime is the point at which the `ordinary raisonment"31 which 
keeps things abstractly separate, encounters the necessity of `thinking' that 
separation, that is, of mediating abstract difference. In the introduction to the 
Critique of Judgement, Kant remarks, 
the part dealing with aesthetic judgement is essentially 
relevant, as it alone contains a principle introduced by 
judgement complete a priori as the basis of its reflection upon 
nature. [Critique of Judgement, 35] 
The principle of reflective judgement, is for Kant disclosed in the uncognizable 
harmony of understanding and intuition which conditions the judgement of 
taste. In the `Analytic of The Sublime', the estrangement of Verstand and 
Vorstellung appears to reason, `the faculty concerned with the independence of 
the absolute totality'32, as a demand for mediation of the separateness which 
conditions aesthetic finality. 
The vacillation of judgement between pain at the inability of imagination to 
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present ideas, and pleasure at reason's capacity for them, constitutes an 
absence of (objective) `finality' which the Third Critique attempts to preserve in 
the concept of teleology. As a concept however, teleology cannot leave the 
empirical content it organizes as the object of `reflective' judgements. The 
necessity entailed in the idea of natural ends is the mediation of actuality with 
subjective knowing. It is in its determination as `means' to the realization of 
particular ends, that the object moves beyond its `unessentiality' for subjective 
self-determination: as means the object becomes `within itself the mediation of 
the end in the object itself. 33 Finally, through the category of mechanism, the 
object is sublated under an end which is itself an object: the exteriority of the 
object is redetermined through the syllogism of its mediation. This 
redetermination is the `last result of the external end relation'34; it is a 
`spontaneous sublation of external objectivity' which demands the notion's 
negative (spiritual) relation to the totality of its posited conditions. The 
precondition of Kant's aesthetic finality, that is, the abstract separateness of 
subject and object, of concept and intuition, is necessarily sublated in the 
concept of teleology: `reflective' judgement cannot sustain the estrangement of 
thought and actuality upon which its `reflectiveness' is premised. 
Lyotard's failure to acknowledge the aporetic structure of Kant's idea of the 
sublime, and the contradictions entailed in its historico-political `significance' 
as `enthusiasm', is fundamental to his transcription of political judgement as 
immediate negativity. The presupposition of Kant's philosophical history, that 
is, the history of humanity's `improvement', is his aporetic conception of the 
sublime. The critical subject, which the First and Second Critiques attempt to 
establish as epistemologically and practically active in relation to sensible 
affection, emerges from the `Analytic of The Sublime' in a state of 
indeterminate agitation which can find no substantive satisfaction. The Idea of 
freedom, as the presupposition of the abstract moral law, is placed permanently 
beyond representation. The subject's negative pleasure in its constant 
reproduction of the `limitedness' of the will (Kant's concept of moral nature is in 
principle a formal opposition to `heteronomy'), is the condition of historico- 
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political judgement's discernment and `signification' of moral improvement. 
For Kant, the moral nature of humanity is disclosed in reason's `practical' 
capacity to determine itself independently of immediate affections and desires. 
The historical development of this `formal subjective capacity'35 for choosing 
one's own ends independently of inclination, is a development of humanity's 
`culture', 
The production in a rational being of an aptitude for any ends 
whatever of his own choosing, consequently of the aptitude of a 
being for his freedom is culture. [Critique of Teleological 
Judgement, 961 
Reason, as the faculty of Ideas a priori, is `distressed' by the chaos of empirical 
history and the apparent lack of improvement in humanity's moral nature. It is 
offended by its inability to find confirmation of the will's autonomous 
development of `culture'. Kant remarks that `we can scarcely help feeling a 
certain distaste on observing [that] ... 
despite the apparent wisdom of 
individual actors here and there, everything as a whole is made up of folly and 
childish vanity. 36 
Kant's solution to this antinomy, that is, of empirical reality's contradiction 
of reason's expectation, is to postulate a purposive nature as a `guiding 
principle' [ibid] for historical inquiry. Instead of trying to deduce the 
improvement of humanity's `culture' from the chaos of empirical history, Kant 
assumes the idea of that improvement as a `guiding thread' for historical 
enquiry. The historico-political judgement whose concept Kant expounds in his 
political writings, is `reflective': it evaluates particular events in the absence of 
determinate concepts; judging them `as if they disclosed an objective 
development of subjective `culture'. , 
As the totality of rational beings, `humanity' can develop its potential for 
`culture' (the making over of nature and will) only through the constitution of 
`civil' and `cosmopolitan' societies. The improvement of human nature 
therefore, is disclosed in and to judgements that discern the possibility of such 
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civilizing formations in the `formlessness' of empirical history. Such judgements 
signify improvement of moral culture both in the possibility they project 
(cosmopolitan federation of states), and in the very fact of their contemporary 
enunciation. Historico-political judgement as such'... does not merely allow us 
to hope for human improvement; it is already a form of improvement in itself, 
insofar as its influence is already strong enough for the present'. 37 
The `critical' evaluation which Kant expounds in his political essays, posits 
the transcendental unsatisfaction of the subject, that is, its negative pleasure 
in the sublime, as a `sign' of moral development. In the essay `The Contest of 
the Faculties', Kant remarks that, 
the passion and enthusiasm with which men embrace the cause 
of goodness ..., gives 
historical support for the following 
assertion: true enthusiasm is always directed exclusively 
towards the Ideal, particularly that which is purely moral, and 
cannot be coupled with selfish interests. [`The Contest of the 
Faculties' in Kant's Political Writings, 1831 
The `sign' of humanity's progress towards a truly moral culture (a republic of 
freely chosen `human' ends), is the disinterested `enthusiasm' of those who 
witness the chaos and upheaval of historical events from states not directly 
involved. The event, or Begebenheit, cannot occur within the `formlessness' 
through which the history of moral culture is made. The actors who participate 
in revolutions cannot disengage their interests from the particular states and 
constitutions in which their conflict occurs. It is only in the `enthusiasm' of 
those who have no material interest in the outcome of the revolution, that 
Kant's proposition of a constant improvement in human nature can be 
validated. The judgement of historico-political approbation is a `sign' both of a 
contemporary, irreversible improvement, and of a necessary development 
towards a cosmopolitan (non-conflictual) republic of states. 
Kant's idea of historico-political judgement is `reflective' in the same sense 
expounded in the Third Critique: the object is evaluated in terms of principles 
which remain purely subjective, and which do not `determine' cognition. The 
objects with which Kant is concerned in his political writings are particular 
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nation-states; that is, the possibility of cosmopolitan republics in which the 
moral culture of each could develop in the absence of conflict. The concept of 
historical enthusiasm is exclusively directed towards the ideality of this 
cosmopolitan formation; it `signifies', non-schematically, the actual formation of 
moral `culture' which is the guarantee of its continued improvement. This state 
of extreme `sympathy' for those involved in the events formative of human 
culture, is not moral in itself; its exposition in Kant's `Contest of the Faculties' 
discloses an aesthetic moment of transcendental agitation akin to that of the 
sublime. The imagination is bidden to present the unpresentable - the Idea 
(ideal) of freedom. 
Lyotard's reading of Kant's `reflective' evaluation of historical events, places 
its aesthetic, that is, `sublime', reception of the moral ideal, at the centre of his 
conception of political judgement. The vacillation of the subject between 
pleasure at its capacity for ideas, and pain at its inability to represent them, is 
that which Kant expounds in the Third Critique as the object's sublime 
`elevation' beyond cognition. It is this ambivalence of thought towards its 
ability to think its own substance, that Lyotard posits as the power of critical 
judgement, 
what is discovered [in the `sublime' enthusiasm of historico- 
political judgement] is not only the infinite import of ideas, its 
incommensurability to all presentation, but also the destination 
which is to supply a presentation for the unpresentable, and 
therefore ... to exceed everything that can be presented. [The Differend, 1661 
The transcription of Kant's idea of enthusiasm presented in The Differend, 
renders the negative pleasure of historical `sympathy' as experience of the 
`incommensurable'. The presupposition of an unbridgeable gulf between the 
realms of practical and theoretical reason, which informs Kant's `reflective' 
notion of historico-political judgement, is represented by Lyotard as the 
disclosure of thinking's ontological relation to every determinate form it 
produces: `In its periodic unbridling ... enthusiastic pathos conserves an 
aesthetic validity, it is an energetic sign, a tensor of the Wunsch'. 38 The 
political as such, consists for Lyotard in the illusion of representability which 
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springs from the aesthetic effect of the unrepresentable (incommensurability, 
heterogeneity): it is the preservation of the `agitated', indirect representation of 
the Idea of freedom (spontaneity) against direct, generic representations. 
The enthusiasm which Kant cites as the Begebenheit signifying progress in 
the moral nature of humanity, presupposes the same `reflective' universality 
expounded in the `Analytic of The Beautiful' and the `Analytic of The Sublime'. 
The disinterestedness of historico-political judgements presupposes a `common 
sense' (sensus communis) which has no determinate rule, but which `in its 
reflective act takes account (a priori) of the mode of representation of everyone 
else'. 39 Each individual ought to judge in this particular way, but does not do so 
necessarily. It is this `indeterminate'40 commonality of judgement that Lyotard 
transcribes in The Differend as `a consensus which is nothing more than a 
sensus that is undetermined'. 41 The objective universality of the community, 
i. e. the work, desire, and satisfaction formative of and sustained within the 
totality of social relations, is dispersed through judgement's `ethical' 
responsibility towards abstract difference (the `unpresentable' as such). 
The reading of the Third Critique through which Lyotard expounds his idea 
of a `community' of individuals related through their sensitivity to the 
`unpresentable' (differend, dissensus, heterogeneity as such), constitutes a 
violent subjectivization of Kant's critical project. The sublime, whose historico- 
political significance is expounded by Kant as enthusiasm for the formative 
potential of historical revolutions, is transcribed by Lyotard as thought's 
spontaneously reformative relation to the `present' genres, discourses, 
institutions, etc. The development of subjective thinking into objective 
categories which is immanent in the Third Critique, is represented by Kant in 
his political writings as a reflective approbation for the actual conditions under 
which subjectivity could develop its moral culture. The Differend's account of 
historical `signs' however, abstracts the transcendental `agitation' of 
enthusiasm from the objective development it signifies. The critical 
philosopher's `distaste' for the disorder of empirical history, is read by Lyotard 
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as an inscription of originality into a demand (for order and `formation') 
constituted in the rules of the `cognitive genre'. It is this inscription which, for 
Lyotard, allows Kant to resolve the antinomy of freedom and determinism: 
human history is represented as the `addressor' (sender) of an ontological 
teleology, 
Whatever acceptation is given to the Idea of nature, one's right 
of access to it is only through signs, but the right of access to 
signs is given by nature. Not even a denaturalized nature and 
signs of nothing, not even a postmodern nonteleology, can escape 
this circulus. [The Dif3. `erend, 135] 
The `sublime' affection (enthusiasm) of the spectator of the historical events 
which `signify' the improvement of man's moral nature, for Lyotard, discloses `a 
kind of agitation [of judgement] in place, one within the impasse of 
incommensurability'. 42 On this transcription, judgement is abstracted from 
Kant's `reflective' teleology, and posited as a perpetually reformative `tension' of 
incommensurability. This constant tension, the result of the impossibility of 
passage from Ideas to their representation in imagination, is taken from the 
lack of mediation among the faculties of the critical subject. The notion of a 
sublime affection disclosing the development of humanity, abstracts the 
receiver of the `Begebenheit' from ethical life; it places the immediate reception 
of `improvement' outside of the conditions through which that improvement is 
recognized, or `received'. The possibility and necessity of such a transmission, 
or `passage', depends upon Kant's radical separation of practical and theoretical 
reason, autonomy and heteronomy. The recognition of nature's `end' for 
humanity (moral nature's autonomous pursuit of its own ends) cannot be 
brought about through the `heteronomy' of social relations. 43 The moral 
`culture' of the critical subject is recognized and attested to in its `improvement', 
only in judgements that abstract it from the social relations in which it is 
embedded. Lyotard's transcription of Kant's idea of the `sign of history, posits 
the impossibility of this reception as a perpetual `agitation' of judgement, the 
experience of incommensurability as stich. 
This reading of Kant's idea of the sign of history, fails to recognize that the 
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abstract separation and difference through which he understands the 
possibility of the social, is itself the precondition of ethical mediation. 
The 
Third Critique's section on `The ultimate end of nature as a teleological system', 
makes it clear that the `culture of skill' through which reason develops 
its 
independence from immediate inclination is produced through an antagonism 
of particular ends which must be opposed by a lawful authority centred 
in a 
whole, called a civil community. 44 The `cosmopolitan whole' which is the object 
of Kant's political judgement however, is thinkable as a `formation' only 
through the abstract separation and difference it presupposes i. e. the reflective 
relations of civil society. The formation of the subject must be acknowledged as 
part of the actuality of the whole (Sittlichkeit); for it is the bourgeois subject's 
abstract individuality which underlies Kant's concept of reflective (non- 
cognitive, conceptless) apprehension of ethical identity. Lyotard's rejection of 
Kant's Begebenheit, i. e. the disinterested enthusiasm of the spectator, as 
`signifying' a finality of ethico-political `congruence', posits the infinite 
vacillation of the sublime as absolutely independent of the concrete national 
forms into which spirit differentiates itself. The moment of subjective affection, 
which Lyotard conceives as the experience of incommensurability as such, is 
posited as completely independent of the immanent mediation (civil 
community) which Kant's historical enthusiasm presupposes. 45 
Lyotard's conception of `postmodernity' formulates the knowledges (genres) 
which have developed in the `postindustrial age'46, as a proliferation of 
absolutely incommensurable discourses which it is impossible to mediate in any 
`totalizing narrative', 
We no longer have recourse to the grand narratives - we can 
neither resort to the dialectic of spirit nor even to the 
emancipation of humanity as validation for postmodern 
scientific discourse. [The Postmodern Condition, 601 
The `postmodern condition' is characterized by the manifest impossibility of 
ethical legitimation founded upon responsibility to the `community' (`congruent' 
totality) as such. Each `generic' form of knowledge has its own specific rules of 
linkage and formation, and its own standards of success and failure which, 
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according to Lyotard are completely incommensurable. Thinking as `critical 
activity', is always immediately responsible to the differends which emerge 
from this incommensurability; it is `obligated' to phrase that which is 
unrepresented and unrepresentable in the conflict (dissensus, paralogy) of 
specific genres. It is infinitely indeterminate sensitivity to difference which The 
Differend presents as the spontaneity of political judgement; that is, thinking's 
acceptance of its originary power in bearing witness to the infinite possibility of 
wrong and differend. 
The `generic discourses' which Lyotard expounds as infinitely re-formed and 
re-legitimated by critical judgement, do not, as he claims, constitute absolute 
heterogeneous and incommensurable forms of knowing. The development and 
differentiation of knowledge into abstract elements, must be understood as 
concrete with the development of ethical life. The objective multiplication of 
`scientific' cognitions within the totality of Sittlichkeit, presupposes a complex 
economy of `social needs'47 which is grounded in the finitude (actuality) of the 
subjective particular. Without the bourgeois subject's atomistic proliferation of 
these social needs and desires, the differentiation of knowledge into 
determinately finite (`reflective') forms could not take place. The determination 
of abstract difference in the discrete `sciences' of the understanding (Verstand), 
presuppose the aporetic self-seeking of the subjective will; and it is not until the 
impossibility of an `ethics' of individual spontaneity is re-cognized, that these 
forms of knowledge can become part of the activity of spiritual self-recognition 
in ethical life. 
Lyotard expounds `the political' as the non-generic spontaneity of thinking in 
relation to generic claims of establishment and presence. This attempt to 
abstract `political' judgement from the conditions which produce and sustain 
self-recognition, posits a `natural beginning' to human history which Lyotard is 
unable to expel from the 'postmodern' experience of absolute heterogeneity. 
`Primitive communities' are produced and reproduced, on Lyotard's 
understanding, through the resistance of `narrative' to the contingency of the 
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occurrence: they are constituted through the retelling of `little histories' in 
which names, as passed from one generation to the next. The social `body' is 
conceived as the universe of these particular names; it is the narrative which 
situates the individual within a `mythic' (homogeneous) time, beyond the 
anxiety of the event. What cannot be `consumed' by this anecdotal history, the 
heterogeneous, the `left over', is, on Lyotard's reading, sublimated in acts of 
sacrifice, or dissipated in shamanistic rites. The savage community thereby 
acknowledges the limits of its narrative universe, while `sheltering the rigid 
designators [names] of common identity from the events of the "now", and from 
the perils of its linkage'. 48 `Savage' narratives are tied to the particular names 
and events they tell. This original negotiation of the occurrence remains 
inscribed in the discourses of nationalism and the political institutions of 
postmodern societies; for each constitutes its historical mythology 
independently of every other. `Political' judgement of events can only be made 
independently of the concrete life in which the individual recognizes its 
identity, i. e. the particular `national world'. 
The possibility of the heterogeneous forms, which for Lyotard constitute 
`postmodernity', is excluded by this account of human history's `savage' 
beginning. The historical forms of Sittlichkeit whose development is expounded 
in the Phenomenology, are intersubjective relations in which self-consciousness 
misrecognizes the concrete universality of its substance. The mythological 
representation of spirit's temporal deployment in the dialectic of master and 
slave, expounds the development of the most undifferentiated structure of 
domination: obedience based on fear of death. Even in this mythos of 
immediately transparent domination, the social can only be thought as 
(abstract) differentiation and misrecognition; that is, as immanently ethical. 
The antithesis of savage discourses to the dispersal and dissensus by which 
Lyotard understands `postmodernity', is a contradictory opposition of the 
contemporary conditions which necessitate thinking's sensitivity to the 
incommensurable, and the homogeneity (`savage' unity) from which those 
conditions are produced. The `beginning' is posited as an undifferentiated social 
The Politics of Judgement 186 
moment; a unified time in which traditional work, belief, satisfaction and 
desire is reauthenticated in the telling of anecdotal histories, 
There would be no gap, therefore, between the current narrator 
[of anecdotal history] and the Ancients, except for in principle a 
chronological one. [The Differend, 154] 
The social as such can only be thought through differentiation and 
misrecognition; it cannot, as Lyotard's notion of savage narratives maintains, 
exist prior to the history of self-consciousness. 
The Differences reading of Kant's Third Critique, attempts to show that the 
concept of reflective judgement discloses an experience of heterogeneity which 
cannot be encompassed within the subjective faculties of reason and 
understanding; and that it is this spontaneous `critical activity' which is the 
ground of all legitimacy. For Lyotard, the incommensurability of the discourses 
which thought encounters in `postmodern' society, is the political form taken by 
this ontologically immediate relation to the present. The freedom of thinking is 
preserved through its constant phrasing of the differends that spring from the 
heterogeneity of discourses. Popular narratives of the nation, on the contrary, 
retain the `savage' potential of the primitive community. The Differend 
presents `sentimental' identification with the nation and its people as a 
preservation of the conflictual opacity of primitive cultures; the 
incommensurability of genres of discourses is, for Lyotard, covered over by the 
violent identity of the nation, which appropriates the idea of the human to its 
particular `community'. The spontaneity of Lyotard's political judgement, is 
distinguished from and opposed to, these concrete national forms in which the 
individual recognizes itself. It is an abstract ought (sollen) which posits 
heterogeneity and dissensus as an end completely independent of self- 
consciousness' concrete historical development. The `political sentiments' of 
nationalism and patriotism49 do not originate in a `natural beginning'; for even 
in their most fanatical, fantastic forms, they can only be truly recognized in 
their relations to the differentiated totality of Sittlichkeit. 
The concept of `generic' knowledges, which Lyotard expounds as the end 
The Politics of Judgement 187 
(termination) of homogeneous `community' and the beginning of modern and 
postmodern cultures, is completely abstracted from the social relations which 
produce the necessity for specialized forms of knowledge. The needs through 
which these knowledges are constituted are specifically `social'; they develop 
through a `division of concrete need into single parts and aspects which in turn 
become different needs, particularized and more abstract'. 50 This 
differentiation of `material' into `abstract' need, is the precondition of the 
philosophical, scientific, and technical knowledges which constitute the finitude 
of the ethical idea: it is not until the subject emerges as reflectively aware of its 
abstract wants, desires and satisfactions (i. e. as `bourgeois'), that the formation 
of these elements of knowing is possible. The specialized knowledges which, for 
Lyotard, mark the end of the `social "body"' as a unifying, homogeneous time, 
cannot function to disperse the subject into an indeterminate, uncommunicable 
form (sensus) accompanying each contingent act of judgement. It is the 
`reflective' subject produced by, and productive of, the work, desire, and 
satisfaction which constitute `social' need, that is the condition of abstractly 
differentiated forms of knowing. The knowledges constituted through the self- 
seeking of the subjective particular, are made possible by the transition to the 
bourgeois property form: `need', which has ceased to be exclusively determined 
by nature, is mediated by the formative activities of those involved in the 
complex of productive relations, 
When needs and means become abstract in quality, abstraction 
is also a character of the reciprocal relation of individuals to one 
another. This abstract character, universality, is the character 
of being recognized, and is the moment which makes concrete 
i. e. social, the isolated and abstract needs and their ways and 
means of satisfaction. [Philosophy of Right, 11921 
The development of discrete forms of knowledge is concrete with the social 
mediation of the satisfaction and desire produced by reflective subjectivity. The 
formative institutions which spring from the thoroughgoing interdependence 
constituted in the system of need (Administration of Justice, Public Authority, 
Corporations) do not subsume the `heterogeneity' of different forms of knowing 
under s posited `metaphysical' idea of the self (Selbst). The forms of knowledge 
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which develop through the proliferation of abstract needs, presuppose a subject 
`whose end its own interest' [Philosophy of Right, 11871, and which recognizes 
the (universal) other only as a means to the fulfilment of its ends. The process 
of differentiation through which abstract conceptions of the social object are 
formulated, is grounded in the wants, desires, and satisfaction of a subject that 
recognizes itself as formally free to appropriate and dispose of things. The 
understanding (Verstand) produces elements of knowledge which reinforce the 
reflective necessities constituted in civil society; each is an external recognition 
of the universal interdependence with which ethical life is concrete. These 
specific forms of knowledge do not exist as self-legitimizing `necessities' whose 
rules are independently `formative' of the subject. The development of reflective 
subjectivity occurs through the necessity of re-cognizing its particular desires 
as produced and satisfied in the totality of social relations. Knowledges 
produced through the socialization of need and satisfaction, are concrete with 
the historical differentiation by which ethical life develops. The 
understanding's abstract cognition of Sittlichkeit, presupposes and reinforces 
its externality to substantive will. 
Hegel's account of political economy for example5l, shows that qualitative 
and quantitative analyses of utilitarian self-seeking, cannot provide an 
adequate account of ethical identity. Adam Smith, in attempting to provide a 
solution to the inequalities which he saw as jeopardizing the `natural liberty' of 
the market economy, failed to acknowledge the mediation inherent in economic 
relations. Thus, although the Theory of Moral Sentiments makes ethical 
recognition a moment posited in the emotivism of `sympathy' (the intrinsic 
`fellow-feeling' with which human beings are invested by God), its project 
implicitly acknowledges the insufficiency of trying to make civil society the 
ground of social and political cohesion. `Adam Smith', as Avineri puts it in his 
Hegel's Theory of The Modern State, `is aufgehoben - both preserved and 
transcended - in the Hegelian system'. 52 
The abstract (moral, epistemological, technical, etc. ) cognitions which 
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develop the universality immanent in pure self-seeking, presuppose the 
separation and difference of relative ethical life. They are forms of Verstand 
which posit difference as pure identity: each element is in principle estranged 
from the unity of the whole. As such, these knowledges are concrete with civil 
society's development of desire and satisfaction; they reflect and reinforce the 
subjective self-seeking through which need is abstractly taken into the totality 
(Sittlichkeit). The `generic' knowledges which Lyotard claims are 
incommensurable53, produce a universal development of subjectivity which 
cannot be encompassed within the terms of abstract separation and difference. 
As the `actuality of the ethical idea'54 the state is the unity of all elements of 
knowing sustained in ethical life. Work, satisfaction and desire, are the 
`actuality' realized in, and presupposed by, self-consciousness' abstract 
appropriations of objectivity; they are the finitude through which individual 
subjectivity re-cognizes itself in the being and the activity of the state. 
The historical development of self-consciousness has no `natural beginning' 
or `utopian end'55; it is the infinite differentiation of its work, satisfaction, and 
desire into abstract forms of misrecognition. This differentiation, and the 
positedness which is inherent in and necessary to it, is the true object of ethical 
and political judgement. Nazism, as was seen in chapter one, can only be 
`thought' in its true philosophical significance when the social, political, and 
economic disintegration of Weimar Germany is conceived as an ethical 
dissolution which is both presupposed and reinforced by the Nazi terror. The 
racial `culturing' of subjectivity, that is, its abstract, destructive relation to 
Sittlichkeit, destroys the institutional forms through which the political life of 
the state is constituted as such. The `Aryan' releases himself from all secular 
(finite, actual) responsibilities to pursue his millennial destiny. The state, 
which has lost its `ethical roots' in civil society, becomes an apparatus of terror 
and coercion, which can only fulfil itself in a perpetual state of war against the 
non-Aryan, and the liquidation of the Jew. This is the rationality and actuality 
of Nazism. The racial culture of subjectivity cannot be contained within the 
disintegrating structures of Sittlichkeit; the political life of the state is reduced 
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to rhetoric and coercion; and the possibility of re-cognizing the destructive 
alienation from ethical substance passes over into more concretely rational 
states. 
Political judgement cannot be abstracted from the formative laws and 
institutions of ethical life (Sittlichkeit). Within a state whose mediation of 
subjectivity is the principle of its objective institutional forms, political activity 
is an infinite reactualization of the `ethical Idea'. The discrete knowledges 
which are constituted through the separation and difference of civil society, are 
re-cognized in the state as finite forms of subjectivity which must be mediated 
with its universal (spiritual) identity. The political activity of the state is 
always judgement and deliberation upon its own finitude (positedness). The 
contingency of knowing and willing produced in civil society is not excluded 
from the mediation of spirit; it is re-cognized and re-integrated into its 
substance. This inner, self-transparent unity confers the right and 
responsibility of judging other, less mediated states, upon those whose 
constitutions embody the principle of finite subjectivity. Particular forms of 
Sittlichkeit, although they are finite and can never know the truth of their 
relation to the absolute - `actuality is already there cut and dried after its 
process of formation has been completed'56 - are related to each other as more 
or less adequate re-cognitions of the ethical Idea. Thus it is the right and 
responsibility of those nations with explicitly established rational 
constitutions57 to judge those whose constitutions are less developed, or which 
have become ethically or politically deformed. 
To conclude, the idea-of sensus communis which Lyotard develops in relation 
to his concept of `the political', discloses a contradiction between the savage 
construction of nationality, and the dispersal of the subject throughout the 
incommensurable discourses of `postmodern' societies. There is a complete 
discontinuity between Lyotard's account of the `mythic', homogeneous time of 
the savage community, and this concept of the paralogy and dissensus which 
political judgement is obligated to produce and reproduce. It is this 
S 
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discontinuity which is at the core of Lyotard's `culturing' of subjectivity; for the 
judgement through which the dispersal of knowledge is infinitely reproduced, is 
posited in abstraction from the historical conditions which it presupposes. The 
differentiation of knowledge produced in civil society, is presented in The 
Differend as an incommensurability which has always to be phrased. This 
reception of difference as absolute heterogeneity, reproduces itself as an 
abstract subjective demand which is always-already insubstantial and 
indeterminate. Lyotard's notion of political judgement as `unprepared' 
spontaneity therefore, has no object precisely because it has no history; it is a 
`culture' of consciousness which remains irreconcilably opposed to the formative 
institutions of Sittlichkeit. His positing of a natural ('primitive') beginning to 
the social "body"58, excludes re-cognition of the spiritual life of the state as 
grounded in the historical forms of self-consciousness' misrecognition. It posits 
a `presence' of the totality in national narratives, which is irreducibly opposed 
to the spontaneity of the `critical watchman'. 
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Postscript 
Ethics and the Necessity of 'Gaining Time' 
The event of `Auschwitz', which Lyotard insists cannot be thought 
speculatively, must be judged in terms of the actual historical formation 
(Sittlichkeit) from which self-consciousness became radically estranged. 
Lyotard's critique of speculative thinking presupposes that Hegel's `method' of 
historical exposition constitutes an abstract set of rules through which 
contingent events are homogenized and re-presented as necessary. Each 
historical form produces its own `new' sublation, and thereby participates in the 
realization of spirit. This is a complete misrecognition and misrepresentation of 
Hegel's concept of speculative exposition. Each historical moment is spiritual 
only insofar as it is actual (finite); its content can be judged only in relation to 
the universality of the work, satisfaction and desire recognized and sustained 
by natural consciousness itself. There is no utopian `end' to speculative history, 
as Lyotard claims. The aporias of finite misrecognition always affect the state; 
and it is this finitude which ought to be the object of political judgements. It is 
only through the recognition and mediation of its own finite differentiation, 
that a state has the right and power to judge the ethical and political 
constitution of another state. 
In chapter one I have shown how it is through the notion of a revolutionary 
`culture' of consciousness that racial (`Aryan') politics of Nazism must be 
thought. The Phenomenology's account of the French Revolution is shown to 
expound the same destructive relation of subjectivity to ethical substance as is 
reproduced in Nazism. Neither the absolute `matter' of freedom, nor the genetic 
purity of the `race', is capable of actualizing itself as anything other than the 
destruction and dissolution of the state. Both concepts - absolutely rational 
`being', and absolute racial purity - are utterly indeterminate and incapable of 
legitimizing any action. The `revolutionary' (re-formative) consciousness 
becomes the sole arbiter of social reality. The possibility of infinitely revising 
the ideal (the `race', absolute `rational' freedom) is produced through the 
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dissolution (lawlessness) of ethical life; and it is this infinite re-presentability 
which constitutes the destructive abstraction of subjectivity from Sittlichkeit. 
It is the relationship of Marx's proletariat to the totality of ethical life, which 
constitutes Marxism's infinite potential for political terror. The subsumption of 
every `superstructural' institution under the basic determinism of the capitalist 
economy, reduces the institutional forms which support and reinforce bourgeois 
individualism, to epiphenomena which distort and pervert the self- 
consciousness of the (revolutionary) proletariat. 59 The relationship of thought 
(subjectivity) to actuality (the contradictory nature of capitalist productive 
relations) which Marx posits as the unitary cause of revolutionary praxis 
therefore, takes the form of an abstract ought, or demand, the conditions of 
whose realization are infinitely specified and unspecifiable. It is the absence of 
a substantive account of how the abstraction and alienation of subjectivity 
produced by bourgeois property relations, is misrecognized by that subjectivity, 
which points to the danger of Marxism as `culture'. Social life can again be 
taken as a non-ethical (`material') object, whose arbitrariness, enshrined in 
bourgeois law, is reinforced by the arbitrariness of the revolutionary 
consciousness. A speculative evaluation of Marxism must acknowledge the 
abstractness of the relation of subjectivity to ethical life posited in the notion of 
a revolutionary proletariat. Only when it is recognized that subjective 
representations of the actual are concrete with its actuality, can the `formative 
and destructive potencies'60 of capitalism be recognized in their spiritual 
relation to the totality of the state. The ethical significance of these potencies 
can only be properly judged by a self-consciousness which has acknowledged its 
concrete relation to the substance of Sittlichkeit. 
For Lyotard, Marx's concept of the emancipated self immanent in the 
domination of labour by capital, is subject to the same `logic of the result'61 as 
Hegel's speculative history. The constitution of a universally revolutionary 
proletariat, cannot take place among the mutually `opaque' national traditions 
of different societies. It remains an idea of reason whose reception and 
The Politics of Judgement 194 
actualization depend upon the `aesthetic' enthusiasm of those (proletarians) 
who witness the particular forms in which the differend between capital and 
labour is violently exposed. The `passage' from the ideality of the proletarian 
`subject', to the `real political organization of the real working class'62, which 
Marx expounds as an objective historical necessity, is for Lyotard a confusion of 
`sign' and `referent': the nationally dispersed `enthusiasm' for the revolutionary 
activity of the proletariat cannot guarantee its empirical existence as a 
universal class (collective agency), 
Internationalism cannot overcome national worlds because it 
cannot channel short, popular narratives into epics, it remains 
`abstract': it must efface proper names .... 
Even the communist 
epic of workers liberation splits off into national communist 
epics. There is no differend between national narratives ...; 
but 
the differend between the Idea of freedom and narratives of 
legitimation is inevitable. [The Di8`erend, 1235] 
An illusory passage is made in Marx's revolutionary politics between the 
heterogeneous regimes of aesthetic reaction and practical determination; and 
this is subsequently compounded by `the party's' attempt to enforce 
pragmatically the universal demands of the proletariat on the empirical 
working class 63 
This problem of the historical victimization of the universal `proletarian' 
subject, is first addressed by Lyotard in his Libidinal Economy. In the section 
`The Desire Named Marx', he attempts to show that Marx's critique of 
capitalism presupposes a `naturality' of labour power, which, although 
abstracted and perverted in exploitative productive relations, periodically 
expresses itself in the crises afflicting capitalist economies. For Lyotard, Marx 
posits a dialectical relation between the original energetical force of labour 
power, which constitutes a `region' that is always beyond the system of 
productive relations; and the system itself, which perverts and corrupts the 
naturality of the proletarian subject, 
The whole `critique' is articulated in the following simple 
statements: profit hides surplus-value, surplus value issues from 
the occultation of the use-value of the force of labour by its 
exchange value; that is: from the occultation of its 
substantial, superabundant force by its property of being an 
exchangeable, sufficient commodity; capitalism must also be 
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mistaken about the origin of its growth, and this mistake is fatal 
to it. [Libidinal Economy, 143] 
The essence of Lyotard's understanding of Marx in Libidinal Economy is that 
there is no absolute necessity underpinning the dialectics of exploitation set out 
in Capital. The labour power, or `force', which Marx understands as the 
necessary condition of capitalist accumulation and exploitation, according to 
Lyotard, is displaced from its privileged position through the historical 
tendency of capitalism to make knowledge a force of production 64 The system 
(of productive relations) is itself `natural' in its origin and development; it is 
always an economy of desire. Thus, the ethical privilege which Marx extends to 
productive labour in its alienated condition, depends upon a posited 
transcendence of `force' which cannot be justified historically: Marx's accounts 
of `primitive societies' according to Lyotard, simply idealize the primacy which 
Marx attributes to labour power. In the absence of this primacy, Marxism loses 
its referent: desire, according to Lyotard, is able to invest even the most 
deskilled, abstract and `alienated' forms of labour. The development of 
capitalism must therefore be understood in terms of the `metamorphoses' of 
desire, not the increasing alienation of an original ('natural') subject. 
In The Differend, Lyotard attempts to expound a link between continued 
existence of Marxism as an object of political faith and commitment (an 
ideology of `working humanity'65), and the impossibility of finding the 
(proletarian) subject of exploitation in the socio-economic relations of national 
economies. The `system' of productive relations is, for Lyotard, internally and 
externally heterogeneous: it produces incommensurable genres of discourse 
which cannot sustain a `national' unity of productive labour; and is (also) 
immediately isolated from the internationality of the proletariat by the opacity 
of national traditions. 66 Thus the relationship of objective reality and subjective 
representation through which speculative thinking expounds the political 
significance of Marxism, is simply excluded by Lyotard's idea of the `result'. The 
possibility of re-cognizing Marx's project as misrecognition of civil society and 
its abstract relations and institutions, is for Lyotard no more than an 
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elaboration of the speculative genre's `metaphysical' Idea of the self (Selbst). 
There is no differend between the discourses of Marx's `scientific' socialism and 
Hegel's speculative exposition of ethical life; for both attempt to `homogenize' 
the contingency of the event, and to nullify the sensitivity of thought to the 
`unrepresentable' (wrong and differend). Between Marx and Hegel, according to 
Lyotard, there is only litigation over the significance of the `occurrence': the 
project of a speculative Marxism could only constitute a further homogenization 
of discourse within the speculative Idea of the good. 
Lyotard's account of an increasingly acute antithesis between the political 
and the economic within the postmodern culture, presupposes his abstract 
homogenization of Marxist and speculative thought. The `economic genre', 
according to Lyotard, does not prescribe an obligation: `gaining time' is not a 
deliberated motivation (wealth creation equals more security, more adventure, 
etc. ), but an immediate necessity (having gained some time I will gain some 
more). The demand of economic rationality therefore, excludes spontaneous 
political judgement; it is insensitive to the incommensurability of different 
regimes and genres, simply reducing them to their efficiency of requital 
('gaining time'). `Exchange' and a `cultural' sensitivity to the unrepresentable 
are, for Lyotard, antithetical. The latter signifies a putting into circulation of 
information irrelevant to the `work to be done' - the work of gaining time. 
Economic rationality demands that `culture' ought to be eliminated; that 
human beings should simply refine their techniques of exchange, rather than 
developing sensitivity to Ideas, their capacity for spontaneous judgement. 67 
This exteriority of `culture' and `economy' which Lyotard expounds as the 
threat of homogenization inherent in postindustrial societies, posits the 
economic as a genre completely abstracted from the work, satisfaction, and 
desire of subjectivity. However, by opposing the temporality of the `economic 
phrase' (immediate requital) to every other discourse and regimen, Lyotard 
introduces a necessity into his unrepresentable community (sensus communis) 
which cannot be dispersed by spontaneous judgement. His claim that the 
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differends which spring from the `current phrase' constitute an `insurmountable 
obstacle'68 to the dominance of the genre of exchange, cannot be sustained in 
the light of his exposition of economic necessity. It is only through re-cognition 
of `reflective' self-awareness as reinforcing bourgeois property relations, that 
the contingency and difference produced in civil society can become actualized 
in the substantive will of the state. A speculative Marxism, which has 
acknowledged the institutional forms through which `capital' in its 
deterministic (`fetishistic') form, would become part of this process of spiritual 
mediation: the contradictions of the economy would become part of a 
`comprehensive exposition of capitalism'69 as a `culture' mediated within the 
totality of ethical life. Conceived speculatively, everything is a judgement; but 
it is not until judgement re-cognizes its own substantive conditions that it has a 
true ethical or political significance. 
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Conclusion 
Metaphysics, Critical Thought, and Speculation 
The Differend, I have argued throughout, is an attempt to expound an 
ethical relation of thinking to being, or `presence'. This relation is developed 
through Lyotard's appropriation of heterogeneity and incommensurability from 
the `representation discourse' of Kant's critical philosophy; and I have argued 
that this appropriation produces a culture of subjectivity, which is unable to 
judge either ethically or politically. What distinguishes the project of The 
Differend from Lyotard's earlier effort to repudiate the `foundational' claims of 
conceptual thought, is the attempt to articulate a `critical' activity which is co- 
present with the realms of legitimacy (genres) it constantly calls into question. 
The speculative position I have developed therefore, is a critique of Lyotard's 
presentation of critical activity: it engages with a project which is concerned to 
bring judgement directly to bear upon the forms and categories of 
representational thought. 
The polemic which Lyotard pursues in Libidinal Economy, develops the idea 
that every form of representational thinking pursues a desire to organize and 
control the unintuitable, undelimitable intensity of the `libidinal band'. The 
possibility of this conceptual representation is articulated through a 
spontaneously disjoining activity which Lyotard calls the `libidinal bar'. This 
activity, which is now taken up into, now distinguished from, the intensity of 
the libidinal band, is the possibility of conceptuality. The inexplicable `slowing 
down' of the libidinal bar, is for Lyotard the condition of the oppositions 
through which conceptual thought marginalizes- the intensity of libidinal 
energy, 
The turning bar slackens its pace, the mad, aleatory movement 
which engenders the libidinal band is sufficiently checked so 
that the this and the not-this, confused by its extremely high 
speed in all the points of the field, now distinct, are sometimes 
the this, sometimes the not-this... The bar becomes a frontier, 
not to be crossed on point of confusion, sin against the concept, 
transgression, stupidity, madness, primitive thought. [Libidinal 
Economy, 241 
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The position which Lyotard develops in Libidinal Economy therefore, is an 
attempt to present representational thought within an economy of 
displacements; that is, to show that theory and conceptuality are always effects 
of the `aleatory' activity of the libidinal band. 
The substance of Libidinal Economys presentation of representational 
thinking, is the constant reinvokation of displacement of libidinal energy as the 
condition of conceptuality. For Lyotard, every conceptual form exacts a desire 
to fix the pure singularities of the libido within a particular space: libidinal 
economy, in other words, presents the `theatre' of representations as 
dramatizing the modifications of libidinal energy. Thus, the terms through 
which Lyotard articulates the `idea' of this economy, can only be presented 
through their co-presence with the representational forms which they threaten, 
Libidinal economy is a disorder of machines, if you will; but 
what for ever prevents the hope of producing the 
systematization and functionally complete description of it, is 
that, as opposed to dynamics, which is the theory of systems of 
energy ... the idea of libidinal economy is all the time rendered 
virtually impossible by the indiscernibility of the two instances. 
[Libidinal Economy, 30] 
The `death drive', which Lyotard presents as the dissolution of conceptual 
forms, cannot be understood simply as an alterity opposed to `theatrical' 
representation. Rather, Libidinal Economy attempts to bring the critiques 
enacted within the theatre of representation, within the terms of energetic 
force and displacement. 
In the first of a series of lectures published under the title of Peregrinations: 
Law, Form, Event, Lyotard states, `Unfortunately, following nothing but the 
intensities of affects, does not allow us to separate the wheat from the chaff. 
Because everything has value according to its energetic force, the law might not 
exist and the monk might really be a devil .., '. 1 This concern with thinking's 
ethical relation to the event, is what informs the project of The Differend. 
Lyotard's transcription of Kant's critical philosophy, I have argued, is an 
attempt to expound a critical activity of thought which is sensitive to the 
heterogeneity of genres of discourse. This sensitivity is articulated in The 
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Differend as critique: it is a spontaneous reception of incommensurability 
among particular genres of discourse. Thus, Lyotard's account of representation 
in The Differend, is distinguished from the terms of Libidinal Economy, by its 
exposition of judgement as the responsibility of thinking to its originary 
spontaneity. The wrong and victimization which is determined by generic 
discourses, must be phrased explicitly; and it is through its phrasing that the 
ethical significance of difference is constantly re-formed. 
It is through the reading of Kant presented in The Differend, that Lyotard 
brings the formative-disintegrative power of `unrepresentability' within the 
terms of (ethical and political) critique. The moments of conjunction 
(Darstallung) articulated in the critical philosophy, are transcribed as 
disclosing incommensurability as the ontic determination of representational 
thought: the faculties of the subject are presented as discrete, juridical forms 
which `litigate' constantly with each other. Thus, Lyotard's reading of the 
`Analytic of The Sublime' articulates a feeling (negative pleasure) of 
incommensurability which is grounded in the heterogeneity of discourses, and 
which is the condition of ethical and political judgements. The `unrepresentable' 
is no longer the `primary process' which both threatens and conditions 
conceptual thought; it is rather the `delegitimizing' condition of the legitimacy 
of genres of discourse. The unpredetermined judgement which Lyotard 
expounds in The Differend, is an immediate sensitivity to the otherness which 
is always co-present with the categories of representational thought. It is the 
appropriation of this idea from Kant's critical philosophy which gives The 
Differend its explicitly ethical significance, and which constitutes the necessity 
of speculative exposition. 
The claim I have advanced in my reading of The Differend, is that the 
fundamental ideas through which Lyotard expounds his ethical and political 
philosophy (obligation without conditions, unpredetermined judgement and 
unrepresentable political affection) are violently abstracted from the critical 
philosophy's discourses of (immanent) mediation. This reading of critical 
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philosophy must be conceived in terms of the idea of metaphysics which 
Lyotard develops through his expositions of both Kant and Hegel. According to 
his understanding, the `metaphysical genre' attempts to ground appearances in 
conditions which are absolutely independent of all contingency and difference. 
The immediate presentation of the phrase is explicated in The Differend as the 
other of this project; for the absolute which metaphysics presents as the 
condition of appearances, is always already relative to the `universe' in which 
its is presented. For Lyotard, the notion of `experience' as the reception and 
organization of representations, is a priori metaphysical: it is the phrase, and 
its spontaneous linkage onto the event, which is original (indubitable), and 
which is the presupposition of the syntheses effectuated by the `I' of 
subjectivity, 
The possibility of reality, including the reality of the subject, is 
fixed in networks of names `before' reality shows itself and 
signifies itself in an experience. [The Differend, 172] 
Metaphysics therefore, `struggles against [the] oblivion'2 of presentation: it 
attempts to bring the (unpredetermined) spontaneity of `linkage' under the 
control of foundational forms and categories. 
Lyotard's reading of the critical philosophy, attempts to show that the forms 
and categories of cognition, or representation, through which Kant expounds 
transcendental subjectivity, depend upon metaphysical ideas of reason to 
guarantee the unity ('congruence') of experience. His claim is that the practical 
and theoretical cognitions of the critical subject, are originally sensitive to the 
heterogeneity which they organize; and that Kant, in `negotiating' this 
exteriority, discloses thinking's immediate receptiveness to the 
`unrepresentable'. It is the account of reflective judgement given in the Third 
Critique, which, on Lyotard's reading, establishes this receptiveness as both 
the condition and negation of legitimacy. The absence of determinate concepts 
in the reception of aesthetic and teleological finalities, is abstracted from the 
development of the Third Critique, and presented in The Differend as a 
spontaneous activity independent of the rules of generic discourses. Thus, the 
notion of judgement which is expounded in the Third Critique, is conceived by 
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Lyotard as the point at which Kant's `metaphysical' representation of the 
experience and autonomy of the subject, is displaced by a `critical activity' 
which pervades his account of transcendental faculties. For Lyotard, Kant's 
reflective judgement is not a faculty, but the condition of discrete 
transcendental functions: it is the condition which Lyotard presents as opening 
up the possibility of non-metaphysical philosophy, politics and ethics. 
The Differend's account of transcendental idealism, sets out to show that the 
spontaneous reception of difference disclosed through reflective judgements, is 
conjoined with attempts to reduce that difference through metaphysical forms 
and categories. Lyotard's reading of each of Kant's three Critiques, and of the 
political essays, is concerned with the possibility of Darstallung, that is, with 
the possibility of conjoining the immediacy and contingency of events, with the 
cognitive conditions through which they are `experienced'. The critical 
philosophy, according to this reading, discloses a tension between the 
`unrepresentable' element which exists as other to the transcendental I, and the 
activity of that I in constituting the unity of itself and its representations. In 
his account of the First Critique, Lyotard attempts to show that this tension is 
disclosed in the relationship of modes of intuition, space and time, to the matter 
of sensible affection. The temporal syntheses upon which Kant's idea of a 
unified cognitive experience depends, presupposes a heterogeneity (otherness) 
which the `Transcendental Aesthetic' has not subsumed under the rules of the 
cognitive genre. In the Second Critique, the persistence of this 
unrepresentability is negotiated through the `type', by which duty is enabled to 
represent itself within a realm of `congruent' human ends. Lyotard's 
transcription of the Third Critique, with its concentration on the tension 
between the faculties of reason and imagination expounded in the `Analytic of 
The Sublime', presents the notion of reflective judgement as an immediate 
sensitivity of thought to the otherness `negotiated' by Kant in the First and 
Second Critiques. The moments. of conjoining, or Darstallung, which Lyotard 
focuses on in his transcriptions of practical and theoretical reason, are 
produced through a 'metaphysical' presupposition of 'reality'3 as prior to the 
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immediate reception of difference. What Lyotard understands as metaphysical 
elements of the critical philosophy therefore, are presented as originally 
sensitive to the heterogeneity which they attempt to homogenize. It is this 
sensitivity which The Differend presents as distinguishing the Kantian project, 
from the totalizing metaphysics of Hegel's speculative philosophy, 
With the notion of the sublime (and on the condition that 
Darstallung be understood as we have here), Kant will always 
get the better of Hegel. The Erhabene persists, not over and 
beyond, but right at the heart of the Aufgehoben. [The 
Differend, 1126] 
For Lyotard, the activity of Kant's transcendental I, both in the constitution 
of experience, and its practical self-determination, constantly rediscloses the 
heterogeneity (otherness) which springs from representational thought. 
Darstallung, the moment of conjunction, necessitates unpredetermined 
judgement; for neither practical nor theoretical reason can `fill in the abyss'4 
between its object (the unity of experience of objects, or the unity of human 
ends), and the otherness which it receives. The faculties of the critical subject 
are not, according to this transcription, fixed, analytic unities, but critically 
related realms whose legitimacy is judged and re judged, one by the other. On 
this reading, the account of reflective finality given in the Third Critique, 
articulates an originating power of judgement within the transcendental I, 
which is the negation of subjectivity and experience. Kant's `Analytic of The 
Sublime' is presented in The Differend as the reception of an 
incommensurability which, momentarily and irreversible, disperses the I and 
its experience into the `critical activity' of judgement. For Lyotard, it is Kant's 
account of sublime affection which displaces the presence of a subject, and 
forecloses on the possibility of `ethico-teleology'. 5 It is this dispersal of the 
transcendental I in the immediate reception of the sublime (negative pleasure) 
which Lyotard opposes to Hegel's `metaphysical' history of the self (Selbst). 
The relationship between metaphysics and thinking's critical activity, which, 
for Lyotard, is articulated in` Kant's transcendental idealism, is one of 
disclosure: judgement is revealed as a spontaneous reception of difference 
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opposed to the fixed determinations of cognitive reception. The 
`incommensurability' of ideas with the faculty of representations which 
produces the negative pleasure of the sublime, cannot be postulated in terms of 
a priori syntheses: each ought to make the same subjective judgement, but does 
not do so necessarily. Thus, the `Analytic of The Sublime' opens up the 
possibility of a philosophy which eschews metaphysics. For Lyotard, Kant's 
account of the conceptless immediacy through which aesthetic finality is 
received, discloses the `philosophical' relation of thinking to the occurrence: 
phrasing in the absence of a determinate rule of judgement, 
The stakes of philosophical discourse are in a rule (or rules) 
which remains to be sought, and to which the discourse cannot 
be made to conform before the rule has been found. [The 
Differend, 97] 
The presence of the transcendental I, sustained in the critical philosophy 
through determinate practical and theoretical judgements and cognitions, is 
displaced by a critical activity which cannot be represented. 
The relationship of speculative thinking to the metaphysical genre however, 
is presented in The Differend as one of identity: Hegel's `dialecticizing' of the 
actual6, for Lyotard, constitutes the annexation of difference to a single, 
suppressive form: the Selbst, 
The objection can be raised that it [the Selbst] is a rule for a 
genre of discourse - the metaphysical genre - which seeks to 
engender its own rules, but precisely that this rule cannot 
engender itself from discourse. [The Differend, 97] 
Kant's retention of exteriority throughout his moral, political and 
epistemological writings, is read by Lyotard as necessitating a spontaneous 
relation of thought to otherness and difference. Each moment of linkage ought 
to be without conceptual or cognitive predetermination. Speculative thinking 
however, is conceived as presupposing a unity which has all substantive 
difference immanently present within it. Linkage from one phrase to another is 
subsumed under the operations of a result (ResuItät) which is present from the 
beginning of dialectical `equivocation' and `derivation'. The forms and categories 
through which difference is articulated in speculative thought, according to 
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Lyotard's reading, suppress the spontaneity of linkage: otherness has always 
already been taken into the objective development of the self. Thus, The 
Differend presents speculative thinking as utterly metaphysical: the syntheses 
of subject and object which it `effectuates', are representable only because the 
Selbst is postulated prior to the contingency of the event. 
The argument I have developed attempts to show that it is Lyotard's 
misreading of critical philosophy, which lies at the heart of the ethical and 
political aporias constituted in The Differend. The specific claims I have made 
concerning Lyotard's analyses of the Kantian concepts of cognitive experience, 
moral obligation, reflective judgement and the reception of historical progress, 
develop a critique which originates in Hegel's own rejection of metaphysics. The 
first chapter of the thesis therefore, is concerned to refute Lyotard's claim that 
speculative thinking is an abstract method which imposes the dialectical 
substantiation of the Selbst upon the contingency of historical events. My claim 
is that speculative phenomenology's account of the development of self- 
consciousness, grounds the necessity of mediation between subject and object 
(`truth and knowledge') in the historical contradictions of abstract 
understanding. Lyotard's conception of the Selbst as a Resultat presupposed at 
the `beginning' of the Phenomenology, misrepresents the historicity of this 
exposition: absolute self-recognition is consciousness' re-cognition of the finite 
historical `elements' which continue to form and contradict its freedom. 
Lyotard, in developing the ethical significance of his notion of differend, 
attempts to show that the event of `Auschwitz' puts an end to universal 
identity, and the possibility of dialectical sublation. The moments of legislation 
and obligation determined in the racial mythology of Nazism, cannot, on 
Lyotard's reading, contribute to the development of ethical recognition. The 
obligation to which the deportee is subject is simply to die; for the law of the SS 
requires no more o him or her than he or she should cease to exist. The forms of 
law and obligation which determine the Nazi slaughter, are presented in The 
Differend as absolutely heterogeneous elements which can engender no 
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determinate contradiction, or more substantive self-recognition. Following 
Adorno, Lyotard claims that speculative thought is `blocked' at Auschwitz. 
This conception of the Holocaust however, fails to recognize the profoundly 
speculative significance of a `law' which is grounded in the subjective 
idealization of freedom and humanity. The reading of Hegel's account of the 
French Revolution developed in chapter one, shows that Lyotard's attempt to 
distinguish radically the Nazi and Jacobin `terrors'7, is dependent upon his 
misrepresentation of speculative thought as an abstract method. As the most 
violently contradictory `culture' of subjectivity, the abstract materialism of the 
French Enlightenment, constitutes an absolute denial of the `lawless' social 
relations which are its precondition. The self-consciousness produced by the 
French Enlightenment is determined through an absolute opposition to the 
ethical relations which form it. Lyotard's claim that the event of the death 
camps ruptures the metaphysical identity presupposed by speculative thinking, 
is founded upon a misrecognition of Nazism's relationship to the actual social 
relations which produce it. The fundamental determinations of Nazism, that is, 
the lawlessness of ethical life, the reformative vocation of subjectivity and the 
belief in the mythology of the `Aryan' race, produce a `culture' of consciousness 
which results in the dissolution and ultimate destruction of the -state. By taking 
`Auschwitz' as Nazism's uniquely exceptive (destructive) relation to the other, 
Lyotard ignores the disintegrative impact which it has upon the substance of 
the state. The evil of the genocide therefore, must be conceived as part of an 
extreme and deeply contradictory `culture', whose objective necessity is the 
destruction of its own particular ethical life. Nazism can and must be re- 
cognized as a radical deformation of subjectivity, which is grounded in the 
historical development of natural consciousness, and which is retraversed in 
spirit's `reflective'8 self-recognition. 
For Hegel, the `culture' of the French Revolution, produces the `moral 
autonomy' of the will as, a concrete necessity for `natural' consciousness. The 
particularity of this sublation however, does not determine the `distinctiveness', 
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or `specific existence', of the form of alienated spirit preserved in absolute self- 
recognition. In thinking itself through the concrete elements of ethical life, self- 
consciousness returns to the culture of absolute re-formation as a violence 
which is utterly non-ethical. Speculative thinking does not depend upon the 
recognition of new contradictions from the substance of actual states: its 
freedom is the power to determine its existence through `self-recollection' of the 
forms through which it has developed. 
The claim which Lyotard develops in The Differend, that speculative 
phenomenology is metaphysics, depends upon his failure to acknowledge the 
development of the Selbst, as the history of Verstande, that is, of abstract 
understanding. On this reading, difference can only be received as an 
unincorporable, insubstantive negativity - the differend- which occurs 
spontaneously among and between genres of discourse and phrase regimes. 
Lyotard's presentation of the critical philosophy attempts to show that the 
otherness to which Kant's transcendental faculties are originally related, 
discloses the impossibility of including the occurrence within the communicable 
forms and structures of foundationalist thought. The experience of 
`incommensurability'9 which Lyotard abstracts from Kant's transcendental 
arguments, is re-presented in The Difi`erend as disclosing the ethical necessity 
of spontaneous judgement. This re-presentation however, fails to acknowledge 
the lack of mediation which produces the aporetic experience of the critical 
subject. The formal categories through which Kant attempts to articulate the 
necessity of practical and theoretical reason, presuppose an abstract difference 
whose `immediacy' Hegel expounds in its historical construction. The 
immediacy C matter' of intuition, formally free will) which Lyotard presents as 
disclosing the critical subject's sensitivity to difference, is expounded through 
the relation of this subjectivity to the social relations in which it is embedded. 
Hegel's reading of Kant's philosophy of transcendental faculties is grounded in 
a thoroughgoing account of the actuality of difference (i. e. the concrete elements 
of ethical life), and the relationship of subjective self-recognition to the 
substance of that difference. The Differend's presentation of speculative 
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phenomenology as the abstract imposition of a `metaphysical' unity (the Selbst) 
therefore, fails to recognize the historical nature of the contradictions through 
which Hegel articulates the relation of critical subjectivity to ethical life. 
Consciousness' `reflective' self-recognition is a recognition of the necessity and 
insufficiency of Verstande; it is not subjectivity's suppressive satisfaction with 
fixed and unchanging forms of representation. 
It is Hegel and Lyotard's respective expositions of the relationship of 
otherness, or exteriority, to the transcendental subject, which is at stake 
throughout the rest of the thesis. The critique of The Differend which I have 
developed, argues that Lyotard's attempt to articulate ethical, political and 
epistemological necessity in terms of the spontaneity of linkage and judgement, 
is dependent upon his appropriation of fundamentally aporetic moments in the 
critical philosophy. Each of the `Kant notices' through which Lyotard abstracts 
the experience of otherness (heterogeneity) from the critical philosophy, re- 
presents a contradictory form of self-consciousness which is set against the 
substantive necessities of mediation, communication and re-cognition. Thus, 
The Differend develops a metaphysics of `presentation' which posits subjectivity 
as a negative moment opposed to every objective form and institution. 
The first of The Differences `notices' on Kant appears in the section on 
`Presentation'. In this section, Lyotard attempts to show that the phrase is the 
irreducible occurrence of linkage which constantly re-situates thinking in 
relation to the legitimacy of genres of discourse. Presentations are conceived as 
atomistic `universes', or dispositions of addressor, addressee, sense and 
referent, which link onto the current phrase, but which, as `events', remain 
undetermined by it. The indubitability of the phrase is its simple irreducibility: 
being is always presented; is always re-formed through the spontaneity of the 
event. It is this distinction of metalinguistic `representations' of being, from the 
immediate `presentation' of the phrase, which informs Lyotard's notion of 
critical judgement as openness to the infinite possibility of the present. For 
Lyotard therefore, Kant's doctrine of experience begins with the assumption 
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that what can be known of the universe of events, must be reducible to faculties 
of a transcendental subject; and that knowledge as such always involves 
representation, 
Metaphysical illusion consists in treating a presentation like a 
situation ... 
A given is given to a subject who receives it and 
deals with it. To deal with it is to situate it, to place it in a 
phrase universe. We can follow this operation at the beginning 
of the Transcendental Aesthetic. [The Differend, 611 
Kant's account of the necessity of spatio-temporal intuition to experience, is 
presented in The Differend as the ground of a cognitive domination of the 
occurrence. Lyotard's claim is that the `ostensive regime' through which the 
form of outer sense is articulated, constitutes the suppression of two 
heterogeneous `idioms': matter/affection and intuition/ostension. The possibility 
of determinate judgements is conceived as arising through this original 
`situation' of the `given' within the rules of the cognitive genre. It is the primary 
moment of Darstallung, or conjoining, effected in the `Transcendental 
Aesthetic'lo, which is presented as disclosing the homogenizing force of the 
critical subject. For Lyotard, the critical philosophy's conjoining (Darstallung) 
of otherness (`matter') of affection, with the `ostensive' forms of intuition, 
situates the totality of subjective judgements within the cognitive 
(`representation) genre. The otherness which the critical subject receives as the 
`matter' of affection, is always already reduced to the necessity of 
representation. Thus, Lyotard presents the activity of the Kantian faculties as 
a constant play of `juridical' representations, in which the objects presented 
`confront, criticize, aggrieve and disrupt' each other within the subject. The 
aesthetic, the moral, the theoretical all litigate with one another, excluding the 
possibility of phrasing the diflerends which arise from representation. 
The second chapter is concerned specifically with the deployment of Kant in 
The Differend's account of presentation. Lyotard's reading of the 
`Transcendental Aesthetic' as an original negotiation of the occurrence, and his 
subsequent claim that transcendental faculties constantly `litigate' with one 
another, involves an attribution of self-consciousness to critical subjectivity 
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which cannot be substantiated. My argument is that Hegel's exposition of 
`consciousness', set out at the beginning of the Phenomenology, shows that none 
of the subject-object relations presupposed by critical subjectivity are capable of 
producing concrete self-awareness. Lyotard's `juridical' conception of a priori 
faculties, which posits an original judgement of the occurrence as an otherness 
to be incorporated, fails to recognize that the relationship of affection and 
understanding (cognition) excludes such an `ethical' reception of otherness. 
Speculatively conceived, the discursive and intuitive faculties posited in the 
critical philosophy, exclude substantive self-recognition: it is through the 
aporetic structure of phenomenal experience that the actuality of the self, its 
work, satisfaction and desire, is historically constituted. This `juridical' 
conception of the critical subject presupposes an identity of self-consciousness 
with each of the subject's constitutive activities; the immediate occurrence of 
each critical phrase is posited as the necessity of an inner litigation which 
ruptures the unity of representation. It is only by abstracting the faculties of 
the Kantian subject from their actual determination of self-consciousness, that 
Lyotard is able to present the First Critique as a suppression of the absolute 
contingency of linkage onto the occurrence. 
Lyotard's `juridical' reading of transcendental subjectivity fails to recognize 
the significance of Hegel's speculative critique of Kant's epistemology: that the 
negativity of consciousness which emerges from phenomenal experience, can 
only become self-conscious through confirmation in the other. What is 
represented in the forms of master and slave, are the conditions necessary to 
the development of self-consciousness through concrete misrecognition. The 
transitions which Hegel sets out in the Phenomenology, expound the necessity 
of re-cognizing the actual conditions which produce these misrecognitions: thus, 
Lyotard's claim that it is the simple immediacy of the phrase which opens up 
the possibility of ethical judgement, rests upon the abstract proposition of 
`thinking' as undetermined by any necessity other than the contingency of 
linkage. This original spontaneity however, presupposes a form of self- 
consciousness which is constituted in the emergence of bourgeois property 
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relations. The external separation and difference (civil society) through which 
abstract judgements of the other are made possible, is a form which develops 
through the historical mediations of subject and object. The critical subject's 
relation to contingency and difference is not `metaphysical': its synthetic 
activity is part of a development in which the other is ethically mediated in 
each particular will. 
The Differend s remaining three `notices' on Kant, attempt to articulate the 
possibility of `non-metaphysical' ethics, politics and history, `disclosed' in the 
critical philosophy. In the second of these, Lyotard develops a reading of the 
critical morality which argues that the idea of duty, suppresses the original 
freedom which Kant assumes as the formal condition of rational autonomy. 
`Obligation without conditions'il, according to this account, cannot be conceived 
simply as the exclusion of inclination (heteronomous causality); the freedom of 
linkage onto the current phrase can only be sustained through the complete 
absence of `representational' conditions, including the idea of a realm of 
`congruent' human ends. 12 For Lyotard, Kant's assumption of a spontaneous 
`free will' as the undeducible condition of the moral law, immediately forecloses 
on the possibility of such a community. Autonomy is presented in The Differend 
as the absolutely unconditioned moment of judgement which obligates through 
its pure immediacy. The essence of Lyotard's reading of the Second Critique is 
presented in this conception of the absolute discontinuity of `ethical time' and 
serial causality. `Performative causality'13 is immediate resistance to 
homogenization and communicability: for Lyotard there can be no necessary 
production from the ethical phrase, not even the `suprasensible idea' of a realm 
of human ends. `Obligation' to the difference of the other is always received in 
the absence of representational forms and categories. 
The second chapter of the thesis developed the claim that it is the lack of 
unity in the practical and theoretical forms of the critical subject, which reflects 
and sustains the dominance of the subjective particular in social relations. The 
fundamental question arising from Lyotard's transcription of the Second 
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Critique, concerns how the `power' of spontaneous causality, which Kant 
attributes to the purely formal independence of the will, contributes to the 
historical development of consciousness towards self-recognition. The argument 
set out in chapter three, shows that the forms of agency and passivity, through 
which the moral will is expounded in the Phenomenology, constitute aporetic 
relations of concept and object, subjectivity and actuality, which can only 
be 
explicated speculatively. The necessity which emerges from consciousness' 
`moral view of the world'14 constitutes an implicit recognition of the law as 
active mediation of subject and object: critical morality is the form through 
which spontaneous reception of the right, is sublated in the concept of the law. 
It is this sublation which is the historical condition of the logical, ethical and 
political necessity which Hegel expounds through the law of the notion. By 
extending the Phenomenology's critique of abstract self-legislation to 
The 
Differend s idea of obligation, I have argued that Lyotard's idea of spontaneous 
reception of difference is afflicted by the same aporias as Kant's moral will. 
Ethical necessity is presented in The Differend as the sensitivity of thought 
to the silence which `signs' wrong and differend; as the necessity of finding 
`idioms' in which to phrase the unphraseable. This ethical sensitivity of thought 
to the incommensurability of discourses, is suppressed by the normative 
phrase: the spontaneity of linkage onto the present is excluded through the 
constitution of an ethical community in which justice is represented as a 
congruent finality. On this reading, normative phrases, which for Lyotard 
constitute the transcendental illusion of community, impose a sanctioned, legal 
citizenship upon the individualities which are dispersed throughout a plurality 
of heterogeneous discourses. The law as such, is imposed upon individualities 
which are ontologically dispersed, and which, for Lyotard, have the 
responsibility of delegitimizing the law. 
Lyotard's concept of individuality's ethical relation to the law, constitutes a 
`culture' of subjective judgement which is rooted in his reading of Kant's 
attempt to give content to the spontaneity of free will. The Phenomenology's 
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exposition of conscience has shown that the categorical demand of the moral 
law is incapable of building the abstract particular to a community of rational 
ends; and that the guarantor of ethical activity, Kant's transcendental God, 
becomes immediately one with self-conviction. The speculative significance of 
this unity is its reinforcement of abstract separation and difference; a 
reinforcement which is capable of legitimizing any act of use or disposal. The 
critique of subjective morality which Hegel articulates in the Philosophy of 
Right, shows that a volition which acknowledges only its immediate reception 
of the good, lapses into an `irony' which `substitutes a void for the whole content 
of ethics, rights, duties and laws'. 15 Lyotard's attempt to present obligation as a 
spontaneous unity of ethical feeling and its expression therefore, fails to 
recognize Hegel's exposition of the critical subject's negative relation to the law. 
The formal possibility of freedom which Lyotard abstracts from Kant's 
exposition of moral necessity, conditions an idea of a `presuppositionless' 
judgement which is incapable of giving ethical significance to the other. 
The final chapter of my thesis is concerned to show the impossibility of an 
ethical politics based upon the `conceptless' judgement which Lyotard abstracts 
from the Third Critique, and the political essays. The conceptions of politics 
and community which Lyotard develops in The Dif erend's section `Genre, 
Norm', and in his essay `Sensus Communis', are informed by the idea of 
`obligation' which is speculatively criticized in chapter three. `The political' is 
understood by Lyotard as entailed in the possibility of the ethical: the pure 
subjective spontaneity of thinking in relation to established realms of 
legitimacy (genres), is the end, or non-end, of political discourse. The 
fundamental problem with this judgement, I have argued, stems from the lack 
of objectivity which Lyotard privileges in his reading of the critique of 
judgement. By abstracting the non-cognitive, undeterminable, moment of 
aesthetic finality from the body of Kant's Third Critique, and attempting to 
establish its reception as the disclosure of a genuinely `critical' judgement, 
Lyotard forecloses on the possibility of an ethical politics. The exposition of 
judgement set out in the Science of Logic and the Encyclopaedia of The 
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Philosophical Sciences, and the place which this occupies in the development of 
the notion as such, constitutes a profound critique of Kant's subjectivization of 
finality, and a fortiori, Lyotard's notions of politics and community. 
The power of Hegel's reading of the Third Critique, is that it 
does not 
abstractly privilege or exclude either of the forms finality through which 
Kant 
expounds the faculty of judgement. The Differencf s 
`forensic' understanding of 
Kant's critical subjectivity is founded upon exactly this kind of abstraction. 
For 
in trying to rid `critical activity' of its attachment to the goal of unified 
experience, Lyotard externally privileges the aesthetic moment in which 
judgement is based only upon the formal, subjective reception of unity. The 
Critique of Judgement comprises the aesthetic and teleological forms of 
reflective judgement; it expounds the reception of finality in 
both formal and 
theoretical moments. Theoretical cognition of nature as an `object of sense' 
cannot determine a unity of appearances a priori: its constitution of the object 
produces a `boundary' between things-in-themselves and phenomena. 
Judgement is the faculty through which noumenal and phenomenal causality is 
(subjectively) mediated; for it provides a substrate of unity in particular 
empirical laws which, for Kant, is `merely reflective and does not determine 
objects'. 16 It is in the notion of teleology, or nature's thoroughgoing 
purposiveness, that the Third Critique discloses the necessity immanent in 
reflective judgement: that the objects of practical and theoretical reason 
(rational freedom and phenomenal nature) are unreal abstractions which must 
be brought into differentiated identity. 
The fundamental significance of Kant's idea of reflective judgement, is 
expounded in the `Subjective Notion'. 17 The contradiction inherent in each of 
the moments of Hegel's logical exposition of judgement, is the separateness of 
subjectivity and actuality. `Qualitative', `reflective', `necessary' and `notional' 
forms of judgement, are all, as Lyotard maintains of Kant's judgement of taste, 
`only in principle communicable': it is not until the activity of judging is set in 
reality by the syllogism, that subjective thought begins the transition to 
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objectivity, i. e. begins to think itself as constitutive of actuality. 
This 
recognition is realized in the forms of objectivity that are produced 
from the 
development of the syllogism; teleology, the highest of these forms, is the 
category in which the concrete unity of notion and objectivity (the idea as such) 
is made explicitly necessary. 
By expounding the displacement of actuality presented in the critical 
philosophy as the precondition of the notion's negative self-relation, 
Hegel 
discloses the necessity of `thinking' and ethical life which is not assimilated to, 
or reinforcing of, the domination inherent in external separation and difference. 
The Phenomenology has shown how the development of natural consciousness 
is the history of misrecognition, in which difference and identity appear in 
abstract, non-spiritual relations to each other. The idea of judgement set out in 
The Differend presupposes the same lack of mediation which the 
Phenomenology sets out in its exposition of moral consciousness, and which 
Kant attempts to reconcile in the Third Critique. By abstracting the reflective 
judgement of taste from its cognitive preconditions, Lyotard's notion of a 
spontaneous `critical activity' of thought, fixes difference as a pure subjective 
contingency never actual. 
The historical development of subjectivity which Hegel sets out in the 
Phenomenology however, does not impose the metaphysical being of the Selbst 
upon difference and contingency. Absolute knowledge is a `Resultäi only in the 
sense of its being concretely produced and sustained by the aporias of 
misrecognition, and their displacement of self-consciousness' actuality (work, 
satisfaction and desire). For Hegel there is neither a `natural beginning' nor a 
`utopian end' to history; spirit knowing itself is subjectivity's recognition of the 
`elements' in which its relationship to the infinite is both realized and 
unrealizable. In absolute knowledge, the abstract moments through which 
natural consciousness misrecognizes itself, become identical with the 
recognition that the substance of spirit is concrete with its historical 
differentiation. Historical events do not come to an end with this recognition; it 
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is merely that contingency and particularity are re-cognized (judged) in relation 
to the totality of subjective and objective conditions which produce them, that 
is, the actuality of the historical form in which they appear. Substantive ethical 
and political judgements therefore, proceed from the unity of the constitution 
with the difference and particularity which constitute ethical life. The unity 
which Hegel expounds in the Philosophy of Right, is the activity of concrete 
mind, or `substantial will', in relation to the subjective moments in which it is 
both actual and non-actual. The realization of subjective willing in the objective 
freedom of the notion does not suppress the `volition of particular ends'; these 
`ends' constitute the actual particularity and difference through which the 
authority of objective mind is exercised. Absolute knowing, as it is actualized in 
the Rechtstaat, is not the oppressive `being' of a determined and determinate 
authority; it is the infinite activity of spirit cognizing and re-cognizing, judging 
and re judging, its appearance in the substance of ethical life. 
The spontaneity of thought which Lyotard presents in The Differend as 
resistance to representation and communicability, depends upon abstraction of 
the aesthetic from the totality of Kant's exposition of judgement. The critical 
philosophy's separation of autonomy and heteronomy is reinforced by Lyotard's 
positing of the subjective moment of taste (the free play of imagination and 
understanding) as independent of the Third Critique's immanent development 
of finality. However, it is the `Analytic of The Sublime', with its account of the 
aesthetic antinomy of representation and conception, that Lyotard takes as the 
crucial moment of disclosure in Kant's philosophy. For it is here, according to 
The Differend's final `notice'18, that the impossibility of `passages' between 
different genres and phrase regimes is formulated within the terms of 
transcendental idealism. For Lyotard, the experience of incommensurability 
which Kant expounds as the (a priori) ground of sublime affection, is the 
experience of the `unpresentable' as such: the antinomy of reason and 
imagination discloses thinking's political responsibility to its (ontological) 
experience of heterogeneity. I have argued that this subjectivizing account of 
Kant's aesthetic finality, fails to acknowledge the speculative necessity 
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constituted in the idea of negative pleasure; and that the historico-political 
problematic which Lyotard abstracts from the `Analytic of The Sublime', 
constitutes an aporetic opposition of the subject to the formative actuality 
(Sittlichkeit) in and through which it exists. The differentiation which Lyotard 
posits as absolutely heterogeneous and incommensurable, can only 
be truly 
expounded by self-consciousness' misrecognition of its (universal) work, 
desire 
and otherness. 
Lyotard's understanding of the sublime is of an experience of 
incommensurability as such: it is presented in The Differend as disclosing a 
`critical activity' permanently `agitated' by the difference of generic discourses. 
Kant's exposition of the sublime in the Third Critique however, is not an 
original (a priori) reception of incommensurability; it is conditioned by a 
posting of imagination and understanding as abstractly separate. The 
`reflective' reconciliation of subject and object which Kant expounds in his idea 
of the sublime, presupposes the First Critiques positing of understanding and 
sensible affection in a relation of abstract opposition. The Third Critique's 
concept of a sublime vacillation between pleasure in the capacity for ideas, and 
pain at their unrepresentability, is possible only on the presupposition of an 
`experience' produced through the domination of the concept (Verstande) over 
intuition (Vorstellung). The Kantian subject, in its a priori exclusion from the 
content of phenomenal representation, can recognize itself only in its infinite 
failure to represent nature as a self-determining totality. Critical philosophy's 
abstract separation of understanding and intuition forecloses upon the 
possibility of re-cognizing substantive freedom. Thus, the relation of the subject 
to the constitution of objectivity expounded in the `Analytic of The Sublime', is 
the Third Critique's most explicitly aporetic moment: the object, nature as 
totality, is disclosed as thinkable only through mediation of concept and 
intuition, sense and idea, which Kant posits as impossible a priori. The 
empirical reflection through which sensible affections are presented to the 
faculty of ideas, posits an external relation of thinking and actuality: each 
empirical predicate `appears' as part of an infinite series which never discloses 
. ýaý. r 
Conclusion: Metaphysics, Critical Thought, and Speculation 226 
the substance of subjectivity. 
Lyotard's failure to acknowledge the aporetic structure of Kants idea of the 
sublime, and the contradictions entailed in its historico-political significance as 
`enthusiasm', is, I have argued, fundamental to his transcription of political 
judgement as immediate spontaneity. The presupposition of 
Kant's 
philosophical history, that is, the history of 
humanity's `improvement', is his 
conception of aesthetic finality. The critical subject, which the 
First and Second 
Critiques attempt to establish as epistemologically and practically active 
in 
relation to sensible affection, emerges from the `Analytic of The 
Sublime' in a 
state of (ontologically) indeterminate agitation which can find no substantive 
fulfilment. The idea of freedom, in other words, is placed permanently beyond 
representation: for Lyotard it is the immediacy (spontaneity) of 
`linkage' onto 
the current phrase. 
This reading of Kant's idea of the sign of history, fails to recognize the 
abstract separation and difference through which he understands the 
possibility of the social, is itself the precondition of mediation. The Third 
Critique's section on `The ultimate end of nature as a teleological system' 
makes it clear that the `culture of skill' through which reason develops its 
independence from immediate inclination, produced through an antagonism of 
particular ends which must be opposed by a lawful authority centred in a 
whole, called a civil community. 19 The `cosmopolitan whole' which is the object 
of Kant's political judgement however, is thinkable as a `formation' only 
through the abstract separation and difference it presupposes i. e. the reflective 
relations of civil society. The formation of the subject must be acknowledged as 
part of the actuality of the whole (Sittlichkeit); for it is the bourgeois subject's 
abstract individuality which underlies Kant's concept of reflective (non- 
cognitive, conceptless) apprehension of ethical identity. Lyotard's rejection of 
Kant's Begebenheit, i. e. the disinterested enthusiasm of the spectator, as 
`signifying' a finality of ethical and political `congruence', posits the infinite 
vacillation of the sublime as absolutely independent of the concrete national 
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forms into which spirit differentiates itself. The moment of subjective affection, 
which Lyotard conceives as the experience of incommensurability as such, is 
posited as completely independent of the immanent mediation (civil 
community) which Kant's historical enthusiasm presupposes. 
The concept of `generic' knowledges, which Lyotard expounds as the end 
(termination) of homogeneous `community' and the beginning of modern and 
postmodern cultures, is completely abstracted from the social relations which 
produce the necessity for specialized forms of knowledge. The needs through 
which these knowledges are constituted are specifically social; they develop 
through a `division of concrete need into single parts and aspects which in turn 
become different needs, particularized and more abstract'. 20 This 
differentiation of material into `abstract' need, is the precondition of the 
philosophical, scientific, and technical knowledges which constitute the finitude 
of the ethical idea: it is not until the subject emerges as reflectively aware of its 
abstract wants, desires and satisfactions (i. e. as bourgeois), that the formation 
of these elements is possible. The specialized knowledges which, for Lyotard, 
mark the end of the `social "body"' as a unifying, homogeneous time, cannot 
function to disperse the subject into an indeterminate, incommunicable form 
(sensus) accompanying each contingent act of judgement. The knowledges 
constituted through the self-seeking of the subjective particular, ' are made 
possible by the transition to the bourgeois property form: `need', which has 
ceased to be exclusively determined by nature, is mediated by the formative 
activities of those involved in the complex of productive relations. 
The abstract (moral, epistemological, technical, etc. ) cognitions which 
develop the universality immanent in pure self-seeking, presuppose the 
separation and difference of relative ethical life. They are forms of Verstande 
which posit difference as pure identity: each element is in principle estranged 
from the unity of the whole. As such, these knowledges are concrete with civil 
society's development of desire and satisfaction; they reflect and reinforce the 
subjective self-seeking through which need is abstractly taken into the totality 
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(Sittlichkeit). The `generic' knowledges which Lyotard claims are 
incommensurable, produce a universal development of subjectivity which 
cannot be encompassed within the terms of abstract separation and difference. 
As the `actuality of the ethical idea'21 the state is the unity of the elements of 
knowing sustained in ethical life. Work, satisfaction and desire, are the 
actuality realized in, and presupposed by, self-consciousness' abstract 
appropriations of objectivity; they are the finitude through which individual 
subjectivity recognizes itself in the being of the state. 
Political judgement therefore, cannot be abstracted from the formative laws 
and institutions of ethical life. Within a state whose mediation of subjectivity is 
the principle of its institutional forms, political activity is an infinite 
reactualization of the `ethical idea'. The discrete knowledges which are 
constituted through the separation and difference of civil society, are re- 
cognized in the state as finite forms of subjectivity which must be mediated 
with universal (spiritual) identity. The political activity of the state is always 
deliberation upon its own finitude (positedness). The contingency of knowing 
and willing produced in civil society is not excluded from the mediation of 
spirit; it is re-cognized and reintegrated into its substance. This inner, self- 
transparent unity confers the right and responsibility of judging the other, less 
mediated states, upon those whose constitutions embody the principle of finite 
subjectivity. Particular forms of Sittlichkeit, although they are finite and 
cannot know the truth of their relation to the absolute, are related to each 
other as more or less adequate re-cognitions of the ethical idea. Thus it is the 
right and responsibility of those nations with established rational 
constitutions22 to judge those whose constitutions are less developed, or which 
have become ethically or politically deformed. 
The event of `Auschwitz', which Lyotard insists cannot be thought 
speculatively, must be judged in terms of the actual historical formation in 
which self-consciousness became radically estranged. Lyotard's critique of 
speculative thinking presupposes that Hegel's method of historical exposition 
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constitutes an abstract set of rules through which contingent events are 
homogenized and represented as necessary. Each historical form produces its 
own `new' sublation, and thereby participates in the realization of spirit. 
This is 
a complete misrecognition and misrepresentation of 
Hegel's concept of 
speculative exposition. Each historical moment is spiritual only 
insofar as it is 
actual (finite); its content can be judged only in relation to the universality of 
the work, satisfaction and desire recognized and sustained 
by natural 
consciousness itself. The aporias of finite misrecognition always afflict the 
state; and it is this finitude which is the object of political judgements. 
It is only 
through the recognition and mediation of its own finitude that a state has the 
right and power to judge the ethical and political constitution of another state. 
Speculative politics is non-metaphysical precisely because it does not forget 
the aporias and contradictions through which `reflective' self-recognition is 
accomplished. Spirit never reaches the point at which its cognitions are 
immediate, or `intuitive', representations of truth; for the finite elements of 
Sittlichkeit (law, constitution, work, satisfaction and desire) are always 
inadequate to realize its substance. The `otherness' which is constituted 
through the history of natural consciousness, is re-cognized, or recollected, in 
those states which acknowledge their own essential finitude: spirit is the 
demand that particular national forms accept the guilt of their finitude, or 
necessary contradiction of the absolute. The substance of political judgement, 
in other words, is substantive difference; it is the recognition of the otherness 
constituted through the abstract reductivism of Verstande. 
This conception of recollection and re-cognition of otherness in its relation to 
the universal, constitutes the necessity to which political judgement as such, is 
responsible. The politicization of the sublime, which Lyotard expounds in The 
Differend, attempts to show that Kant's concept of reflective judgement 
discloses an absolute negativity of thinking in relation to all `representational' 
discourses. This negativity is presented as the `delegitimization'23 of every 
established form which it encounters; it is the immediate reception of difference 
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as pure `unrepresentability'. Nothing, in other words, is recollected by this 
political activity: otherness has no substantive being for judgement, and 
remains fixed within the `unconscious' affection24 of subjective particularity. 
That for Lyotard the necessity of thinking's `humorous'25 relation to the law, 
can survive despite the infinite responsibility of phrasing the evil perpetrated 
at Auschwitz, discloses the ethical bankruptcy of his concept of the political. 
Only by thinking spirit's violence against itself through its universal 
determinations, is judgement political, that is, related to the present through a 
historical re-cognition of difference and otherness. 
-q 
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Notes 
1. Peregrinations: Law, Form, Event, 15. 
2. The Differend, ¶124. 
3. Ibid., 91126. 
4. See The Differend, 123. 
5. See Kant's Critique of Teleological Judgement, 183. 
6. The Differend, 97. 
7. Ibid., 1158 and ¶159. 
8. See the Phenomenologjs section on `Absolute Knowledge'. 
9. The Differend, 165-167. 
10. Critique of Pure Reason, 65-82. 
11. The Differend, ¶174. 
12. Just Gaming, 94. 
13. The Differend, 120-123. 
14. Phenomenology of Mind, 615-627. 
15. Philosophy of Right, note to 1140. 
Conclusion: Notes 232 
16. Critique ofJudgement, introduction. 
17. Science of Logic, 599-661. 
18. The Differend, 161-171. 
19. Critique of Judgement, 97. 
20. Philosophy of Right, ¶196-7198. 
21. Ibid., 1257. 
22. Ibid., ¶351. 
23. The Differend, 209. 
24. Heidegger and "the jews", section 4. 
25. The Differend, 1183. 
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